Schleiermacher\u27s Doctrine of Biblical Authority: An Alternative to Content-Based/Supernaturalist and Function-Based Rationalist Models by Holton, Kerry W.
University of Denver 
Digital Commons @ DU 
Electronic Theses and Dissertations Graduate Studies 
1-1-2015 
Schleiermacher's Doctrine of Biblical Authority: An Alternative to 
Content-Based/Supernaturalist and Function-Based Rationalist 
Models 
Kerry W. Holton 
University of Denver 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.du.edu/etd 
 Part of the Religious Thought, Theology and Philosophy of Religion Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Holton, Kerry W., "Schleiermacher's Doctrine of Biblical Authority: An Alternative to Content-Based/
Supernaturalist and Function-Based Rationalist Models" (2015). Electronic Theses and Dissertations. 
1031. 
https://digitalcommons.du.edu/etd/1031 
This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate Studies at Digital Commons @ DU. It 
has been accepted for inclusion in Electronic Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Digital 
Commons @ DU. For more information, please contact jennifer.cox@du.edu,dig-commons@du.edu. 
SCHLEIERMACHER’S DOCTRINE OF BIBLICAL AUTHORITY:  
AN ALTERNATIVE TO CONTENT-BASED/SUPERNATURALIST AND FUNCTION-
BASED/RATIONALIST MODELS 
__________ 
A Dissertation 
Presented to 
the Faculty of the University of Denver and the Iliff School of Theology Joint PhD 
Program 
University of Denver 
__________ 
In Partial Fulfillment 
of the Requirements for the Degree 
Doctor of Philosophy 
__________ 
by 
Kerry W. Holton 
August 2015 
Advisor: Theodore M. Vial, Jr.  
Author: Kerry W. Holton 
Title: SCHLEIERMACHER’S DOCTRINE OF BIBLICAL AUTHORITY: AN 
ALTERNATIVE TO CONTENT-BASED/SUPERNATURALIST AND FUNCTION-
BASED/RATIONALIST MODELS 
Advisor: Theodore M. Vial, Jr. 
Degree Date: August 2015 
Abstract 
 This dissertation examines Friedrich Schleiermacher’s understanding of biblical 
authority and argues that, as an alternative to strictly supernaturalistic and rationalistic 
models, his understanding allows the New Testament to speak authoritatively in Christian 
religion in an age of critical, historical awareness.  After classifying Schleiermacher’s 
position in a typology of the doctrine of biblical authority, this dissertation explores his 
conception of divine revelation and inspiration vis-à-vis scripture.  It demonstrates that 
although he did not believe there is warrant for the claim of a direct connection between 
divine revelation and scripture, or that scripture is the foundation of faith, he nonetheless 
asserted that the New Testament is authoritative.  He asserted the normative authority of 
the New Testament on the basis that it is the first presentation of Christian faith.  This 
dissertation examines Schleiermacher’s “canon within the canon,” as well as his denial 
that the Old Testament shares the same normative worth and inspiration of the New.  
Although this dissertation finds difficulty with some of Schleiermacher’s views regarding 
the Old Testament, it names two significant strengths of what is identified as his 
evangelical, content-based, and rationalist approach to biblical authority.  First, it 
recognizes and values the co-presence and co-activity of the supernatural and the natural 
 !ii
in the production of the New Testament canon.  This allows both scripture and the church 
to share religious authority.  Second, it allows Christian faith and the historical-method to 
coexist, as it does not require people to contradict what they know to be the case about 
science, history, and philosophy.  Thus, this dissertation asserts that Schleiermacher’s 
understanding of biblical authority is a robust one, since, for him, the authority of 
scripture does not lie in some property of the texts themselves that historians or 
unbelievers can take away. 
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Chapter One: Introduction 
The Erosion of Biblical Authority 
 Edward Farley and Peter C. Hodgson began a chapter on the nature, authority, and 
function of the Bible in Christian theology with these undeniable assertions:  
Until recently, almost the entire spectrum of theological opinion would have 
agreed that the scriptures of the Old and New Testaments, together with their 
doctrinal interpretations, occupy a unique and indispensable place of authority for 
Christian faith, practice, and reflection.  But this consensus now seems to be 
falling apart.    1
Indeed, the collapse of biblical authority since the Enlightenment is well-attested.  2
    
 What explains the erosion of biblical authority?  Several reasons have been 
offered,  but certainly one of the primary causes is the advent of historical criticism in the 3
seventeenth century.  Also known as the historical-critical method, a method that became 
the dominant approach in the study of the Bible from the mid-nineteenth century until a 
 Edward Farley and Peter C. Hodgson, “Scripture and Tradition,” in Christian Theology: An Introduction 1
to Its Traditions and Tasks, rev. ed., ed. Peter C. Hodgson and Robert H. King (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress 
Press, 1994), 61.
 Donald G. Bloesch, Holy Scripture: Revelation, Inspiration & Interpretation, Christian Foundations 2
(Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity, 1994), 30-33; Edward Farley and Peter C. Hodgson, “Scripture and 
Tradition,” 61, 72-77; Roy A. Harrisville and Walter Sundberg, The Bible in Modern Culture: Baruch 
Spinoza to Brevard Childs, 2nd ed. (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans, 2002), 10-13; Roy A. 
Harrisville, “The Loss of Biblical Authority and Its Recovery,” in Reclaiming the Bible for the Church, ed. 
Carl E. Braaten and Robert W. Jenson (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans, 1995), 47-48; Gordon D. 
Kaufman, “What Shall We Do with the Bible?” Interpretation 25, no. 1 (January 1971): 96.
 Robin Scroggs, for example, identifies these reasons: biblical ethics are said to be no longer suitable for 3
contemporary society; the theological claims of the Bible have been judged to be inadequate and outmoded; 
biblical scholarship, influenced by history-of-religions approaches, has questioned the uniqueness of 
biblical writings as compared with other ancient texts; and, liberation theologies have raised disturbing 
questions concerning the apparent patriarchal and sexist ideologies in the biblical text.  Robin Scroggs, 
“The Bible as Foundational Document,” Interpretation 49, no. 1 (January 1995): 17-19.
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generation ago, historical criticism “seeks to answer a basic question: to what historical 
circumstances does this text refer, and out of what historical circumstances did it 
emerge?”  4
 The historical-critical method has shed much light on many areas of vital 
importance to Christian thought.  Nevertheless, some have asserted that it has also 
fostered a rationalistic skepticism of the biblical text.   One way it did so was to question 5
the historical nature of the text.   Is the Bible historically accurate?  Not exactly, said 6
many historical critics.   They asserted further, that biblical texts were never intended to 7
be historical documents.  Rather, such texts are only expressions of faith narrowly 
defined, sometimes couched in myth, and bearing historical inaccuracies of various 
 Richard E. Burnett, “Historical Criticism,” in Dictionary for Theological Interpretation of the Bible, ed. 4
Kevin J. Vanhoozer (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2005), 290.  For the features normally said to be 
central to historical-critical study of the Bible, cf., John Barton, “Historical-Critical Approaches,” in The 
Cambridge Companion to Biblical Interpretation, ed. John Barton (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1998), 9-12.
 N.T. Wright, The Last Word: Beyond the Bible Wars to a New Understanding of the Authority of Scripture 5
(San Francisco: HarperCollins, 2005), 82.  Wright claims that the Enlightenment made Reason the arbiter 
of religious and theological claims, that it renounced the authority of the church and the Bible, and that it 
avowed faith in the authority of nature and reason.
 Regarding challenges to the Bible, Rowan A. Greer claims that both history and nature have been enemies 6
of the Bible since the eighteenth century.  He suggests that nature was the preoccupation of the eighteenth 
century and history in the nineteenth century.  See Rowan A. Greer, Anglican Approaches to Scripture: 
From the Reformation to the Present (New York: The Crossroad Publishing Company, 2006), 62.  Van A. 
Harvey addresses the problem historical inquiry raises for Christian belief and documents the shift from 
Christianity’s will to belief to the Enlightenment’s will to truth in The Historian and the Believer: The 
Morality of Historical Knowledge and Christian Belief (Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 1996; 
repr., New York: Macmillan, 1966), 3-37.  Harvey’s book is a classic discussion of the conflict between the 
morality of historical knowledge and traditional Christian belief.  Cf., e.g., 102-126.
 That the text of the Bible reported accurately the events it describes was already seriously questioned by 7
the early nineteenth century, popularized by the then sensationalist findings of David Friedrich Strauss.  Cf. 
e.g., W.G. Kümmel, The New Testament: The History of the Investigation of Its Problems (Nashville, TN: 
Abingdon Press, 1972), 120-205.  For more on the post-Enlightenment challenge of history to biblical 
authority, see Greer, Anglican Approaches to Scripture: From the Reformation to the Present, 112-39.
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sorts.   Before the Enlightenment, biblical interpretation tended to read the Gospels as 8
“realistic narratives.”   The “literal sense” of the biblical narratives and “historical 9
reference” were identical.  But the rise of modern historical criticism meant that now 
there were two worlds: biblical history and actual history.  10
 The rationalistic skepticism of the Enlightenment also challenged the Bible as 
revelation.  During the Protestant Reformation, the Bible was generally seen to be 
authoritative because it was considered to be an inspired collection of writings that 
originated from God.  In contrast, chiefly by virtue of Enlightenment inquiry, for many, 
scripture came to be seen primarily as a human document.  Claims about a verbally 
inspired text came into question with the rise of textual and source criticism.  Doubts 
were cast upon the Bible’s origins, authorship, and validity.  Consequently, many 
concluded that the Bible is not a unique deposit of revelation, the special qualities of 
which would be due to its inspired origins. 
 Those who are skeptical of the Bible’s historicity and deny that it contains 
specific revelatory content may be broadly identified as post-Enlightenment rationalists.   11
 Cf. e.g., Rudolf Bultmann, Kerygma and Myth, rev.ed., ed. Hans Werner Bartsch (New York: Harper & 8
Row, 1961).
 Hans W. Frei surveys the ways in which biblical narrative has been read and understood from Luther to 9
Strauss and traces the change that took place in biblical hermeneutics during the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries, leading to a loss of the sense of realism in reading the biblical text, in The Eclipse of Biblical 
Narrative: A Study in Eighteenth and Nineteenth Century Hermeneutics (New Haven, CT: Yale University 
Press, 1974).
 Daniel J. Treier, “Scripture and Hermeneutics,” in Mapping Modern Theology: A Thematic and 10
Historical Introduction, ed. Kelly M. Kapic and Bruce L. McCormack (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker 
Academic, 2012), 72.
 For a more comprehensive description of this and the following group, cf. Wright, The Last Word: 11
Beyond the Bible Wars to a New Understanding of the Authority of Scripture, 3-6.
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Generally, they tend to deny biblical authority altogether or identify the locus of that 
authority in how scripture functions in the life of the church.   In contrast, those who 12
defend the doctrine of biblical authority based on their belief in the Bible’s historicity and 
divine origin may be broadly identified as anti-Enlightenment supernaturalists.  
Generally, they tend to identify the locus of biblical authority in some property of the 
texts themselves, that is, in the content, rather than in the function, of Christian scripture.    
 Both function-based rationalists and content-based supernaturalists are open to 
challenge on various grounds.  It is unclear, for example, upon what basis function-based 
rationalists who fully embrace historical criticism, but who still read the Bible with the 
expectation that it speaks authoritatively, can assign more authority to biblical books than 
to any other books if there are no distinctive properties of the biblical texts that set them 
apart from other texts.   Also, if the historical reliability of the biblical narratives cannot 13
be trusted,  upon what basis could one expect them to have the power to “occasion new 14
occurrences of revelation” or to be useful to the Christian community in other ways? 
 Content-based supernaturalists seem open to the challenge that they fail to take 
seriously what seems to be the historical nature of much of the biblical text.  The inherent 
danger of this failure is that without critical, historical inquiry there is no check on 
 Cf. e.g., David H. Kelsey, The Uses of Scripture in Recent Theology (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1975).12
 E.g., “Why should one prefer, say, Leviticus to Dante’s Inferno, or Jude to Thomas à Kempis’s Imitation 13
of Christ?  Yet, proponents of the liberal view of the Bible rarely suggest in any serious way that such later, 
or even earlier, writings be used in public worship in place of Holy Writ.”  Paul J. Achtemeier, Inspiration 
and Authority: Nature and Function of Christian Scripture (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 1999), 35.
 Of course, most would agree that it might be overly-optimistic to think that we could get back to “what 14
actually happened,” arriving at “objective” historical truth.
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Christianity’s propensity to remake Jesus, never mind the Christian god, in its own 
image.   Furthermore, it is unclear how Christian scripture can be regarded as a unique 15
deposit of divine revelation when the biblical texts also contain factual errors, 
discrepancies, and contradictions.    16
 If neither function-based rationalists nor content-based supernaturalists are able to 
present a convincing case for biblical authority, can the Bible speak authoritatively in 
Christian religion in an age of critical, historical awareness?  And if so, how?  These are 
the overarching questions this dissertation answers. 
Schleiermacher’s Alternative Model of Biblical Authority 
 This study argues that there is an alternative to strictly rationalistic and 
supernaturalistic models of biblical authority, an alternative which successfully makes the 
case for that authority.  Friedrich Schleiermacher, nineteenth-century philosopher, 
theologian, and biblical critic, provides us with a third way of understanding biblical 
authority that has significant advantages to models which are strictly function- or content-
based.    17
 N.T. Wright, The New Testament and the People of God (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1992), 10.15
 See Achtemeier, Inspiration and Authority, 45-61.16
 I argue in this dissertation that Schleiermacher’s model of biblical authority is neither strictly nor 17
absolutely content- or function-based.  For him, it is the event that Jesus represents that has authority.  
However, because Schleiermacher understands the New Testament to be somewhat of a record or 
interpretation of that event, one may legitimately argue that in some sense, he does locate some authority in 
the content of scripture, although not because it contains divine revelation.  His claim, however, is that 
whatever authority resides within the text is that of the event of Jesus’ conscious relationship with God, 
which occurred, of course, before there was any text or church.  One of Schleiermacher’s strongest 
arguments, in my opinion, is that the earliest disciples of Jesus became Christians before there was a New 
Testament.
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 Chapter Two presents a typology of biblical authority and places Schleiermacher’s 
viewpoint on this map.  I broadly classify models of biblical authority as either content- 
or function-based and offer a description of each.  Content-based theories view scripture 
as authoritative by virtue of a content that is in some sense divinely disclosed.  Function-
based theories derive biblical authority from the way scripture is used in the life of the 
Christian community.  Then, I briefly explain Schleiermacher’s third way, which I 
broadly identify as evangelical, since its focus and center is what God did in Christ the 
Redeemer.  
 Chapter Three examines Schleiermacher’s doctrine of revelation.  I show that 
although he has a robust understanding of divine revelation, he does not believe there is 
warrant for the claim of a direct connection between divine revelation and the Bible.  
Also, I take a look at the core criticism of Schleiermacher’s position: it does not allow for 
a knowledge of God.  Then, I conclude the chapter by responding to this fundamental 
criticism. 
 In Chapter Four, I analyze his understanding of the meaning of “inspiration.”  
Again, I demonstrate that although he believes in divine inspiration, this does not mean 
that he views the Bible as a deposit of divinely-revealed truths.  Rather, for him, the locus 
of inspiration is the authors of scripture, not their words, and the agent of inspiration is 
the common spirit of the church. 
 Chapter Five introduces Schleiermacher’s understanding of what makes scripture 
authoritative: it is the first recorded expression of Christian faith.  For him, the New 
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Testament is composed of reports of the experience of redemption in Christ and of the 
revelation of Jesus’ perfect God-consciousness.  As such, Schleiermacher considered 
those reports to be the original interpretation of Jesus’ consciousness of God,  an 
interpretation which was embodied in Christ’s words and deeds.  The authority of 
scripture for Schleiermacher, then, lies not in some property of the texts themselves, nor 
strictly in the way scripture functions in the Christian community, but rather in our faith 
that through them and in the community of faith we meet Christ.   Also in this chapter, I 18
lay out the principal criticism of his understanding of biblical authority, that it rejects 
scripture as the foundation of Christian faith.  Then, after a close examination of one of 
his sermons, I trace out his response to this criticism and the reasoning which underlies it. 
 Chapter Six continues the investigation into Schleiermacher’s conception of 
scripture’s authority by examining what he believed regarding the normative character of 
scripture.  I identify his “canon within the canon,” and why he ascribed normative 
authority to some parts of scripture over other parts.  Also, I lay out his controversial 
claim that the Old Testament does not share the normative worth and inspiration of the 
New. 
 Schleiermacher’s assumption, fundamental to his entire dogmatic project, Christian Faith, is that 18
Christian faith is always and everywhere brought about in the same way, namely, by the personal impact of 
Christ on persons of faith.  See Friedrich Schleiermacher, Christian Faith, trans. Terrence N. Tice, 
Catherine L. Kelsey, and Edwina Lawler, ed. Terrence N. Tice (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox 
Press, forthcoming), §127.2, §14.1.  For the apostles, this impact was direct, while for us it is mediated. 
Also, faith in Christ, for Schleiermacher, is rooted in community experience.  That is where one is 
confronted with Christ.  Terrence N. Tice, Schleiermacher (Nashville, TN: Abingdon Press, 2006), 28, 
37-38.
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 In Chapter Seven, I review his doctrine of biblical authority, respond to his view 
of the Old Testament, and discuss what I see as two major strengths of his conception of 
biblical authority. 
 The focus of this study, then, is a careful analysis and evaluation of 
Schleiermacher’s understanding of the nature, function, and authority of Christian 
scripture.  The primary source for this inquiry is his systematic theology, found in 
Christian Faith.  His theology on the doctrine of scripture may be found there, in 
§§127-132.  Other primary sources upon which I rely heavily are Brief Outline of 
Theology as a Field of Study, On Religion: Addresses in Response to Its Cultured Critics, 
and On the Glaubenslehre: Two Letters to Dr. Lücke, as well as many of 
Schleiermacher’s published sermons. 
Significance of This Study 
 The significance of this research is two-fold.  First, it makes a contribution to the 
field of Schleiermacher studies, especially to those studies that relate to his understanding 
of the doctrines of scripture and biblical authority.  In reference to these subjects, Dawn 
DeVries notes that although Schleiermacher works out a sophisticated doctrine of 
scripture in several of his writings, and although he himself lectured more frequently on 
the New Testament than on dogmatics, little attention has been given by biblical scholars 
and theologians to his observations on scripture.  19
 Dawn DeVries, “Rethinking the Scripture Principle: Friedrich Schleiermacher and the Role of the Bible 19
in the Church,” in Reformed Theology: Identity and Ecumenicity, ed. Wallace Alston, Jr. and Michael 
Welker (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2003), 296.
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 Second, this research contributes to a better understanding of the nature of 
scripture and biblical authority in Protestantism and Evangelicalism.  Earlier, I noted that 
even though some believe that “the house of biblical authority has collapsed,” many still 
try to live in it.  This research, then, contributes to the ongoing Evangelical conversation 
regarding biblical authority and its role in theological method, a significant 
methodological issue still debated within Evangelicalism today.   For many who 20
doggedly continue to look to scripture as an authority in Christian religion and who 
continue to give scripture a central role in the church, this study provides valid reasons 
for doing so. 
 What this study demonstrates is that it is possible for Christians to maintain a 
robust doctrine of biblical authority without requiring them to contradict what they know 
about science, history, and philosophy.  Accordingly, I am convinced that critical 
reflection on Schleiermacher’s conception of the authority of scripture has the potential to 
affirm and clarify its nature and central role in Christian religion today.  
 For more information on the ongoing debate on the issue of biblical authority in Evangelicalism, see 20
Alister E. McGrath, “Evangelical Theological Method: The State of the Art,” in Evangelical Futures: A 
Conversation on Theological Method, ed. John G. Stackhouse, Jr. (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Books, 2000), 
28.
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Chapter Two: Mapping the Doctrine of Biblical Authority 
 The thesis of this dissertation is that Schleiermacher provides us with a third way 
of understanding the doctrine of biblical authority, which has significant advantages over 
content-based/supernaturalist and function-based/rationalist models.  Before I delve into a 
closer examination of this “third way,” however, I think the sensible move is to consider 
in some small measure an aerial view of the field.  The purpose of this chapter, then, is to 
introduce a conceptual framework of the range of views on the doctrine of biblical 
authority and then to locate Schleiermacher in this framework.  
 Because of the variety and complexity of the proposals defended on this subject 
from the Enlightenment to the present day, to synthesize and do justice to them in one 
brief chapter would be a formidable task and one which I will not undertake.  So, in no 
way will this be an exhaustive examination of any or all views of biblical authority.  My 
modest aim in this chapter is merely to explain a meaningful typology and illustrate the 
content of those categories by offering an example of the type of theories which belong 
there.  Although I will refer to a handful of theologians and their conceptions of the 
authority of scripture, my primary focus will be upon one theologian in each class.  I will 
use that theologian’s understanding of the authority of scripture to describe each category.  
I have chosen Kevin Vanhoozer’s viewpoint to depict the content-based/supernaturalist 
model and David H. Kelsey’s to describe the function-based/rationalist category.  I will 
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close the chapter with a classification of and brief introduction to Schleiermacher’s 
alternative position. 
 The conceptual structure of the map of biblical authority models in this chapter is 
my own contrivance, but in its design I have often referred to and leaned heavily upon the 
typologies of others.   I am suggesting that one way to classify most views on this subject 1
is to categorize them as either content- or function-based, and I am delineating them in 
three ways.  First, this classification differentiates theories based on their locus of 
authority.  Content-based approaches tend to identify the locus of authority in some 
 See the following sources for discussions of some of the more commonly-known systematic 1
classifications of biblical authority: Robert Gnuse, The Authority of the Bible: Theories of Inspiration 
Revelation and the Canon of Scripture (New York: Paulist Press, 1985).  Gnuse groups theories of biblical 
authority into five categories: 1) Inspiration—Theologians in this camp affirm the priority of the divine 
authorship of the Bible and assert that it is authoritative because of its inspired, revelatory content; 2) 
Salvation history—Theories in this category view the Bible as an account of salvific events rather than as a 
repository of ideational or propositional content.  The source of authority may be the salvific events, the 
interpretation of the events by biblical theologians, or history itself as the revelation of God; 3) 
Existentialism—Theories of biblical authority in this category shy away from the notion that inspiration is a 
quality of the text, but rather see in the text an occasion for a divine-human encounter.  Here, the locus of 
authority is the modern existential situation; 4) Christocentrism—In models in this category, a selected 
norm is taken from part of the biblical text, or a crucial theological concept in the text serves as a norm to 
interpret the rest of the Bible.  Usually, these models favor the Christ event, the gospel, or the kerygma as 
the locus of authority; 5) Limited authority—Gnuse places theories in this category that tend to view 
scripture as authoritative because of what scripture does for the church, rather than because of what it is; 
David H. Kelsey, Proving Doctrine: The Uses of Scripture in Modern Theology (Harrisburg, PA: Trinity 
Press International, 1999).  Although his work is technically an analysis of how theologians construe the 
scripture they actually use to help them authorize theological proposals, I believe it may also serve as 
somewhat of a systematic classification of biblical authority theories.  Here are Kelsey’s categories: 1) 
Scripture may be construed as containing inspired, inerrant doctrine; 2) It may be construed as containing 
distinctive concepts; 3) Scripture may be construed as the recital of salvation history; 4) Scripture may 
produce or foster an encounter with Christ; 5) It mediates a new revelatory occurrence by the poetic images 
of scripture, religious symbols, and/or kerygmatic statements; Markus Barth, “Sola Scriptura,” in Scripture 
and Ecumenism, vol. 3 of Duquesne Studies Theological Studies, ed. Leonard Swidler (Pittsburgh, PA: 
Duquesne, 1965), 86-92; David Bartlett, The Shape of Scriptural Authority (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 
1983).  Bartlett’s work evaluates the authority behind various types of literature found in the Bible; Paul J. 
Achtemeier, Inspiration and Authority: Nature and Function of Christian Scripture (Grand Rapids, MI: 
Baker Academic, 1999); and, Avery Dulles, “Scripture: Recent Protestant and Catholic Views,” in The 
Authoritative Word: Essays on the Nature of Scripture, ed. Donald K. McKim (Eugene, OR: Wipf and 
Stock Publishers, 1983), 239-261.
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property of the biblical texts themselves, whereas function-based approaches recognize 
that locus in how scripture functions in the life of the church.   
 Second, another way to describe the difference between content- and function-
based conceptions of biblical authority is to ask where authority is concentrated.  For 
example, is religious authority to be found in the canon or the church?  This is a key 
question that continues to be discussed in theology to the present day.  Admittedly, this is 
a false dichotomy to some extent, since the church decided which Christian writings 
merited canonical standing.  Thus, one could argue that there is a sense in which the 
church has ultimate authority over the canon.  (I will show how this is both true, albeit 
not the full truth for Schleiermacher, in Chapter Seven.)  That said, content-based theories 
tend to place religious authority in scripture.  Function-based approaches are apt to 
identify the church as having overriding authority. 
 Third, I am identifying content-based models as supernaturalist and function-
based models as rationalist.  I am defining a supernaturalist understanding of biblical 
authority as one which asserts that the production of scripture is due primarily, if not 
entirely, to divine agency.  We may identify this view of scripture as the traditional view; 
it tends to see the Bible as a divinely-inspired source of revealed truths.  Supernaturalists, 
then, tend to insist upon an identical relationship between divine revelation and the Bible.  
Conversely, I am defining a rationalist understanding of biblical authority as one in which 
rational reasoning and critical inquiry reign.  It tends to subjugate scripture to the claims 
of reason, the result of which is that biblical writings are viewed as human documents.  
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Now, let us turn to a description of theories that fall into the content-based/supernaturalist 
class. 
Content-Based/Supernaturalist Approaches to Biblical Authority 
 In this inquiry I am defining content-based/supernaturalist models as those that 
view scripture as authoritative by virtue of a content that is in some sense identical with 
divine revelation.  Proponents of these models tend to argue that scripture contains 
divinely-disclosed revelatory content and that, consequently, its underlying source of 
authority lies in a certain property or characteristic of the biblical text itself.  For 
example, content-based models include those theories that construe scripture as 
containing inspired, inerrant doctrine, distinctive concepts, or as the recital of certain 
notable acts of God in history.  2
 I have chosen Kevin Vanhoozer’s theology of biblical authority to serve as an 
illustration of the content-based/supernaturalist model.   Vanhoozer asserts the authority 3
of the canon over the community of faith when he writes that “[i]f Scripture enjoys final 
authority . . . it is because authority finally resides in the divinely authorized and 
 These are the initial categories that David Kelsey identifies in his typology.  The representatives he selects 2
to exemplify these approaches are B. B. Warfield (scripture construed as inerrant doctrine), Hans Werner 
Bartsch (scripture as containing distinctive concepts), and G. Ernest Wright (scripture as the recital of 
historical events as the acts of God).  See David H. Kelsey, Proving Doctrine: The Uses of Scripture in 
Modern Theology (Harrisburg, PA: Trinity Press International, 1999), 14-55.
 Vanhoozer is Research Professor of Systematic Theology at Trinity Evangelical Divinity School.  He is 3
the editor of The Cambridge Companion to Postmodern Theology and The Dictionary for Theological 
Interpretation of the Bible.  He is also the author of The Drama of Doctrine: A Canonical-Linguistic 
Approach to Christian Theology and Faith Speaking Understanding: Performing the Drama of Doctrine.
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appropriated discourse of the canon.”   Here, he not only affirms his belief in the 4
authority of scripture, but also acknowledges a reason for it: the canon is “divinely 
authorized.” 
 He ties that authority to scripture’s content.  For Vanhoozer, the biblical texts 
narrate and explain God’s story—what God began in the history of Israel and 
completed in the history of Jesus Christ—which is also the story of humanity.  
Scripture is a polyphonic testimony to what God has done, is doing, and will do 
in Christ for the salvation of the world.    5
Similarly, he suggests: “Scripture is Christ’s own witness to himself via the 
commissioned agency of the prophets and apostles who authored it in the power of the 
Holy Spirit.”   He asserts that scripture is divine revelation, but he believes it is more:  6
“Scripture is holy not simply because its content is revealed or because God on occasion 
uses its content to make himself known.  Rather, it is holy because it is part of God’s 
broader plan to give access to himself through Jesus Christ.”  7
   
 Kevin J. Vanhoozer, The Drama of Doctrine: A Canonical-Linguistic Approach to Christian Theology 4
(Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox Press, 2005), 166.  Vanhoozer claims that a properly theological 
account of scripture begins from the premise that God is a communicative agent, able to use language for 
communicative purposes.
 Kevin J. Vanhoozer, “Scripture and Tradition,” in The Cambridge Companion to Postmodern Theology, 5
ed. Kevin J. Vanhoozer (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 167.  His understanding of the 
nature and authoritative element of scripture is similar to G. Ernest Wright’s in God Who Acts: Biblical 
Theology As Recital (London: SCM Press, 1952).
 Vanhoozer, “Scripture and Tradition,” 165.  Vanhoozer would surely agree with Luther that “Christ is the 6
subject matter of theology.”  (Cited in Vanhoozer, “Scripture and Tradition,” 166.)  Vanhoozer adds: 
“Where can we find Christ?  In the Gospel.  The Gospel is not simply propositional information, but 
narrative; not simply narrative, but promise; not simply promise, but summons.  The purpose of these 
various illocutions is to preach and present Christ: the wisdom and salvation of God.  The Scriptures are the 
‘swaddling clothes’ of Christ, the ‘manger’ to which we come to adore him” (Ibid.).
 Vanhoozer, The Drama of Doctrine, 45.7
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 He further explains his understanding of the nature of scripture when he writes: 
The Bible is the means by which the apostolic memory of what God was doing in 
Christ is given specificity and substance.  For, as Calvin rightly says, the only 
Christ we have is the Christ of the Scriptures.  Hence the ground of Scripture’s 
indispensable role in the economy of the gospel is ultimately christological.  The 
Bible—not only the Gospels but all of Scripture—is the (divinely) authorized 
version of the gospel, the necessary framework for understanding what God was 
doing in Jesus Christ.  Scripture is the voice of God that articulates the Word of 
God: Jesus Christ.  8
 Certainly, Vanhoozer understands scripture to be authoritative because of its 
divine origin and discourse and because it is a record of what God did in Christ.  But his 
conception of the nature of scripture is nuanced: God uses the human discourse in the 
canon to perform certain actions.  He writes: “In sum: it is the divine illocutions—God’s 
use— that constitute biblical authority.  Let us posit the notion of a “canonical illocution” 
to refer to “what God is doing by means of the human discourse in the biblical texts at the 
level of the canon.”   He adds that  9
[a]ccording to our revitalized Scripture principle, then, the divine author is not 
merely a teacher who passes on propositional truths or a narrator who conveys 
 Ibid., 46.8
 Ibid., 179.  Italics his.9
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the discourse of others but a dramatist who does things in and through the 
dialogical action of others.  10
 When Vanhoozer asks: “Why privilege the church’s use of Scripture?” his answer 
exemplifies the content-based/supernaturalist understanding of scripture’s authority.  It is 
that the Bible “is a text of divine discourse.”  He elaborates:  
The Bible is not Scripture simply because an interpretive community decides to 
use it as such.  On the contrary, it is the divine decision to authorize, appropriate, 
assume, and annex these human communicative acts into the economy of 
revelation and reconciliation.  11
He goes on to assert that the church acknowledges what the Bible is, that it is divine 
discourse, but that this acknowledgment does not make it so.  In other words, he holds 
fast to the notion that scripture’s authority is not conferred upon it by the church.  Rather, 
 Ibid.  One of the reasons I chose Vanhoozer’s theory to represent the content-based/supernaturalist model 10
is found just here in this quotation.  Vanhoozer is an evangelical theologian who supports a “revitalized 
scripture principle” in which “the divine author is not merely a teacher who passes on propositional truths.” 
In comparison, consider B. B. Warfield’s theology, which Kelsey selected to represent the position that 
scripture contains inspired, inerrant doctrine.  Warfield is probably best known for his vigorous defense of 
the doctrine of the plenary verbal inspiration of the scriptures of the Old and New Testaments.  He believes 
that scripture was directly created by the power of God to produce a book consisting quite literally of the 
words or oracles of God uttered directly to people. For example, regarding the prophets of the Christian 
Bible, he writes: “What the prophets are solicitous that their readers shall understand is that they are in no 
sense co-authors with God of their messages.  Their messages are given them, given them entire, and given 
them precisely as they are given out by them.  God speaks through them: they are not merely His 
messengers, but ‘His mouth.’”  [Benjamin B. Warfield, The Inspiration and Authority of the Bible 
(Philadelphia: The Presbyterian and Reformed Publishing Company, 1948), 113.]  It is not relevant to this 
project to explain why Warfield believed in the divine inspiration of scripture.  However, because it is 
interesting to me and instructive, I will include his reasons here.  First, he argued that one reason to accept 
the doctrine of plenary verbal inspiration of the Christian Bible is that this doctrine has always been the 
church’s doctrine.  Second, he argued that the Bible itself teaches it.  In a statement that seems to beg the 
issue, he writes: “The church doctrine of inspiration was the Bible doctrine before it was the church 
doctrine; and the church doctrine only because it was the Bible doctrine.” (Ibid., 174.)
 Vanhoozer, The Drama of Doctrine, 165.  In this very quotation one can almost sense Vanhoozer’s 11
struggle to hold in tension his convictions that scripture is both a divine and a human product.  This 
position is certainly evangelical, but represents several steps away from Warfield’s extreme position.
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he explains, scripture’s authority is inherent and due principally to its inspiration by the 
Holy Spirit, a fundamental theme of content-based/supernaturalist perspectives.  12
 As it turns out, what is authoritative for him is biblical content that relates to what 
he calls “the great drama of redemption.”    He asserts that scripture is the supreme norm 13
for Christian faith and life, but not, he writes, “as an epistemic norm that caters to 
modernity’s craving for certainty, but as a sapiential norm that provides direction for 
one’s fitting participation in the great evangelical drama of redemption.”   14
Function-Based/Rationalist Approaches to Biblical Authority 
 Whereas most content-based/supernaturalist theories derive the authority of 
scripture from its perceived divine origins, a second category of theories express an 
explicitly functional understanding of scripture.  I am labeling models that derive 
authority from the uses of scripture in the life of the Christian community as function-
based and rationalist.   I broadly identify these as “rationalist” because they tend to 15
champion the post-Enlightenment skepticism that challenged the Bible as revelation and 
 Ibid.12
 Ibid., 141-150.13
 Vanhoozer, “Scripture and Tradition,” 167.14
 This category would include theories that Gnuse classifies as “limited authority” and “existential” 15
models.  According to the former, scripture is authoritative because of what it does for the church, rather 
than what it is.  See Gnuse, The Authority of the Bible, 123.  According to theories in Gnuse’s existential 
category, the locus of authority is the modern existential situation.  Here, “inspiration” does not refer to a 
quality or property of the text, but rather to God’s ability to use a text as an occasion for a divine-human 
encounter.  In such cases, the ordinary words which humans author, become the word of God.  Gnuse 
places Karl Barth, Emil Brunner, and the Bultmannian school in this category. 
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history.  Theories in this class view biblical writings as human documents rather than 
divine products. 
 Models in this category understand the authority of scripture in functional terms.  
That is, “[t]he texts are authoritative not in virtue of any inherent property they may have, 
such as being inerrant or inspired, but in virtue of a function they fill in the life of the 
Christian community.”   For example, for Karl Barth, scripture is authoritative not 16
because the Bible communicates divinely inspired information about God and God’s 
ways, but because “it provides our normative link with God’s self-disclosure.”   He 17
believes that, sometimes, biblical texts may function as occasions in which people may 
encounter God when those texts are used in a Christian assembly as the basis of 
preaching and worship.  According to Barth, then, texts have the potential to render God’s 
personal presence.  Scripture is a fallible witness through which God in Christ personally 
encounters the trusting reader or hearer.  For Barth, to say that scripture is “inspired” is to 
say that “God has promised that sometimes, at his gracious pleasure, the ordinary human 
words of the biblical texts will become the Word of God, the occasion for rendering an 
agent present to us in a Divine-human encounter.”  18
 According to Barth, the aspect of scripture that has the potential for rendering a 
divine-human encounter is biblical narrative.  Kelsey explains: 
 Kelsey, The Uses of Scripture in Recent Theology, 47.16
 Ibid.17
 Ibid., 47.18
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Narrative is taken to be the authoritative aspect of scripture; it is authoritative in 
so far as it functions as the occasion for encounter with an agent in history, viz., 
the Risen Lord.  Hence we may say that scripture is taken to have the logical 
force of stories that render a character, that offer an identity description of an 
agent.  Scripture does this by means of certain formal features of the writing, 
certain patterns in the narrated sequences of intentions and actions.  It is to these 
patterns that the theologian appeals to authorize his proposals.  19
Barth affirms, then, that in view of God’s personal presence in the world, a series of 
theological proposals not expressly found in scripture, may be indirectly authorized “by 
the patterns in biblical narrative that render an agent and sometimes occasion an 
encounter with him.”  20
 David H. Kelsey shares Barth’s functionalist understanding of the authority of 
scripture.   Although neither Barth nor Kelsey are rationalists, I am using Kelsey’s 21
understanding of the nature of scripture to describe models in the function-based/
rationalist category.   Kelsey asserts, for example, that biblical writings are authoritative 22
 Ibid., 48.19
 Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics, trans. G. T. Thomson, vol. 4, pt. 2, The Doctrine of Reconciliation 20
(Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1936), 165.
 For example, Paul Dafydd Jones suggests that Kelsey’s work, Eccentric Existence, marks a new phase in 21
the intellectual trajectory associated with Karl Barth, H. Richard Niebuhr, Hans Frei, George Lindbeck, and 
so-called postliberal thinkers.  See Paul Dafydd Jones, review of Eccentric Existence: A Theological 
Anthropology, by David H. Kelsey, Journal of the American Academy of Religion 80, no. 3 (September 
2012): 787.
 Clearly, neither Barth nor Kelsey are rationalists since they believe in the supernatural and in God’s 22
activity in the world.  As a narrative theologian, for example, Kelsey strongly affirms the notion of divine 
disclosure in the narratives of scripture.  However, although Kelsey is not a clear fit for the function-based/
rationalist category, his understanding of biblical authority may be described as “rationalist,” as I am 
defining the term in this study, on the basis that he accepts the skepticism that challenges the Bible as 
divine revelation and history.  So, while Kelsey is not a rationalist, his approach to scripture may be 
characterized as such.  Kelsey is Luther Weigle Professor Emeritus of Theology at Yale Divinity School.  
He is the author of one of the classics in biblical-theological studies, The Uses of Scripture in Recent 
Theology (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1975), as well as Eccentric Existence: A Theological Anthropology, 
2 vols. (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox Press, 2009).  Kelsey’s understanding of biblical authority 
is sketched out in “The Bible and Christian Theology,” Journal of the American Academy of Religion 48 
(September 1980): 393-401.
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when they shape individual and communal life and thereby author new identities.   Thus, 23
scripture’s authority is manifest when it functions to define the identity of the Christian 
community and when it is used to nurture and reform the community’s common life.  For 
these reasons and on these bases, he holds that scripture also functions to authorize 
theological proposals.  He writes:  
[T]o call certain texts ‘scripture’ is to acknowledge that they are authoritative de 
facto in the church and that that authority is functional.  That is, its authority 
consists in its functioning to “author” or shape decisively communal and 
individual identities.  And to call them ‘scripture’ is to say that the community is 
in fact committed to use them in this way in the course of Christian praxis.  24
 Kelsey also speaks of scripture’s authority de jure when he asserts that biblical 
writings ought to be used in the common life of the Christian community “because the 
power of God’s kingly rule graciously shapes human identity and empowers new forms 
of life in persons through scripture.”   He clarifies that this authority has little to do with 25
the content of scripture, but rather has everything to do with how scripture is used.  He 
 Kelsey, “The Bible and Christian Theology,” 393.  James Barr is another theologian who shares Kelsey’s 23
functionalist perspective of scripture’s authority.  Barr attributes the Bible’s relevance in the modern world 
to its power to evoke fresh disclosures of the reality of God and the meaning of human existence.  But, he 
clearly does not believe this influence is due to any inherent property in the text itself.   He acknowledges 
that his account of the authority of the Bible is framed very much in human terms: “It has not required any 
appeal to supernatural interventions, such as inspiration by God extending only to certain books and no 
others, or the giving by God of the right list of canonical books.  The formation of tradition within ancient 
Israel and the early church, the committing of the tradition to writing, and the decision to collect a group of 
chosen books and form a ‘scripture,’ are all human decisions, decisions made by men of faith but still 
human decisions and describable as such.”  See James Barr, The Bible in the Modern World (London: SCM 
Press, 1973), 118-122.
 Kelsey, “The Bible and Christian Theology,” 394.  I appreciate the distinction Kelsey identifies between 24
“biblical writings” and “scripture.”  “The distinction between ‘biblical writing’ and ‘scripture’ no doubt is 
artificial; but it is useful to make a central point about the relation between Bible and theology.  To describe 
a writing as a ‘biblical writing’ is to identify it as one of a set of more or less ancient writings customarily 
published together as the Bible and historically rooted partly in the religious life of the early Christian 
church. . . . To say ‘This is our scripture’ is to say, ’These are the texts that present to us the promise and 
call that define our communal identity” (Ibid., 393). 
 Ibid., 395.25
!20
asserts that  “biblical writings have authority, but the authority derives not . . . from their 
‘content,’ but rather from the end to which they are used., viz., by God’s power to 
empower new human identities.”     26
 Moreover, Kelsey denies that the authority of biblical writings is based on the 
supernaturalist understanding that scripture is a deposit of divine revelation.  In his 
discussion of the nature of scripture, he explains that 
what is authoritative about scripture is not a systematizable set of doctrines about 
transcendent status [sic] of affairs and about arcane metahistorical histories, nor 
is it a systematically elusive “word.”  It is a heterogeneous collection of images, 
parables, metaphors, principles for action, beliefs, emotion-concepts, etc,. each of 
which is determinately particular and concrete.  27
Like Barth, then, Kelsey denies that scripture is divinely inspired, as Vanhoozer or 
Warfield understand the term.   Accordingly, in his model of biblical authority, God is 28
not “saying” or “revealing,” but God is “shaping identity,” “using” the uses of scripture 
toward a specific end: the actualization of God’s eschatological rule.  29
 That Kelsey does not believe that God authors scripture, does not mean that he 
rejects the notion of God’s active presence there.  For example, he affirms that  
the practices that compose the common life of ecclesial communities seek to be 
appropriate responses to the ways in which God relates to all that is not God, 
including God’s way of relating in the person of Jesus, as those ways of relating 
 Ibid., 396.  See fn. 16 on Kelsey’s rationalist understanding of scripture.26
 Ibid., 398.27
 See his discussion of the inspiration of scripture in Proving Doctrine: The Uses of Scripture in Modern 28
Theology, 207-212.
 Ibid., 215.29
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are explicitly or implicitly narrated, commented on, celebrated, longed for, 
alluded to, or assumed in various parts of canonical Holy Scripture.  30
   
In fact, he believes the church ascribes authority to the biblical canon because to do so is 
deemed, first and foremost, an “appropriate response” to God and to God’s way of 
relating that is disclosed in and through texts that are first regarded as Bible, then 
Scripture, then, ultimately as Holy Scripture.   31
 To recapitulate, then, for the traditional content-based/supernaturalist view of the 
Bible as a divinely inspired source of revealed truths, Kelsey would substitute a 
functional view.  This view is oriented to the life of the church and correlates scripture 
and its authority with the existential concerns of the believing community and individual.  
He writes: 
The functionalist analysis of “scriptural authority over the church” brings with it 
an important implication concerning the conceptual home of some doctrines of 
scripture in some theological positions.  Scripture’s authority specifically for 
theology . . . is a function of its authority for the common life of the church.  It’s 
authority for the church’s common life consists in its being used in certain rulish 
and normative ways so that it helps to nurture and reform the community’s self-
identity and the personal identities of her members.  32
 Again, what is “normative,” according to Kelsey, is neither the content of the 
Bible, nor that the Bible contains propositional revelation in the form of divinely given 
information about God and his ways.  Rather, as he explains:  
Our analysis suggests that it is the patterns in scripture, not its “content,” that 
make it “normative” for theology. . . . So scripture is authority for theological 
 Kelsey, Ecclesial Existence: A Theological Anthropology, 133.  Cf. also, 14-15.30
 For Kelsey’s discussion of these terms, see Ecclesial Existence: A Theological Anthropology, 135-56.31
 Kelsey, The Uses of Scripture in Recent Theology, 208.32
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proposals, not by being the perfect source of the content that they fully preserve, 
but by providing a pattern by which the proposal’s adequacy as elaboration can 
be assessed.   33
 Interestingly, Kelsey’s concept of biblical authority, which looks to “patterns in 
scripture” for the basis of that authority, is that such patterns are “decisively shaped by an 
imaginative judgment about the mode in which God makes himself present.”   Further, 34
that imaginative judgment “is logically prior to any exegetical judgments about the 
[biblical] texts.”  35
 Kelsey contends that scripture “deserves” to be considered the theological norm 
and that theologians “ought” (he puts both these verbs in quotes) so to regard it.  But he 
quickly adds that “this ‘objective normativity’ of scriptural authority is not undercut by 
taking its ‘authority’ in terms of scripture’s functions rather than of its properties.”   He 36
acknowledges that theologians who agree that scripture—in diverse ways, to be sure—is 
“authority” for theological proposals disagree widely over the extent, content, and 
meaning of canonical scripture other than to assert its “sufficiency” for an indicated use, 
“the occasion for the presence of God among the faithful.”  37
 As illustrated by Barth and Kelsey, and to sum up, function-based models of 
biblical authority are those that, broadly speaking, tend to understand that the authority of 
 Ibid., 195-6.33
 Ibid., 198-9.34
 Ibid., 199.35
 Ibid., 152.36
 Ibid., 106.37
!23
scripture derives from its uses in the life of the Christian church.  Further, these models 
may be labeled as rationalist because they defend the post-Enlightenment skepticism that 
challenged the Bible as revelation and history.  Theories in this class, therefore, view 
biblical writings as human documents rather than divine products. 
A Content-Based/Rationalist Approach to Biblical Authority 
 I have already let the cat out of the bag by describing Schleiermacher’s 
perspective as a “third way” to conceive of scripture’s authority.  Although one could 
make the case that his approach might seem to borrow from or be suggestive of both 
content-based/supernaturalist and function-based/rationalist models, I am suggesting that 
his understanding of biblical authority will not fit neatly in either category.  Why is this 
so? 
 To begin with, we may identify his perspective as more content-based/
supernaturalist than function-based/rationalist, in some respects, since he considers the 
New Testament to be authoritative by reason of its being a reliable witness to the 
revelation of Jesus’ perfect God-consciousness and the first in a series of presentations of 
Christian faith.  However, in other respects, his understanding fails to meet the test of a 
content-based/supernaturalist model, according to the way I am defining it.  Those who 
advocate content-based/supernaturalist models also tend to view scripture as authoritative 
by virtue of a content that is in some sense divinely disclosed.  Further, they tend to 
ascribe greater authority to the biblical canon than to the church, asserting that the former 
has authority over the latter.  As I will demonstrate in later chapters, however,  
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Schleiermacher does not affirm a direct connection between divine revelation and the 
Bible.  Moreover, in some respects, he affirms ecclesial over biblical authority.  Thus, at 
least for these reasons, his understanding seems to exhibit characteristics of function-
based/rationalist models.  Hence, his conception of biblical authority is neither absolutely 
content-based nor function-based, but borrows from both. 
 So, how should we label Schleiermacher’s doctrine of biblical authority?  At the 
outset, we may broadly identify his third way as evangelical, since according to his 
theology, everything in Christianity is connected in one way or another to redemption 
through Christ.  His theology revolves around Jesus’ perfect God-consciousness and its 
influence upon the community of faith that Jesus founded.  Therefore, Schleiermacher’s 
approach may be classified as a thoroughly evangelical one. 
 Before suggesting a more specific label to his approach to biblical authority, I 
believe it may be helpful to discuss how some in Schleiermacher’s own day characterized 
him and how he characterized himself.  To do so will cast some light on how and how not 
to classify him.  At the same time, it will demonstrate the difficulty of identifying an 
appropriate category for his views. 
 Was he a supernaturalist or a rationalist?  Cathie Kelsey suggests in her book, 
Thinking about Christ with Schleiermacher, that the opponents he primarily had in mind 
as he wrote Brief Outline and Christian Faith, for example, were what he called 
supernaturalists on the one hand and rationalists on the other.  Regarding his 
understanding of Christ, Kelsey claims that Schleiermacher “takes a path between super-
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naturalism and rationalism, distinguishing his understanding from both.”   Although 38
Kelsey is referring to a doctrine not extensively considered in this study, I am suggesting 
here that what she noticed about Schleiermacher’s christology could very well be said of 
his approach to scripture.   39
 Moreover, Schleiermacher discusses this same subject, the conflict in his day 
between rationalism and supernaturalism, near the close of a letter to his friend, Friedrich 
Lücke.  He mentions that many who read his understanding of the supernatural in 
Christian revelation and the natural development of the divine plan of salvation in the 
Glaubenslehre  had a difficult time deciding where he stood in regard to the rationalism/40
supernaturalism controversy.  It surely may have seemed that he shared an interest in both 
worlds.  And, of course, as a churchman and a post-Enlightenment theologian, he did.  He 
writes, albeit tongue in cheek: 
Quite recently a new type of rationalism has been devised—I would almost like 
to think it was done for me especially, but that would be to give me too much 
 Catherine L. Kelsey, Thinking about Christ with Schleiermacher (Louisville, KY: Westminster John 38
Knox Press, 2003), 38.  Similarly, Ted Vial suggests that “Schleiermacher’s generation found itself 
confronted with two ways of approaching answers” to the christological questions of his day, and that he 
was satisfied with neither.”  Vial identifies those two ways as confessionalist/traditionalist, which view 
Schleiermacher labels as “magical,” and rationalists.  [Theodore Vial, Schleiermacher: A Guide for the 
Perplexed (London: Bloomsbury T&T Clark, 2013), 88.]  
 Regarding Schleiermacher’s view of biblical authority, I will explain the path he takes “between 39
supernaturalism and rationalism” in the remaining chapters, especially in Chapter Seven.
 See Schleiermacher, Christian Faith, §§13, 47.1, 88.4, 89. 40
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honor.  It seems to me that it is called ‘ideal rationalism,’  and it refers to the 41
belief that something natural could at the same time be something supernatural.  42
Schleiermacher informs Lücke that he is grateful for the suggestion, but he has a better 
idea: he wishes someone would devise a position for him in which what is supernatural 
can at the same time be natural.  He suggests that whenever he speaks of the supernatural, 
he does so with reference to whatever comes first.  Afterwards, however, it becomes 
something natural.  For example, he suggests that “creation is supernatural, but it 
afterwards becomes the natural order.”  Likewise, he asserts: “[I]n his origin Christ is 
supernatural, but he also becomes natural, as a genuine human being.”  He suggests that 
the Holy Spirit and the Christian church can be treated in the same way.   He concludes 43
by labeling himself as a “real supernaturalist”:  
If the former view was called rationalism, this view would have to be a 
supernaturalism, and why should it not be called real?  And so I want to say that I 
consider myself to be a real supernaturalist, and I think this label is as good as 
any other.  44
 According to James Duke and Francis Fiorenza, the reference here is a term used by Ferdinand Christian 41
Baur, who differentiated two types of rationalism.  “There is the ‘ordinary rationalism’ of the 
Enlightenment, which is based upon the autonomy of reason, and an ‘ideal rationalism,’ based on historical 
forms proper to supernaturalism.  This ideal rationalism represents those historical forms of consciousness 
in which the ideas of reason appear in the course of temporal-historical development.  Despite 
Schleiermacher’s assertions to the contrary, the Glaubenslehre exemplifies ideal rationalism because it 
seeks to mediate between the supernaturalism of traditional church doctrine and the claims of 
reason.” [Cited in Friedrich D. E. Schleiermacher, On the Glaubenslehre: Two Letters to Dr. Lücke, trans. 
James Duke and Francis Fiorenza, American Academy of Religion Texts and Translations Series 3 (Ann 
Arbor, MI: Scholars Press, 1981), 98.]  
 Ibid., 88-89.  This is key to understanding Schleiermacher’s entire theology.  I will explain his 42
understanding that “something natural could at the same time be something supernatural” in Chapter Three, 
where I discuss his understanding of the revelation of God in Christ.
 Ibid., 89.43
 Ibid.  A. F. Schott called Schleiermacher’s position, “rational supernaturalist,” although in the above 44
quotation, Schleiermacher denies the merits of this description.  (Cited in Schleiermacher, On the 
Glaubenslehre, 130.)
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 To sum up, Schleiermacher self-identified as a “real supernaturalist,” although his 
writings indicate that regarding many Christian doctrines, at least, he wanted to steer a 
path between supernaturalists and rationalists.  In fact, Schleiermacher was neither an 
absolute supernaturalist nor an absolute rationalist. 
 In light of the above, then, how should we classify Schleiermacher’s doctrine of 
biblical authority?  First, I believe we may identify his perspective as, in the main, 
content-based.  For Schleiermacher, the New Testament is authoritative because it is a 
witness to the revelation of Jesus’ perfect God-consciousness and the first in a series of 
presentations of Christian faith.  I am proposing that what this means is that since the 
New Testament provides a picture of Jesus’ consciousness of God, embodied in his words 
and deeds, and since it is a record of the first expression of faith in Christ, one may 
conclude that Schleiermacher’s conception of the locus of biblical authority is found in 
that particular New Testament content.  Granted, one could make the case that his 
perspective is neither strictly nor absolutely content-based.  However, I am arguing in this 
study that because the locus of authority is the record of the Christ event, his 
understanding of scripture’s authority is substantially content-based. 
 This understanding is what separates Schleiermacher’s conception of biblical 
authority from Kelsey’s and other function-based models.  While Schleiermacher views 
the record of the Christ event as the locus of biblical authority, Kelsey asserts that the 
actual locus of authority is ecclesial communities who, in their common life, ascribe 
authority to scripture.  According to Kelsey, communities of faith ascribe authority to 
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scripture, in part, “because [they believe that] God is self-committed to work through the 
communities’ ways of living with these texts to author life for them by forming new 
communal and personal identities.”   That is, Kelsey’s understanding is that ecclesial 45
communities choose to “live with these texts” because they believe God is active in them. 
 But, why do ecclesial communities make this choice?  Upon what basis do they 
believe God is active in the biblical texts?  Kelsey’s answer seems to be that the church 
recognizes “the constitutive patterns of [biblical] texts.”   Like Barth, Kelsey seems to 46
understand that “the patterns in biblical narrative,” to use a Barthian phrase,  are the 47
basis for the decision of ecclesial communities to live with these texts, and thus, ascribe 
authority to them.   This represents a fine distinction between Kelsey’s and 48
Schleiermacher’s understanding of the locus of biblical authority, but a real one, 
nonetheless.  For Schleiermacher, biblical writings have authority, not because of their 
narrative patterns or literary forms, but because of their content: they contain reliable 
information about the God-consciousness of Christ and his influence on others.  While 
Kelsey pushes for a functional usage of scripture in which it is not scripture’s content that 
is normative but the “patterns” that are found there, Schleiermacher, in contrast, claims 
that it is the actual content of scripture that is authoritative.   
 Kelsey, Ecclesial Existence: A Theological Anthropology, 138.  Italics mine.45
 Ibid., 146.46
 See fn. 20 in this chapter.47
 See also Kelsey, Ecclesial Existence, A Theological Anthropology, 153-6 and page 22, fn. 33 of this 48
study.
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 Not only may we identify Schleiermacher’s conception of biblical authority as 
content-based, but we may also identify it as rationalist.  While he may not have 
considered himself to be a rationalist, and while his theology may not qualify as 
absolutely rationalistic since it allows space for the supernatural, I firmly believe that his 
approach to biblical authority is deserving of the rationalist label.  I have identified his 
view of biblical authority rationalist primarily on the basis of his denial that the Bible is a 
unique deposit of divine revelation.  Further, his model of biblical authority demonstrates 
a willingness to accept, even welcome, scientific and philosophical advances, a spirit 
descriptive of the post-Enlightenment age.  Again, he held that the phenomena of the 
biblical writings are such that the Holy Spirit must have chosen not to produce scripture 
in a “totally miraculous way”; instead “every element must be treated as purely human, 
and the action of the Spirit was only to produce the inner impulse.”   Here, 49
Schleiermacher sounds as if he is trying to qualify his supernaturalism as natural.  To me, 
that he believed the biblical writings were human documents guardedly qualifies his 
perspective of biblical authority as rationalist, although he would argue that he himself 
was not one. 
 I am proposing, then, that Schleiermacher’s doctrine of biblical authority merits 
classification in a third category.  Neither content-based/supernaturalist, nor function-
based/rationalist, I am identifying it as content-based/rationalist, a label that borrows 
 Friedrich Schleiermacher, Hermeneutics: The Handwritten Manuscripts, trans. Jack Forstman and James 49
O. Duke, ed. Heinz Kimmerle (Missoula, MT: Scholars Press for the American Academy of Religion, 
1977), 104.
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from both of the aforementioned categories.  Several advantages accrue to identifying his 
doctrine as such, but that discussion must wait for Chapter Seven.  Before I highlight 
those advantages, I want to dig deeper into Schleiermacher’s conception of biblical 
authority.  What did he believe about revelation?  Inspiration?  What is his understanding 
of the locus of biblical authority?  To what extent did he accept scripture’s normative 
character?  In the next chapter, I will begin to answer these questions, turning first to 
Schleiermacher’s doctrine of revelation.  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Chapter Three: Schleiermacher and the Doctrine of Revelation 
 In the introduction to this inquiry I asserted that content-based/supernaturalist and 
function-based/rationalist models of biblical authority hold conflicting views of the 
concept of “revelation,” as it relates to scripture.  The former avers that the Bible is a 
unique deposit of divine revelation, which in some way originated with God.  The latter 
denies that the Bible contains specific revelatory content and tends to see the Bible 
primarily as a human document.  What was Schleiermacher’s conception of revelation 
and its connection to scripture, and why? 
 My aims in this chapter are threefold.  First, inasmuch as the concept of revelation 
is often connected, if not foundational, to many models of biblical authority, I want to 
compare Schleiermacher’s view of revelation as it relates to scripture with a classic 
content-based/supernaturalist model.  As I mentioned in Chapter 2, his is neither an 
absolutely supernaturalist nor an absolutely rationalist model of the doctrine of divine 
revelation.  Before identifying Schleiermacher’s understanding of this concept, I want to 
briefly describe a representation of the latter, one championed by Carl. F. H. Henry.  My 
purpose in doing so is to elucidate Schleiermacher’s viewpoint.  Second, I want to lay out 
the primary criticism of Schleiermacher’s understanding of divine revelation relative to 
scripture.  To accomplish this, I rely on the oeuvre of several conservative evangelicals, 
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as well as that of neo-orthodox theologian, Karl Barth.   Third, I want to trace out what I 1
believe would be Schleiermacher’s response to his critics and the reasoning behind it.  
Therefore, I want to postpone until this part of the chapter a more complete explanation 
of his understanding of revelation, as I believe such an explanation provides the best 
evidence of how he would respond to his critics.  To do so, I rely heavily upon what he 
wrote on the subject in Christian Faith and On Religion: Speeches to Its Cultured 
Despisers.  I do not limit my analysis to these primary sources alone, however, as I also 
utilize accompanying clarifications from elsewhere.  I will make the case that, for 
Schleiermacher, God’s revelation may be identified in at least three places: in and 
through the whole world in general, in the feeling of absolute dependence, and in Christ.  
Carl F. H. Henry’s Doctrine of Revelation Vis-à-vis Scripture 
 In his book, Models of Revelation, Avery Robert Dulles constructs a typology of 
twentieth-century revelation theology according to how and where revelation occurs.  He 
distinguishes five different models: doctrinal, historical, experiential, dialectical presence, 
and new awareness.   According to the doctrinal model, as the classification suggests, the 2
Bible is seen primarily as a source of doctrine.  Thus, it equates revelation with 
propositional statements, that is, with truth claims from and about God and God’s 
purposes.  Consequently, the doctrinal, or as it may also be identified, the propositional 
 While there are more contemporary critics of Schleiermacher’s theology, in general, and of his 1
understanding of revelation, in particular, I have found that for the most part they tend to share Barth’s 
principal complaint.
 Robert Avery Dulles, Models of Revelation, 2nd ed. (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1992), 27-28.2
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model  certainly qualifies as an appropriate representative of a classic content-based/3
supernaturalist model of revelation. 
 Carl F. H. Henry, one of the most prominent theologians of the conservative wing 
of American Evangelicalism, is a proponent of this model.  When Gabriel Fackre 
discusses and draws on Avery Dulles’s typological survey of the concept of revelation, he 
too selects Henry to represent the doctrinal model.   Henry defends that model and 4
explains the methodological groundwork for neo-evangelical theology in his six-volume 
magnum opus, God, Revelation and Authority.   That primary source provides for us the 5
pertinent features of Henry’s concept of revelation and its connection to scripture.   
 What is relevant to this inquiry regarding Henry’s concept of revelation is his 
strong affirmation of a direct connection between divine revelation and the Bible.   That 
is, for Henry and others who subscribe to supernaturalist/content-based models of 
revelation, the Bible is an important locus of that revelation.  After setting forth the nature 
of theology in the first volume of God, Revelation and Authority, Henry turns his 
attention in volumes two, three, and four to a delineation of fifteen foundational theses 
about divine revelation.  These are followed in volumes five and six by a development of 
 Others designate the doctrinal model of revelation as the propositional model.  See, e.g., William C. 3
Placher, “How Do We Know What to Believe?  Revelation and Authority,” in Essentials of Christian 
Theology, ed. William Placher (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox, 2003), 14-18; Miikka Ruokanen, 
Doctrina Divinitus Inspirata: Martin Luther’s Position in the Ecumenical Problem of Biblical Inspiration 
(Helsinki: Luther-Agricola Society, 1985), 19-23.
 Gabriel Fackre, The Doctrine of Revelation: A Narrative Interpretation, Edinburgh Studies in 4
Constructive Theology (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1997), 16.
 Carl F. H. Henry, God, Revelation and Authority, 6 vols. (Waco, TX: Word Books, 1976-1983).  For a 5
review of Henry’s apologetic theology, cf. Stanley J. Grenz, Renewing the Center: Evangelical Theology in 
a Post-Theological Era, 2nd ed. (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2006), 94-110.
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a largely classical orthodox approach to the doctrine of God.   The eleventh thesis states: 6
“The Bible is a reservoir and conduit of divine truth.”  In Henry’s explanation of this 
thesis he asserts that  
the Scriptures are the authoritative written record and interpretation of God’s 
revelatory deeds, and the ongoing source of reliable objective knowledge 
concerning God’s nature and ways. . . . The Scriptures offer a comprehensive and 
authoritative overview of God’s revelatory disclosure and publish his purpose in 
the past, present and future.  7
   
Clearly, Henry understands the Bible to be a deposit of divine revelation.  8
 What this means, of course, is that Henry understands the content of revelation to 
be information about God and his purposes.   This is clear when he defines revelation as  9
that activity of the supernatural God whereby he communicates information 
essential for man’s present and future destiny.  In revelation God, whose thoughts 
are not our thoughts, shares his mind; he communicates not only the truth about 
himself and his intentions, but also that concerning man’s present plight and 
future prospects.    10
One could summarize Henry’s understanding of the content of revelation by stating that 
revelation consists in knowledge.  For him, the reality of revelation means that God has 
 I believe it is significant that Henry placed his discussion of revelation prior to his discussion of God.  6
One can make the case that he intended to make it clear that whatever may be said about the being and 
attributes of God arises solely out of God’s own self-disclosure as found in the Bible.
 Henry, God, Revelation and Authority, 2:13.7
 Indeed, for him, true theology could be based only on the self-disclosure of God found in the Bible, for 8
there alone can true knowledge of God be found.  Henry lays down the thesis that the Bible is the sole 
foundation for theology.  See Henry, God, Revelation and Authority, 1:181-409.  Schleiermacher challenges 
the notion that the Bible is the sole foundation for theology and of faith, as well, as I will explain in Chapter 
Five.
 Henry, God, Revelation and Authority, 3:170, 269.  See also Carl F. H. Henry, “The Priority of Divine 9
Revelation: A Review Article,” Journal of the Evangelical Theological Society 27, no. 1 (March 1984): 
77-78.
 Henry, God, Revelation and Authority, 3:457.10
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both acted in history and spoken to humankind.   However, God’s speaking takes 11
precedence over God’s acting, for the divine word provides the rationale and meaning of 
the divine historical acts.   According to this perspective then, revelation is a 12
transcendent disclosure that gives the meaning of revelatory events and provides valid 
truths about God’s nature and purposes. 
 Furthermore, Henry believes that revelation’s content is both objective and 
propositional.  Indeed, he holds that the content of the Bible is almost exclusively 
propositional.   In God, Revelation and Authority, he develops the thesis that “God’s 13
revelation is rational communication conveyed in intelligible ideas and meaningful 
words, that is, in conceptual-verbal form.”   For Henry, the reality that God has spoken 14
means that the intellect plays an integral role in the overall revelatory process.   15
 By now the essence or nature of revelation according to Henry has become 
apparent: revelation is principally, if not strictly, in words with strict propositional 
meanings.  So, according to the doctrinal model, divine revelation is operative in the 
realm of cognition or knowledge.  “Revelation in the Bible,” Henry declares, “is 
essentially a mental conception: God’s disclosure is rational and intelligible 
communication.  Issuing from the mind and will of God, revelation is addressed to the 
 Ibid., 3:261-71.11
 Carl F. H. Henry, The Protestant Dilemma (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1949), 95-96, 217.12
 Henry, God, Revelation and Authority, 3:46813
 Ibid., 3:467.14
 Henry, The Protestant Dilemma, 97.15
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mind and will of human beings.”   His belief is that “God directly and objectively 16
manifests himself by intelligible words, commands and acts” and that “revelation is given 
. . . to the mind and conscience of man universally.  17
 The reality that God has communicated to human beings and that God has spoken, 
according to Henry, means that the intellect plays an integral role in the revelatory 
process.   Moreover, in contrast to what he saw as a fallacy in neo-orthodoxy, Henry 18
asserted that this revelation is objective and available to human reason.  He brought 
revelation, reason, and scripture together in what he set forth as his basic epistemological 
axiom:  
Divine revelation is the source of all truth, the truth of Christianity included; 
reason is the instrument for recognizing it; Scripture is its verifying principle; 
logical consistency is a negative test for truth and coherence a subordinate test.  
The task of Christian theology is to exhibit the content of biblical revelation as an 
orderly whole.  19
  
 Henry, God, Revelation and Authority, 3:248.  This view of the nature of revelation is, of course, 16
Thomist.  Aquinas believed that revelation was the result of God’s action on the human intellect by which 
“God might disclose new ideas or species to the mind of the prophet by direct action upon the senses, the 
imagination, or by reordering existing ideas or species in an original way, or by direct action upon the 
intellect.”  [J. T. Forestell, “Biblical Inspiration,” in New Catholic Encyclopedia, vol. 7, 2nd ed. (Detroit, 
MI: Thomson Gale, 2003), 495.]  Aquinas certainly believed, however, in the transcendence and utter 
incomprehensibility of God.  For an in-depth study on Aquinas’ doctrine of revelation, see Paul Synave and 
Pierre Benoit, Prophecy and Inspiration: A Commentary on the Summa Theologica II-II, Questions 
171-178,” trans. Avery Dulles (New York: Desclee, 1961). 
 Henry, “The Priority of Divine Revelation: A Review Article,” 78.  By contrast, Schleiermacher does not 17
think that he is qualified to say what we discern in God’s acts, or what his “mind” necessarily does, or that 
we can immediately understand “the mind” of God whenever we “see” his acts or “hear” of them.
 Henry, The Protestant Dilemma, 97.18
 Henry, God, Revelation and Authority, 1:215.  If theology is the explication of revelation as disclosed in 19
the Bible, then in Henry’s estimation, the Bible is the central authority for theology.  “Revelation is in fact a 
core doctrine of the Bible,” Henry claims.  “Without it the entire Scriptural message would lose its 
authority.” See Henry, “The Priority of Divine Revelation: A Review Article,” 77.  This perspective is 
certainly representative of the content-based/supernaturalist model of biblical authority.
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 To sum up, Henry believes that divine revelation is given in words with strict 
propositional meanings, located in the Bible, a book authored by God.  His conception of 
revelation is an accurate depiction in general terms of the content-based/supernaturalist 
model of revelation and biblical authority.  
Schleiermacher’s Understanding of Revelation Vis-à-vis Scripture 
 How does Schleiermacher’s understanding of revelation vis-à-vis scripture 
compare with Henry’s?  Whereas Henry’s classic representation of the content-based/
supernaturalist understanding of revelation typifies the doctrinal model in Dulles’s 
typology of revelation, Schleiermacher’s understanding represents what Dulles identifies 
as the experiential model.   In this model, the Bible is viewed, not as a deposit of 20
divinely-revealed truths, but as a human document which chronicles and expresses the 
experience of God in the lives of believers.  According to the experiential model, then, 
biblical authors are viewed as writing from their experience of the divine.  This is 
certainly true of Schleiermacher’s understanding of revelation, as will become evident 
later in this chapter.  For now, I only want to highlight the more general dissimilarity 
between Schleiermacher’s view of divine revelation and Henry’s: whereas Henry 
conceives of a direct connection between divine revelation and the Bible, Schleiermacher 
conceives only of an indirect one.   
 Dulles, Models of Revelation, 68-83, 119.  Schleiermacher is also Gabriel Fackre’s and William Placher’s 20
choice to typify the experiential model.  See Fackre, The Doctrine of Revelation, 17; Placher, “How Do We 
Know What to Believe?  Revelation and Authority,” 16-18.
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 While Schleiermacher most certainly believes in the reality of divine revelation, 
for him, scripture is not the locus of revelation, at least not in the same sense that it is for 
Carl F. H. Henry and others who would classify themselves as conservative 
evangelicals.   To attest to this, there is no warrant, according to Schleiermacher, for 21
people to claim that scripture has a divine origin.  This is clear from his discussion of the 
doctrine of scripture in Christian Faith.   Although there is no doctrine of revelation per 22
se in this or any other section of Christian Faith, Schleiermacher makes, what only seems 
to be at first glance, a passing comment regarding the meaning of revelation when he 
discusses the concept of “inspiration.”  As it turns out, this comment is not insignificant, 
but it is rather crucial for his entire doctrine of scripture.  He contends that the general 
custom of calling sacred scripture (die heilige Schrift) “revelation” leads to a  
misconception: that the two concepts, revelation (Offenbarung) and inspiration 
(Eingebung), may be used interchangeably.  But these terms are not synonymous, he 
asserts, and to treat them as such only leads to confusion.  He explains:   
[I]f one should understand the matter in such a way that by writing down sacred 
scripture in a state of inspiration these authors would declare its content in a 
special divine fashion, this would be an entirely groundless claim.  This is the 
 As I will show below, that Schleiermacher does not conceive the Bible to be a locus of revelation is an 21
inaccurate claim, since he believes that divine revelation is ubiquitous.  Similarly, to claim that 
Schleiermacher does not accept a direct connection between divine revelation and scripture, is not to say 
that he rejects an indirect one.  In contrast to Henry, however, he does not affirm that the Bible is a deposit 
of divinely-disclosed truths.
 Schleiermacher’s discussion of the doctrine of scripture in Christian Faith falls under the rubric of 22
ecclesiology in the second part.  Along with the ministry of the Word of God, the sacraments of Baptism 
and the Lord’s Supper, the power of the Keys of the Kingdom, and prayer in the name of Jesus, scripture is 
identified as one of the essential and unchanging marks of the Christian church.
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case whether one looks more at the act of composing a sacred book itself or more 
at the arousal of thoughts that precede and underlie that act.  23
 Besides his reasoning that there is no evidence to support the claim that God 
somehow revealed scripture’s content to its authors, Schleiermacher adds that because 
everything which those authors teach is traceable to Christ, God’s original act of 
disclosure (Kundmachung) of whatever is contained in the sacred scriptures must already 
be present in Christ himself.  Revelation in this case, then, would be manifested “not as a 
series of discrete bits of inspired information, but rather as a single and indivisible 
revelation that develops organically (that is to say, under the conditions of space and 
time).”   He concludes: “Thus, the speaking and writing of the apostles, moved as they 24
were by the Spirit, was also a communicating (Mittheilen) of the divine revelation that 
existed in Christ (der göttlichen Offenbarung in Christo).”  25
The Core Criticism of Schleiermacher’s Theology of Revelation 
  Before I develop a more complete picture of Schleiermacher’s understanding of 
revelation, I want to introduce the core criticism of his position.  What objections have 
his critics raised regarding his conception of revelation as it relates to scripture?  What 
follows are a few samples. 
 Friedrich Schleiermacher, Christian Faith, trans. Terrence N. Tice, Catherine L. Kelsey, and Edwina 23
Lawler, ed. Terrence N. Tice (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox Press, forthcoming), §130.1.  I have 
checked translations of Christian Faith against the original, Der christliche Glaube nach den Grundsätzen 
der evangelischen Kirche im Zusammenhange dargestellt, Zweite Auflage (1830/31), ed. Rolf Schäfer 
(Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2008).
 Schleiermacher, Christian Faith, §130.1; See also Dawn DeVries, “Rethinking the Scripture Principle: 24
Friedrich Schleiermacher and the Role of the Bible in the Church,” 302.
 Schleiermacher, Christian Faith, §130.1.  I will have more to say below about the meaning of this claim. 25
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 This is what conservative evangelical theologian, Millard J. Erickson, writes 
about Schleiermacher’s understanding of revelation under the heading, “Modern Versions 
of Immanentism,” and the sub-heading, “Classical Liberalism”: 
The definition of revelation . . . has become more generalized.  In an extreme 
form, that of Schleiermacher, revelation is any instance of conscious insight.  
Thus, the Bible is a book recording God’s revelations to humanity.  As such, 
however, it is not unique; that is, it is not qualitatively different from other pieces 
of religious literature, or even literature that does not claim to be religious.  
Isaiah, the Sermon on the Mount, Plato, Marcus Aurelius, Carlyle, Goethe, all are 
vehicles of divine revelation.  Any truth, no matter where you find it, is divine 
truth.  This position virtually obliterates the traditional distinction between 
special and general revelation.  26
There is much in the above quotation that is inaccurate and unfair to Schleiermacher’s 
conception of revelation.  However, Erickson summarizes well, in a general way, the core 
criticism of Schleiermacher’s position: it “virtually obliterates the traditional distinction 
between special and general revelation.”   
 Another related and somewhat incorrect explanation and appraisal of 
Schleiermacher’s position is that although he 
does not deny the out-there existence of God as certain moderns have done . . . 
all man receives from God [according to Schleiermacher] is a feeling.  Man 
cannot, as the result, locate God out there, but all he receives from God is what 
he finds within.  Revelation therefore has to do neither with propositions nor 
events in history, but with a feeling of dependence.  27
Olbricht adds that since Schleiermacher withdraws revelation from the category of 
knowledge and locates it in feeling, “the theologian cannot pretend to speak about God 
 Millard J. Erickson, Christian Theology, 2d ed. (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2009), 331-332. 26
 Thomas H. Olbricht, “The Bible as Revelation,” Restoration Quarterly 8, no. 4 (1965): 215.27
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but only about the human feeling of independence [sic] on God.”   Similarly, Charles 28
Hodge feels that the logical result of Schleiermacher’s approach to religion with its 
feeling of absolute dependence greatly undermined the authority of the Scripture, which 
for Hodge robs theology of its factual, objective base for data.   Likewise, James I. 29
Packer shares this fundamental criticism, that Schleiermacher’s doctrine of revelation 
removes it from the category of knowledge: 
To side-step Kant’s critique of the idea of revealed truth, he [Schleiermacher] 
abandoned the notion altogether, and argued that Christianity is essentially not 
knowledge but a feeling of dependence on God through Christ. . . . Man’s self-
consciousness is the reference-point of all theological statements; to make them 
is simply a way of talking about oneself; they tell us nothing of God, but only 
what men feel about God.  Theology is thus dogmatically agnostic about God and 
his world.  As a science, it knows nothing of any events but states of mind. . . . 
Schleiermacher’s position made the idea of revelation really superfluous, for it 
actually amounted to a denial that anything is revealed.  30
   
 Ted Vial makes the claim in Schleiermacher: A Guide for the Perplexed that 
“[t]he most wholesale criticism of Schleiermacher’s theology comes from Karl Barth.”   31
Then Vial identifies the core of Barth’s objection to Schleiermacher: “that theology must 
be grounded on the revealed Word of God, it cannot be grounded on the experience of the 
community.”   While it is true that Barth is not technically referring to scripture when he 32
 Ibid., 214.28
 Charles A. Jones, III, “Charles Hodge, the Keeper of Orthodoxy: The Method, Purpose and Meaning of 29
His Apologetic” (PhD diss., Drew University, 1989), 211.
 James I. Packer, “Contemporary Views of Revelation,” in Revelation and the Bible: Contemporary 30
Evangelical Thought, ed. Carl F. H. Henry (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Book House, 1958), 92.
 Vial, Schleiermacher: A Guide for the Perplexed, 99.31
 Ibid.32
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speaks of the “Word of God,” that he does not share the aforementioneds’ view of the 
Bible as revelation,  and that Dulles in his revelation typology classifies Barth, not as a 33
representative of the doctrinal, but rather, along with Emil Brunner and Rudolf Bultmann, 
of the dialectical presence model,  Schleiermacher’s content-based/supernaturalist critics 34
would readily agree with the general complaint that Barth articulates.  Barth judged that 
Schleiermacher’s theology did not allow for God’s speaking to humankind.  On one 
occasion, for instance, Barth asserted that the “ancestral line” which runs back through 
“Kierkegaard to Luther and Calvin, and so to Paul and Jeremiah” does not include 
Schleiermacher.  “With all due respect to the genius shown in his work,” he explained, “I 
cannot consider Schleiermacher a good teacher in the realm of theology because, so far as 
I can see . . . one can not speak of God simply by speaking of man in a loud voice.”    35
 After reviewing Schleiermacher’s conception of revelation in Christian Faith, 
Barth claimed that “[n]one of the different definitions of the concept of revelation holds 
up.”  Why did he feel this way?  He explains:  
 For Barth, the Bible and the preaching of the Church bear witness to divine revelation but are not 33
themselves revelation.  In Barth’s well-known terminology, Bible and proclamation as such are not the 
word of God, but they can become God’s word and his revelation if and insofar as Jesus Christ, the 
revealed Word of God, is pleased to speak to us through these chosen witnesses.  See Karl Barth, The 
Doctrine of the Word of God, vol. 1/1 of Church Dogmatics, trans. G. T. Thomson (Edinburgh: T & T 
Clark, 1936), 131-133.
 Dulles, Models of Revelation, 84-97.34
 Karl Barth, The Word of God and the Word of Man, trans. Douglas Horton (Boston: Pilgrim Press, 1928), 35
195-196.  Indeed, to traditionalists, Schleiermacher’s Christian Faith represented a capitulation to the anti-
supernaturalist spirit of the Enlightenment age.  As Barth described Christian Faith, it is “a thinly disguised 
attempt to talk about humanity as if it were talk about God.”  The same could very well be asserted 
specifically of his doctrine of revelation.  See also Stanley J. Grenz and Roger E. Olson, “The 
Reconstruction of Transcendence: Immanence in Nineteenth-Century Theology,” in Twentieth-Century 
Theology: God and the World in a Transitional Age (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 1992), 42. 
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When he [Schleiermacher] calls revelation a divine impartation and 
communication, this has a hopeful ring, but it is only by way of summary.  
Greeks, Egyptians, and Indians all claim to have a communication, and the only 
thing that seriously remains is the ‘fact’ underlying the religion.  A fact, not a 
teaching.    36
Barth explains: “Divine communication as a fact sounds adequate, but what follows 
shows that it is no real communication but part of a series of facts already present, that is, 
of the world.”   Another way of describing Barth’s appraisal of Schleiermacher’s 37
theology is to consider the way he saw his theology compared with Schleiermacher’s: he 
considered his to be “from above” and Schleiermacher’s, “from below.”   38
 Barth asserts that when Schleiermacher thinks of revelation, he is not thinking 
about the encounter between God and humans, but the encounter between those who 
teach and those who are taught.  Barth feels that according to Schleiermacher’s theory, 
then, revelation “can only be a matter of direct (personal) impact and not of the 
communication of thoughts and words.”   Hence, Barth does not believe that 39
Schleiermacher subscribes to “true revelation.”  His conclusion is that if everything is 
revelation, nothing is revelation.  40
 Karl Barth, The Theology of Schleiermacher: Lectures at Göttingen, Winter Semester of 1923/24, ed. 36
Dietrich Ritschl, trans. Geoffrey W. Bromiley (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans, 1982), 234-235.
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Schleiermacher: Beyond the Impasse?, ed. James O. Duke and Robert F. Streetman (Philadelphia: Fortress 
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 That Schleiermacher’s understanding of revelation obliterates the traditional 
distinction between special and general revelation, that if one accepts his understanding 
one cannot pretend to speak about God, that his conception is basically a denial that 
anything is revealed, that his understanding allows no communication of thoughts and 
words—all of these objections are generally articulating the same core criticism of 
Schleiermacher’s theology of revelation, at least of his asseveration that the connection 
between divine revelation and scripture is only indirect.   That principal criticism is this: 41
Schleiermacher’s viewpoint robs Christianity of its content because it does not allow for 
a knowledge of God. 
 In this section, it should be clear that I focus primarily on the criticisms of Schleiermacher’s doctrine of 41
revelation vis-à-vis scripture, and only secondarily on the criticisms of his understanding of revelation in 
general.  The reason for this choice is that the former is more pertinent to my inquiry.  That said, here are 
some of the most common criticisms of his doctrine of revelation: 1) It leads to the loss of transcendence.  
The argument is that his model tells us more about human subjectivity and its functions than it does about 
God.  This criticism, of course, is similar to the one articulated in the body of this chapter.  The general 
criticism is this: If reference to the transcendent is made something achievable by autonomous human 
beings as they reflect on the workings of their consciousness, then in the end, the transcendent is made non-
transcendent.  Schleiermacher’s approach, then, it is claimed, confuses the transcendence of God with the 
transcendence of the human mind.  See Ben Quash, “Revelation,” in Oxford Handbook of Systematic 
Theology, ed. J B. Webster, Kathryn Tanner, and Iain R. Torrance (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 
327-330; Millard J. Erickson, Christian Theology, 330-333, where he identifies Schleiermacher’s theology 
as a modern version of Immanentism.  See also Stanley J. Grenz and Roger E. Olson, “The Reconstruction 
of Transcendence: Immanence in Nineteenth-Century Theology,” 24-62.  2) His identification of the feeling 
of absolute dependence with an experience of God is unwarranted.  Cf., Ronald F. Thiemann, Revelation 
and Theology: The Gospel as Narrated Promise (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1985), 
26-31.  Thiemann writes: “That an experience of absolute dependence is an experience of God is a 
judgment which must be warranted.  Appeals to perceived uniqueness or degree of intensity are insufficient 
to establish the veridical character of the claim. . . . [Schleiermacher’s] defense of revelation founders on 
the incoherence of the notion of intuition or immediate self-consciousness. . . . Schleiermacher’s attempt to 
ground revelation in universal immediate experience is thwarted by his inability to demonstrate that the 
experience stems from a divine origin” (Thiemann, Revelation and Theology, 31); 3) His conception of 
revelation, which includes a supernatural/natural explanation for the appearance of Christ, is incompatible 
with historical science.  For example, Walter E. Wyman, Jr. asks: “Can the historical thinker who adheres 
strictly to historical modes of thought acknowledge anything supernatural in history, even something that 
becomes natural?”  [Walter E. Wyman, Jr., “Revelation and the Doctrine of Faith: Historical Revelation 
within the Limits of Historical Consciousness,” Journal of Religion 78, no. 1 (Janurary 1998), 51.]; See 
David Friedrich Strauss, The Christ of Faith and the Jesus of History, trans. and ed. Leander E. Keck, Lives 
of Jesus Series (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1977), 29.  
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Schleiermacher’s Response 
 How would Schleiermacher respond to the criticism that his doctrine of revelation 
does not allow for a knowledge of God?  How would he respond to the charge that his 
understanding of the connection between divine revelation and scripture, in effect, robs 
Christianity of its content?  In this section I want to answer these questions.  Accordingly, 
I will need to offer a more complete explanation of his conception of revelation in order 
to do so.  As we will see, Schleiermacher’s understanding of revelation is interconnected 
with his soteriology and christology.  In general, I believe Schleiermacher’s response to 
his critics would be twofold: 1) He would disagree with them, to this extent: Inasmuch as 
God is revealed in and through the world and inasmuch as scripture is a part of the world, 
he would argue that his understanding of revelation does allow for “knowledge of 
God,”  albeit knowledge that is limited and based only on an indirect connection 42
between revelation and scripture.  2) He would argue that their criticism is moot, since his 
claim is that communion with God is not knowledge-based.  Rather, it is the experience 
 In 1787, Schleiermacher entered the University of Halle, where he was introduced fully into the 42
Enlightenment climate of the day in philosophy and theology.  It was here that he became familiar with the 
biblical criticism of the Halle scholar J.S. Semler, whose aim was to interpret the Bible as historical 
writings, free from any dogmatic considerations about the special status of the biblical writings as scripture. 
Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason had appeared only six years earlier in 1781, and the philosopher J.A. 
Eberhard gave Schleiermacher a thorough grounding in Kant’s philosophy.  Bruce L. McCormack notes 
that the question of whether and how God is known stood at the heart of theological reflection in this 
period.  He suggests that the issue was created by two developments: the rise of biblical criticism with its 
concomitant distinction of revelation from the Bible, and the much celebrated “turn to the subject,” which 
occurred in philosophy from Descartes through Kant.  It was above all, Kant’s limitation of theoretical 
knowing to the intuitable which made knowledge of God so deeply problematic to modern theologians.  
For if God is a transcendent, wholly spiritual being as the Christian tradition maintains, then God is 
unintuitable, and—if Kant’s restriction holds—cannot be known. See Bruce L. McCormack, Orthodox and 
Modern: Studies in the Theology of Karl Barth (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2008), 23-25.  In the 
Kantian tradition, represented in some ways by Schleiermacher, there was a tendency to stress faith rather 
than revelation.  For more on Schleiermacher’s epistemology and its relationship to Kant’s, see Vial, 
Schleiermacher, 25-41, 67-74; Grenz, Twentieth-Century Theology, 24-51.  
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Christians have of Christ as the mediator of a relationship to God that is salvific.  Vial 
well summarizes this point when he writes:  
The essence of Christianity, for Schleiermacher, is . . . [the] experience of 
redemption.  It is not a set of intellectual propositions about the world to which 
one must subscribe. . . . [R]eligion for Schleiermacher is not thinking or doing, 
not metaphysics or morality, but feeling.  The Christian religion is an experience 
of redemption linked to the person Jesus.  43
The Revelation of God in and through the World 
 Upon what basis would Schleiermacher disagree with his critics?  First, he would 
do so upon the basis that God is revealed in and through the world.  What is the 
significance of this understanding of revelation?  If God is revealed in and through the 
world, that would include scripture, even though it is a human document.  Furthermore, 
for Schleiermacher, scripture is witness to Jesus of Nazareth.  Thus, there remains a 
special, not just a general quality to his understanding of revelation.  Both scripture and 
creation allow for a knowledge of God in Schleiermacher’s theology. 
 According to him, to given observers who had conscious insight, revelation is 
found in and through the world, in the whole of finite and temporal reality.  Over and 
over again in Christian Faith,  Schleiermacher makes this clear:  
[T]he world is the most abundant revelation of God that we can possibly imagine. 
. . . [T]he world is a complete manifestation [Offenbarung] of the attributes of 
God. . . . [E]verything in the world, precisely insofar as it is ascribed to divine 
wisdom, must also be referred to God’s redemptive or newly creating 
revelation. . . . Divine wisdom is the ground by virtue of which the world, viewed 
 Vial, Schleiermacher, 90.43
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as the theater of redemption, is also the absolute revelation of Supreme Being, 
and, consequently, the world is good.      44
 He conveys the same understanding of revelation—that the infinite is revealed in 
and through the finite—in On Religion: Speeches to Its Cultured Despisers.  In the 
second Speech, an artistic discursus on the nature of true religion, Schleiermacher asserts 
that religion’s essence “is neither thinking nor acting, but intuition and feeling.”   Then, 45
he entreats his readers to become familiar with this concept, which he identifies as the 
hinge of his whole speech: “intuition of the universe.”   This is what he asserts about the 46
universe:     
[It] exists in uninterrupted activity and reveals itself to us in every moment.  
Every form that it brings forth, every being to which it gives separate existence 
according to the fullness of life, every occurrence that spills forth from its rich, 
ever-fruitful womb, is an action of the same upon us.  Thus to accept everything 
individual as a part of the whole and everything limited as a representation of the 
infinite is religion.  47
Again, he writes this about revelation: 
What we feel and perceive in the stirrings of religion is not the nature of things 
but their operation upon us. . . . The universe is ceaselessly active.  It is revealing 
itself to us every instant of our lives. . . . Religion is the process of receiving all 
these influences and of adopting their effects within us; and it is the process of 
letting them move us . . . as a representation of the infinite in our lives.  48
 Schleiermacher, Christian Faith, §164.2, §92.3, §168.2, §169.44
 Friedrich Schleiermacher, On Religion: Speeches to Its Cultured Despisers (1799), trans. and ed. Richard 45
Crouter, Cambridge Texts in the History of Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996): 
22.  Hereafter, I will abbreviate this source as On Religion, (Crouter).
 Ibid., 24.46
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 Friedrich Schleiermacher, On Religion: Addresses in Response to Its Cultured Critics (1821), trans. and 48
ed. Terrence N. Tice (Richmond: John Knox Press, 1969), 93.  From this point, I will abbreviate this source 
as On Religion, (Tice).
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 As Schleiermacher nears the end of the second Speech, he reflects upon some of 
the concepts—“miracles,” “inspirations,” “revelations,” “supernatural experiences”—
which underlie the propositions that are created to explain or reflect upon the essence of 
religion.  He asserts that these concepts are not necessary for religion itself, but that 
reflection needs and therefore creates them.  He also acknowledges that there is often 
controversy over the meaning of these concepts.  What is a “miracle”? he asks.  His 
answer once again hints at his belief in the everywhereness of the infinite: a miracle is a 
sign, and “every finite entity is a sign of the infinite.”   Then, he adds:  49
The more religious you become the more of the miraculous you are likely to see 
all around you.  Accordingly all disputing over whether certain events deserve to 
be called miracles or not—no matter where it occurs—simply gives me a painful 
impression of how poor and paltry the religious sense of the combatants is. . . . In 
this way, they simply indicate that they do not wish to see anything of that 
immediate relation to the infinite, and thus to the deity, which exists in the 
world.  50
  
Then, he asks: “What is “revelation”?  Here is his well-known and classic answer: “Every 
new and original intuition of the universe.”   He concludes with this zinger:  51
What can we say of the person who does not see miracles for himself, from his 
own standpoint of viewing the world, of the person whose soul yearns to draw in 
the world’s beauty and to be permeated by its Spirit but for whom no revelation 
 Ibid., 141.49
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 Schleiermacher, On Religion, (Crouter), 49.  Schleiermacher added the following to the second edition of 51
On Religion: “Thus every moment such as I have pointed out above can be seen to be revelatory, if you are 
properly conscious of its special character.  But, in fact, every combination of perspective and feeling that 
has originally developed out of such a moment emerges as a revelation.  To be sure, we cannot openly 
demonstrate it to be so, because it lies beyond conscious observation.  Nonetheless, we must not only 
presuppose the existence of revelation in general terms.  We must also assert that each person knows best 
for himself whether an event is merely experienced as a repetition of something from a non-revelatory 
source or whether that event is original and new.”  Schleiermacher, On Religion, (Tice), 142.
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seems to arise deep within . . . what can we say of the person who is not at least 
conscious of his feelings as immediate influences of the universe upon him . . . 
[w]hat can we say but that such a person has no religion?  52
 In a handful of his sermons, Schleiermacher affirms this same understanding that 
God is revealed in and through the world.  For instance, he speaks of how God is 
revealed in a family and wherever else love is present: 
Just as God is love and God is most clearly revealed to human beings in all that 
love is, so it is especially true of any human love worthy of the name that it can 
attach itself to our feeling for the Supreme Being in our innermost selves and 
thereby sanctify us.  53
In a sermon entitled, “From a Sermon in a Time of Trouble,” he seems to implore his 
listeners to measure the worth of events, not in terms of pleasure or sensual well-being 
but “whether they contain revelations of the divine will and illuminations toward self-
knowledge that make us wiser and better.”   He notes that love is the most common 54
revelation of the eternal essence (vernehmlichste Offenbarung des ewigen Wesens ist).  55
 Schleiermacher’s acceptance of an indirect connection between divine revelation 
and scripture must be subsumed under his conviction that divine revelation is ubiquitous 
in and through the whole world.  Because of this, I believe he would deny that scripture 
 Schleiermacher, On Religion, (Tice), 143.52
 Friedrich Schleiermacher, The Christian Household: A Sermonic Treatise, trans. and ed. Dietrich Seidel 53
and Terrence N. Tice, Schleiermacher Studies and Translations 3 (Lewiston, NY: Edwin Mellen Press, 
1991), 188.
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 Schleiermacher, Kleine Schriften und Predigten, ed. Hayo Gerdes and Emanuel Hirsch (Berlin: De 55
Gruyter, 1970), 405.  Here, he refers to 1 John 4:16, that God is love, and that this is the way Christians 
should live their whole lives.  “Love,” he writes, “is a revelation of God.”
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did not provide information about God, although he would deny that God had provided 
the exact words to scripture’s authors.  56
Communion with God Is Not Knowledge-Based 
 The second response that I believe Schleiermacher would make to those who 
claim that his understanding of revelation does not allow for a knowledge of God is this: 
one’s theology is flawed if it is based on the assertion, as is often the case, that 
knowledge of God precedes communion with God.  In other words, Schleiermacher 
would argue that a relationship with God is not knowledge-based.  It is not the product of 
accepting a set of intellectual propositions about the world or assenting to an assortment 
of doctrines and dogmas about God and religion.   57
 Upon what basis would Schleiermacher argue the above?  First, he would assert 
that the essence of religion is not a knowledge of God.  Rather, it is piety, and piety is not 
based upon knowledge.  The title page to Christian Faith itself provides an early clue to 
Schleiermacher’s understanding of religion’s essence.  There, Schleiermacher includes 
this quote from Anselm: “I do not seek to understand that I may believe, but I believe in 
order to understand. . . . For those who do not believe will not experience, and those who 
 Schleiermacher, Christian Faith, §130.1.56
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have not experienced will not understand.”   In On Religion, Schleiermacher identifies 58
the essence of religion and the “contemplation of pious men” as   
the immediate consciousness of the universal being of all finite things in and 
through the infinite, of all temporal things in and through the eternal.  To seek 
and to find this infinite and eternal factor in all that lives and moves, in all 
growth and change, in all action and passion, and to have and to know life itself 
only in immediate feeling—this is religion. . . . [R]eligion is, indeed, a life in the 
infinite nature of the whole, in the one and all, in God—a having and possessing 
of all in God and of God in all.  Knowledge and knowing, however, it is not, 
either of the world or of God; it only acknowledges these things without being 
either.  59
Again, he claims:  
[At base] religion could not and would not ever originate as pure knowledge.  It 
does not arise from the sheer drive to know.  What we feel and perceive in the 
stirrings of religion is not the nature of things but their operation upon us.  What 
you may know or believe about the nature of things, therefore, lies far outside the 
sphere of religion.  60
Under the propositions borrowed from Ethics in the Introduction of Christian Faith, 
Schleiermacher claims: “The piety that constitutes the basis of all ecclesial communities, 
regarded purely in and of itself, is neither a knowing nor a doing but a distinct formation 
of feeling, or of immediate self-consciousness.”   He does not deny the connection of 61
 Schleiermacher, Der christliche Glaube nach den Grundsätzen der evangelischen Kirche im 58
Zusammenhange dargestellt, Zweite Auflage (1830/31), ed. Rolf Schäfer (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2008), 
1.  This quote is omitted from the title page of the English translation. 
 Schleiermacher, On Religion, (Tice), 79.59
 Ibid., 93.60
 Schleiermacher, Christian Faith, §3.61
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piety to knowing and doing, but asserts that “neither of these constitutes the essence of 
piety.”    62
 Naturally, Schleiermacher was criticized in his day for holding this position.  For 
example, among those who held a different view of the relation of knowledge to piety 
was Karl Gottlieb Bretschneider (1776-1848), a German theologian who evaluated the 
Glaubenslehre in two essays and in an Appendix to his theological textbook.   He held 63
that  
the essence of piety is not feeling, but a combination of knowledge, action, and 
feeling.  Sense objects are to be distinguished from ideas or religious objects.  
The former make impressions that produce either pleasure or pain.  Prior to this 
impression upon us, no knowledge of the object is required.  An idea, however, 
must first be apprehended before it can influence the feeling.  Otherwise, one 
would have a feeling only of something obscure or indefinite rather than a feeling 
of God.  Therefore, a knowledge of God rather than a feeling is essential to 
piety.  64
 Schleiermacher writes a rebuttal to Bretschneider’s critique and a defense of his 
own understanding of the relation between knowledge and piety in his first letter to Dr. 
Lücke.  His rebuttal seems to be founded upon what sensible people would conclude after 
thoughtful reflection upon their own experience.  He writes that when there are so many 
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thousands of people whose representations of God are highly imperfect, yet whose piety 
is simple and pure, “may I then not believe that piety as the determination of the self-
consciousness could be present even before one has come to a concept of the idea of 
God?”   Then, he imagines the possibility of  65
a group of intellectuals who have conceived of the idea of God and who, as they 
do with every other important idea, have worked it out intellectually and drawn 
the consequences from it, but whose feeling for the idea never emerges and never 
makes any impact on their lives, should I nevertheless not be allowed to say that 
the conception of the idea of God, considered in and by itself, is not part of piety 
and is not necessarily the first element in piety?  66
 A second reason Schleiermacher holds that communion with God must not be 
knowledge-based is his strong conviction that saving faith must be accessible to all, 
which it would not be, he claims, if the acquisition of knowledge necessarily precedes 
relationship with God.   We could legitimately infer that Schleiermacher’s claim here is 67
due to his strong belief in spiritual egalitarianism.  Because he believes saving faith is 
equally accessible to all, he is convinced that it cannot come by knowing.  He feels 
strongly about this: “I could never confess that my faith in Christ is derived from 
knowledge or philosophy,” he adamantly acknowledges to Dr. Lücke.    68
 Rejecting the notion that “religion is the daughter of theology,” he powerfully 
claims that this assertion must be rejected by those who have experienced piety in their 
 Schleiermacher, On the Glaubenslehre, 39.65
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youth before they even had any thought of their future vocation and who, therefore, know 
from their own particular history that “piety is independent of every insight into any 
system of comprehended ideas.”   “Do we not have every reason to thank God,” he asks, 69
“that he has revealed piety to the immature especially, that is, to those whose piety would 
not amount to much at all if it were to be based upon a complexus of ideas?”   Again, he 70
probes: 
[H]ow would our evangelical church fare if living evangelical Christianity had 
not struck such deep roots in unspeculative and unphilosophical persons whose 
piety is so far from being based on thought and grounded in an insight into a 
system of ideas that by and large they came only gradually to think about their 
piety?  Thanks be to God, many others now share my conviction that our piety is 
not really that different from that of such persons after all.  71
 Schleiermacher reasons that the position that an idea of God must precede an 
experience of God presupposes that those who are unable to be affected inwardly first by 
an object of thought and to grasp a set of ideas other than those related to their own 
concerns either have no piety at all or have only a piety derived from that of the 
theologians rather than from their own personal lives.  If this were the case, he argues, 
there would then emerge “a hierarchy of intellectual cultured, a priesthood of speculation, 
which for my part cannot find to be very Protestant and which, whenever I had the fate to 
encounter it, has never appeared without a certain popish tinge.”   Then, he adds, that 72
 Ibid., 40.69
 Ibid.70
 Ibid.71
 Ibid., 41.72
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such a position naturally entails a different view of the ministry of the Word: it makes 
every Christian sermon into an instruction.  Schleiermacher saw the task of ministry as 
that of giving “a clear and enlivening description of a common inner experience.”   He 73
explains: 
[W]hat emerges as doctrinal teaching is really only a preparation and a means to 
this end [to the end of giving a “clear and enlivening description of a common 
inner experience”].  We do not fancy that we are introducing into our church 
communities something completely new, as though in the first course of study we 
communicate the ideas to them and then in a second course we base piety on the 
ideas.  Rather, what is possessed is shared in common, and we serve our brothers 
only by explaining more clearly to them what it is and so awaken in them the joy 
in it as well as concern for it.  74
 If communion with God, saving faith, and a relationship to God is not preceded 
by knowledge, upon what does Schleiermacher believe it is based?  The answer to this 
question represents a third reason why Schleiermacher argues against a content/
knowledge-based piety.  His answer is this: what is redemptive is the experience 
Christians have of Christ as the mediator of a relationship to God.   For him, experience, 75
rather than knowledge, is the locus of revelation. 
The Revelation of God in the Feeling of Absolute Dependence 
 I have demonstrated that, in general, Schleiermacher believes that the revelation 
of God may be found in and through the whole world.  Now, I want to explain his 
understanding of a second and more specific locus of revelation: the feeling of absolute 
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dependence.  Under the Propositions borrowed from Ethics in the Introduction of 
Christian Faith, Schleiermacher writes:  
God is given to us in feeling in an original way; and if we speak of an original 
revelation (Offenbarung) of God to man or in man, the meaning will always be 
just this, that, along with the absolute dependence which characterizes not only 
man but all temporal existence, there is given to man also the immediate self-
consciousness of it, which becomes a consciousness of God.  76
   
What is the content of this “original revelation”?  Schleiermacher’s answer is that it is 
nothing less than a consciousness of God.  How is this consciousness of God manifested?  
His answer is that the consciousness of God is embodied or expressed in the feeling of 
absolute dependence.  He writes: “[T]o feel oneself absolutely dependent and to be 
conscious of being in relation with God are one and the same thing.”  77
 One may wonder upon what basis Schleiermacher can call the feeling of absolute 
dependence an original revelation of God.  His explanation is grounded in the way he 
perceives the psychological makeup of human beings.  He asserts that in every self-
consciousness there are two elements, which we might call, respectively, a self-caused 
element (ein Sichselbstsetzen) and a non-self-caused element (ein 
Sichselbstnichtsogesetzthaben).   These two elements correspond, respectively, to 78
activity and receptivity in every person.  That is, human beings are aware that in every 
subject there is an element that acts upon the world and another element upon which the 
 Schleiermacher, Christian Faith, §4.4.76
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!57
world acts.  In brief, there is a part that is active and a part that is passive in every self-
consciousness. 
 The element which expresses movement and activity is the feeling of freedom.  
According to Schleiermacher, however, humans do not have a feeling of absolute 
freedom.   This is evident, he claims, because even when we are exercising freedom we 79
know that our existence is not due to our own spontaneous activity alone.  Rather, our 
existence is given to us.  Alternatively, the element in the self-consciousness which 
expresses a receptivity from some outside quarter is the feeling of dependence.  And, 
contrary to the fact that humans do not have a feeling of absolute freedom, they do have a 
feeling of absolute dependence.  Here is Schleiermacher’s argument:  
[T]he self-consciousness which accompanies all our activity, and therefore, since 
that is never zero, accompanies our whole existence, and negatives absolute 
freedom, is itself precisely a consciousness of absolute dependence; for it is the 
consciousness that the whole of our spontaneous activity comes from a source 
outside of us in just the same sense in which anything towards which we should 
have a feeling of absolute freedom must have proceeded entirely from 
ourselves.  80
 Schleiermacher grounds his understanding of the equivalence of the feeling of 
absolute dependence and a feeling of being related to God on the meaning of “God.”  He 
explains that “God” is the term we use to designate the “Whence of our receptive and 
active existence.”  He adds: “[T]his is for us the really original signification of that 
word.”   This “whence,” however, cannot be the world or any single part of the world 81
 Ibid., §4.3.79
 Ibid.80
 Ibid., §4.4.81
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because “we have a feeling of freedom (though, indeed, a limited one) in relation to the 
world.”  Furthermore, we are parts of the world and we exercise an influence on parts of 
the world.  Schleiermacher points out that “God signifies for us simply that which is the 
co-determinant in this feeling,” the feeling of absolute dependence.   According to this 
line of reasoning, original revelation is “a disclosure of the ‘whence’ of the feeling of 
absolute dependence.”   In other words, the feeling of absolute dependence is to be 82
identified with consciousness of God. 
 There seems to be an exact structural parallel between the argument in proposition 
4 and the argument of the second Speech in On Religion.   Schleiermacher’s aim in the 83
second Speech is to explain the essence, or basic nature, of piety.  He says that the nature 
of real religion “is neither thinking nor acting, but intuition (Anschauung) and feeling 
(Gefühl).”   Then, near the end of that Speech he asks: “What is revelation?”  His answer 84
is, “Every original and new intuition of the universe is one.”  85
 What did Schleiermacher mean by the term, Anschauung?  Vial believes that 
Schleiermacher defined and used the term as Kant had.   For Kant, “[A]n intuition is 86
 Wyman, “Revelation and the Doctrine of Faith: Historical Revelation within the Limits of Historical 82
Consciousness,” 45.  See also Schleiermacher, Christian Faith, §94.2: “[T]o ascribe to Christ an absolutely 
powerful God-consciousness, and to attribute to Him an existence of God in Him, are exactly the same 
thing.  The expression, ‘the existence of God in anyone,’ can only express the relation of the omnipresence 
of God to this one.”
 I am indebted to Wyman for pointing this out.83
 Schleiermacher, On Religion, (Crouter), 22.84
 Ibid., 49.  Schleiermacher adds the following to the second edition of On Religion: “Thus every moment 85
such as I have pointed out above can be seen to be revelatory, if you are properly conscious of its special 
character.  But, in fact, every combination of perspective and feeling that has originally developed out of 
such a moment emerges as a revelation.”  Schleiermacher, On Religion, (Tice), 141-142.  
 Vial, Schleiermacher: A Guide for the Perplexed, 68.86
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such a representation as immediately depends upon the presence of the object.”    One 87
could say that “impression” could be another synonym for what Schleiermacher believes 
Anschauung means.   This is so because Schleiermacher speaks of the influence of the 88
object upon the subject in revelation.  He says: “All intuition proceeds from an influence 
of the intuited on the one who intuits, from an original and independent activity of the 
former, which is then grasped, apprehended, and conceived by the latter according to 
one’s own nature.”   Again, he says: “[W]hat you thus intuit and perceive is not the 89
nature of things, but their action upon you.  What you know or believe about the nature of 
things lies far beyond the realm of intuition.”  90
 What does Schleiermacher mean when he writes that revelation is an intuition of 
the universe?  He seems to mean that the universe is that object—in this case the whole 
of finite and temporal reality—which presents itself or is presented to a subject.  He 
writes:  
 Immanuel Kant, Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics, ed. Beryl Logan, Routledge Philosophers in 87
Focus Series (London: Routledge, 1996), 51.  Kant writes: “Cognition refers to or ‘presents’ objects in 
many different ways, but it is ‘intuition’ (Anschauung) by which it refers to them directly, or without 
mediation.  An intuition is a direct presentation (Vorstellung) of an object.  Or, in other words, an intuition 
is the object as given.”  Douglas Burnham, Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, Indiana Philosophical Guides 
(Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2007), 37.  Tice gives the basic definition of Anschauung as 
“perception.”  He writes: “For Schleiermacher, Anschauung is indeed always a relatively internal 
phenomenon, because it is an internal mental function that registers what comes into the sensorium from 
relatively external sources, including the body.  Nevertheless, the referent is always external relative to any 
given affective state.  This is why the most frequent, ordinary uses of Anschauung must be translated 
‘perception,’ as they tend to be wherever the word is placed.”  (Tice, Schleiermacher, 23-24.)
 “To register the impression from without is the function of Anschauung.”  Tice, Schleiermacher, 23.88
 Schleiermacher, On Religion, (Crouter), 24-25.89
 Ibid., 25.  Vial notes that Schleiermacher shares Kant’s conviction that one cannot know things-in-90
themselves.  “Schleiermacher does not think that, by intuiting something, we pierce the Kantian veil and 
have direct contact with a thing-in-itself.”  Vial, Schleiermacher: A Guide for the Perplexed, 68.
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The universe exists in uninterrupted activity and reveals itself to us in every 
moment.  Every form that it brings forth, every being to which it gives separate 
existence according to the fullness of life, every occurrence that spills forth from 
its rich, every-fruitful womb, is an action of the same upon us.  Thus to accept 
everything individual as a part of the whole and everything limited as a 
representation of the infinite is religion.    91
Elsewhere, he explains further: 
What we feel and perceive in the stirrings of religion is not the nature of things 
but their operation upon us. . . . The universe is ceaselessly active.  It is revealing 
itself to us every instant of our lives. . . . Religion is the process of receiving all 
these influences and of adopting their effects within us; and it is the process of 
letting them move us . . . as a representation of the infinite in our lives.  92
  
 Anschauung and Gefühl are certainly key terms in Schleiermacher’s lexicon.  
Schleiermacher clearly makes a distinction between the two, though they reside at the 
same level of mental functioning and can add components as they extend to thinking, 
willing, and acting.  He writes:  
[R]ecall that every intuition (Anschauung) is, by its very nature, connected with a 
feeling (Gefühl).  Your senses mediate the connection between the object and 
yourselves; the same influence of the object, which reveals its existence to you, 
must stimulate them in various ways and produce a change in your inner 
consciousness. . . . The same actions of the universe through which it reveals 
itself to you in the finite also bring it into a new relationship to your mind and 
your condition; in the act of intuiting it, you must necessarily be seized by 
various feelings.   93
  
 Schleiermacher, On Religion, (Crouter), 25..91
 Schleiermacher, On Religion, (Tice), 93.92
Schleiermacher, On Religion, (Crouter), 29.93
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Vial understands Anschauung and Gefühl to be “two sides of the same coin of 
experience.”   He writes: “One can understand intuition, for Schleiermacher, as the 94
objective side of experience (the action on us of something outside us).  ‘Feeling’ he 
defines not primarily as emotion but as the subjective side of experience.”  95
The Revelation of God in Christ 
 A third locus of revelation, and the principal one for Schleiermacher, is Christ.  
He describes Christ as “the supreme divine revelation” (die höchste göttliche 
Offenbarung).   In his second letter to Lücke, and just after wondering what challenges 96
will be posed to Christianity by natural science, he encourages Lücke to see if he can 
dismiss, in light of the modern worldview, 
what has been until now essential to Christianity: belief in a divine revelation in 
the person of Jesus (des Glaubens an eine göttliche Offenbarung in der Person 
Jesu) from whom everyone can and should derive a new, powerful heavenly 
life.  97
 Vial, Schleiermacher, 69.  See also, Wyman, “Revelation and the Doctrine of Faith,” 41-42.  Tice defines 94
these two words as perception (Anschauung) and feeling — “an immediate awareness of God’s presence 
within communities of Christians, transforming and motivating one’s innermost being.”  Friedrich 
Schleiermacher, Brief Outline of Theology as a Field of Study: Revised Translation of the 1811 and 1830 
Editions, trans. and ed. Terrence N. Tice, 3rd ed. (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox Press, 2011), 
134.  Hereafter, this source will be abbreviated as Brief Outline.
 Vial, Schleiermacher, 69.95
 Schleiermacher, Christian Faith, §14, p.s.  Interestingly, Wyman asserts that there does not need to be a 96
doctrine of revelation in the body of the Glaubenslehre, since there is a christology.  His point is that 
Schleiermacher’s christology embodies his doctrine of divine revelation.  Wyman, “Revelation and the 
Doctrine of Faith,” 49.
 Schleiermacher, On the Glaubenslehre, 62.97
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 Several times in Christian Faith, Schleiermacher refers to “the revelation of God 
in Christ (die Offenbarung Gottes in Christo).”   What is his understanding of this 98
concept?  First, he believes it is Christ’s God-consciousness that is the revelation of God 
in him.  Christ’s God-consciousness is his awareness that arises from God; it is the 
presence of God in him.   It is the level of that God-consciousness that makes Christ’s 99
experience of God unique.  Schleiermacher explains: 
[T]he Redeemer  is the same as all human beings by virtue of the selfsame 100
character of human nature, but he is distinguished from all other human beings 
by the steady strength (stetige Kräftigkeit) of his God-consciousness, a strength 
that was an actual being of God in him.  101
   
Not wanting his readers to misunderstand what he means by this, he adds that “to 
attribute an absolutely strong God-consciousness to Christ and to ascribe to him a being 
of God in him are entirely one and the same thing.”   According to Schleiermacher’s 102
understanding, this God-consciousness was “co-posited” (mitgesezten) in Christ’s self-
consciousness.   Furthermore, it exists uniquely in him alone.  After explaining that 103
 Schleiermacher, Christian Faith, §§14, p.s., 47.1, 103.2, 164.2, 168.2.98
 See Catherine L. Kelsey, Thinking about Christ with Schleiermacher (Louisville, KY: Westminster John 99
Knox Press, 2003), 17-18.  
 It is not the aim of this dissertation to examine Schleiermacher’s christology or his soteriology.  100
However, I will add here that what is redemptive in Schleiermacher’s theology is that disciples of Jesus 
encounter his perfect God-consciousness.  This is related to the reason scripture is an authoritative norm for 
theology: it is the first expression of this experience.  I will discuss this in more detail in Chapter Six.
 Schleiermacher, Christian Faith, §94.  The phrase, which is translated, “an actual being of God in him,” 101
is ein eigentliches Sein Gottes in ihm.  This phrase may be a bit misleading.  Schleiermacher is only 
expressing his belief that Christ is a be-ing (Sein) of God, not that there is a strict identity between the two.
 Ibid., §94.2.  For other references to the “being of God” in Christ, see Christian Faith, §100.1 and 102
§103.2.
 Ibid.103
!63
God’s being can be conceived only as “pure activity” and that there is “no being of God 
in any individual thing, but only a being of God in the world,” Schleiermacher asserts 
that 
Christ is deemed to be the sole and original locus for the being of God in human 
nature, and he alone is the “other” in whom there is an actual being of God—that 
is, he does so inasmuch as we posit God-consciousness in his self-consciousness 
as determining every element of his life steadily and exclusively.  In 
consequence, he has this status inasmuch as we also posit this complete 
indwelling of Supreme Being as his distinctive nature and his innermost self.  104
  Second, Schleiermacher believes that this revelation, the appearance in history of 
this perfect God-consciousness is, indeed, due to divine causality.   When 105
Schleiermacher discusses revelation under the propositions borrowed from the 
Philosophy of Religion in the Introduction to Christian Faith,   he asserts that all will 106
agree that the term “revealed” is never applied either to what is uncovered by one person 
and passed on to others or to what one person works out for himself and passes on to 
others.  It “presupposes a divine communication (Mittheilung) and declaration 
 Ibid.  Tice includes this note just here in his translation of Christian Faith: “Cf., the statement at this 104
place in the first edition (KGA I/7.2, 29): ‘God was in him [the Redeemer] in the highest sense in which 
God can ever be in anyone” (dass Gott in ihm war in dem höchsten Sinne, in welchem überall Gott in 
Einem sein kann).  At this place in this second edition Schleiermacher clarifies the point that no one else 
actually reaches the same level of God-consciousness that is to be seen in Christ.”
 Schleiermacher describes “the divine causality” as “the divine government of the world,” which is 105
expressed as divine love and wisdom.  Schleiermacher, Christian Faith, §§164-165; See also Tice, 
Schleiermacher, 35.
 Schleiermacher’s discussion of revelation in the Introduction of the Glaubenslehre appears under 106
propositions which belong to Ethics, the Philosophy of Religion, and Apologetics.  Ethics, in 
Schleiermacher’s architectonic of knowledge, has to do with the science of reason and history, or the 
human sciences, and runs parallel to Physics, the science of nature.  He understands the science of Ethics as 
a field, which encompasses all human activity, most particularly the activity that furthers the 
interpenetration of reason and the material world.  By Philosophy of Religion, Schleiermacher refers to the 
study of the phenomenon of piety in human nature and the different forms of religion.  Schleiermacher, 
Brief Outline, §39. Apologetics has to do with the study of Christianity, in general, and Protestantism, in 
particular.  For a discussion of Schleiermacher’s architectonic of knowledge, see Vial, Schleiermacher: A 
Guide for the Perplexed, 33-34.
!64
(Kundmachung).”   In this sense, he adds, the word is generally applied to the origin of 107
religious communions.  Then, he provides a definition of historical revelation that is not 
only applicable to Christianity but also to all positive religions.  He claims that “the 
concept ‘revelation’ designates the originative character of the fact that underlies a given 
religious community.”   Thus, he defines revelation as that which explains the starting 108
point from which any religion can be traced. 
  Schleiermacher adds that the “original fact” which shapes the life of any new 
community cannot be explained by historical antecedents.  In the Christian community, of 
course, this original fact is Jesus Christ and the redemption accomplished in and through 
him.  According to Schleiermacher, this original fact, which is the foundation of the 
community’s life, cannot be explained wholly in terms of the natural forces and causes 
that precede it.  Appeal must therefore be made to divine causality as its ultimate 
source.  109
 In fact, Schleiermacher calls the appearance of the Redeemer in history “that one 
great miracle”  and “the miracle of miracles.”   He writes that the redemption 110 111
accomplished by Christ is through his influence, through the communication of his 
 Schleiermacher, Christian Faith, §10, p.s.107
 Ibid.108
 Ibid.  For Schleiermacher, this also explains why the content of revelation cannot be information.  He 109
reasons that if revelation is equated with doctrine and propositions, “then nothing supernatural was required 
for their production” (Schleiermacher, Christian Faith, §10, p.s.).  Naturally, Schleiermacher also traces to 
the divine causality “our consciousness of fellowship with God.” See Christian Faith, §164.
 Ibid., §47.1110
 Schleiermacher, On the Glaubenslehre, 64.111
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sinless perfection, and because of the potency of his God-consciousness.  So, he explains 
the warrant for believing that the appearance of Jesus was “supernatural”:  
This God-consciousness, manifesting itself in this potency, can have come into 
existence only outside the sinful corporate life.  And since the whole human race 
is included in this sinful corporate life, we must believe that this God-
consciousness had a supernatural origin, though only in the sense which has been 
postulated above.     112
 In what sense does Schleiermacher believe that the appearance of an archetypal 
God-consciousness in history had a supernatural origin?  He elaborates in the 
Glaubenslehre, §13.  At first glance, the proposition may sound like a denial that 
Christian revelation is “outside the human and natural order.”   The proposition states: 113
“As divine revelation, the appearance of the Redeemer in history is neither something 
absolutely supernatural nor something absolutely superrational.”   Although 114
Schleiermacher begins his discussion of this proposition by asserting again that the origin 
of any religious communion can never be explained by “the condition of the circle in 
which it arose and progressed,” he quickly suggests that there is nothing to prevent us 
from assuming “that the emergence of such a life would be the effect of the force for 
development that indwells our nature as a species.”   He claims that founders of 115
 Schleiermacher, Christian Faith, §88.4.  Just here, Schleiermacher includes a footnote to compare §13.1.112
 This is the language Schleiermacher uses to describe the sense in which we find the word “revelation” as 113
it is applied to the origin of religious societies, “that they originally came from heaven or were proclaimed 
by Deity in some way which fell outside the human and natural order” (Christian Faith, §10, p.s.).
 Schleiermacher, Christian Faith, §13.  Tice notes here that “it might be clearer to say ‘supra’ (above and 114
beyond) rather than ‘super’ (which could mean ‘heightened.’).”  For a fine summary and explanation of 
Christian Faith, §13, see Tice, Schleiermacher, 41-42.  See also Christian Faith, §92.4.
 Schleiermacher, Christian Faith, §13.115
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religious communions are specially-endowed individuals, who “are made fruitful from 
the general wellspring of life (Lebensquell).”   Then, he adds, that we have to regard the 116
fact that such individuals do appear from time to time to be a natural occurrence 
(Gesetzmäßiges). 
 For Schleiermacher, there is no real comparison between Christ and the founders 
of other religions, even though it may be said that all have special endowments.  Christ 
and Christianity are distinctively different.  Schleiermacher reasons that the contributions 
of other founders of religious societies are limited to particular times and places and are 
destined to be submerged in Christ.  Too, only Christ is in a position to enliven the entire 
human race to its higher state.  He asserts that a person who does not accept Christ as 
providing divine revelation in this generally extended sense cannot intend Christianity to 
be a permanent phenomenon.  117
 Notwithstanding this claim that there is a distinction between Christ and all other 
human beings, Schleiermacher insists that there is nothing to prohibit one from saying 
that Christ’s appearance, “even as the becoming human (Menschwerden) of the Son of 
God, would be something natural.”   This is true for two reasons, according to 118
Schleiermacher.  First, it must be possible for there to be a natural explanation for 
Christ’s appearance or for an accompanying Christian revelation since it has been proven 
 Ibid., §13.1.116
 Ibid.117
 Ibid.  Schleiermacher does not feel the need to “draw boundaries between what is natural and what is 118
absolutely supernatural in actual reality.”  See Schleiermacher, On the Glaubenslehre, 64-65.
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possible for human beings to “take up what is divine into oneself (das göttliche . . . in 
sich aufzunehmen).”   Christ was and he did; he was a human being who received, and 119
thus, took up the divine into himself.  Second, if one rules out the possibility of a natural 
explanation for the appearance of Christ, one would have to say that what is restoratively 
divine made its appearance in Jesus and in no other because of an arbitrary act of God.  
Schleiermacher cannot accept this explanation.  To do so would necessitate an 
anthropathic (anthropopathische) view of God, which, he asserts, even scripture does not 
support.  Rather, Schleiermacher refers to Galatians 4:4 and claims that scripture views 
the appearance of Christ as a conditional event, that is, as an action of human nature and 
one that developed naturally.  120
 Schleiermacher explains that he subscribes to the notion that the appearance of 
Christ was due to “an initiating divine activity” which is supernatural, but that, at the 
same time, what was supernatural became historically natural.   He adds: 121
[T]he appearance of the Redeemer in the midst of this natural development is no 
longer a supernatural emergence of a new state of development, but simply one 
conditioned by that which precedes—though certainly its connection with the 
former is to be found only in the unity of the divine thought.  122
   
Again, Schleiermacher asserts the supernatural origin of Christ, but in a natural way:  
Now this second Adam is placed within the historical interconnectedness of 
human nature, and indeed simply as an individual human being, though not from 
 Schleiermacher, Christian Faith, §13.1.119
 Ibid.120
 Ibid., §88.4.121
 Ibid.  See also Christian Faith, §47.1.122
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within this earlier interconnectedness of human nature but in relation to it as a 
supernatural phenomenon.  This being the case, he, as well as his entire 
efficacious action, stands under the law of historical development, and that 
development is completed through its gradual spread outward from the point of 
his appearance over the whole of humanity.  123
   
Schleiermacher views the appearance of Christ and the new corporate life made possible 
by him as the completion of the creation of human nature.  124
 Although he asserts that the appearance of Christ in history is not absolutely 
supernatural, he claims that it is, nonetheless, supernatural.   For Schleiermacher, Christ 
is the Redeemer.  Because he believes that no one else is able to accomplish redemption, 
he reasons that the state of God-consciousness by which the Redeemer accomplishes 
redemption is inexplicable on the basis of “reason that uniformly indwells all other 
human beings.”   If it were otherwise, then others could effect redemption, which, of 125
course, he believes they cannot do.  Moreover, he asserts that in redeemed people there 
are states of mind which are caused solely by Christ’s communication or influence.  How 
shall these mental states be explained?  Schleiermacher here asserts that these states 
cannot be explained solely by the reason which has dwelled within them from birth.  Tice 
 Ibid., §89.2.123
 Ibid., §89.124
 Schleiermacher, Christian Faith, §13.2.125
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summarizes it well: “The appearance of the Redeemer in history is indeed supernatural, 
but not as if the possibility for assimilating it did not already exist in human nature.”   126
 When Schleiermacher discusses the prophetic office of Christ and his teaching 
activity in Christian Faith he asserts that the source of Jesus’s teaching was not the law, 
as it was for the prophets of Israel, nor was it a development of the ethics current among 
the people.  It did not spring from universal human reason.  Rather, the source of his 
teaching was “the absolutely original revelation of God in him.”   Schleiermacher adds 127
that Christ’s self-determination to teach was the task of satisfying fully the powerful God-
consciousness in him. 
 This is one additional reason why Schleiermacher does not see a direct connection 
of identity between revelation and Scripture.  All that the writers of the New Testament 
scriptures taught, Schleiermacher believed, must have derived from Christ.  For, “the 
original divine declaration of whatever is contained in the sacred scriptures also has to be 
present in Christ himself.”   Schleiermacher’s conclusion is that “the speaking and 128
writing of the apostles moved as they were by the Spirit, was also a communicating of the 
divine revelation that existed in Christ.”   129
 Tice, Schleiermacher, 41.  Here is how Kelsey describes the appearance of Jesus: “Miracles are 126
superfluous for redemption through Christ; they don’t help us to receive his God-consciousness ([Christian 
Faith,]§103.1).  The only miracle that matters is the appearance of Christ’s sinless perfection in a living 
human person, which is not really a miracle.  Instead, the appearance of the Redeemer is part of the 
unfolding of God’s original creation—part of the intention for nature, though not an intention we could 
achieve on our own.” (Kelsey, Thinking about Christ with Schleiermacher, 93.)
 Schleiermacher, Christian Faith, §103.2.127
 Ibid., §130.1.128
 Ibid.129
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 It should be obvious by now, that Schleiermacher’s understanding of the nature or 
essence of revelation is in stark contrast to the content-based/supernaturalist model of 
revelation, generally, or to Carl F. H. Henry’s doctrinal model, specifically.  One of the 
chief differences is that for Schleiermacher, revelation does not operate in the activity of 
knowing, but in the activity of feeling.   Therefore, we might say that, for him, the 130
nature of revelation is not cognitive, but experiential.  This partially explains his 
disinclination to equate revelation to dogma, doctrine, facts, or information.  For him, 
revelation does not occur on the level of knowing.  After granting in the Introduction to 
Christian Faith that “there is a divine causality” to revelation and that revelation is “an 
activity which aims at and furthers the salvation of human beings,” Schleiermacher 
states: “But I am unwilling to accept . . . that it operates upon any human being as a 
knowing being.  For that would make the revelation to be originally and essentially 
doctrine; and I do not believe that we can adopt that position.”  131
 In discussing Schleiermacher’s understanding of the relationship of divine 
revelation to scripture—that there is only an indirect connection of identity between the 
two—I have compared his understanding of this concept to the content-based/
supernaturalist model of revelation.  The latter tends to affirm a direct connection 
between revelation and scripture and asserts that divine revelation is given in words with 
 Just here I am intentionally using terms that Schleiermacher used to describe the tripartite division of 130
selfhood (feeling, knowing, and willing).  This terminology is found in Christian Faith, §3.2.  Also, I refer 
to his understanding of the two forms of consciousness, knowing and feeling, which constitute the “abiding 
in self” (Insichbleiben).  See Christian Faith, §3.3.
 Ibid., §10, p.s.131
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strict propositional meanings, which are authored by God.  Schleiermacher does not share 
this perspective.  His understanding of divine revelation is that it is located in the 
experience of God in the world, in the feeling of absolute dependence, and in Christ, the 
appearance of the archetypal God-consciousness in history.  I have shown that the chief 
criticism of Schleiermacher’s understanding of revelation, that it does not allow for a 
knowledge of God, is an unfair one.  Moreover, I have demonstrated that this criticism, 
according to Schleiermacher, arises from what seems to be a flawed understanding of 
how relationship with God is achieved.  In the next chapter, I turn to a discussion of 
Schleiermacher’s understanding of “inspiration” and the identity and influence of the 
Spirit.  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Chapter Four: Schleiermacher and the Meaning of Inspiration 
 In the previous chapter I showed that it is erroneous to claim that Schleiermacher 
did not believe in the reality of divine revelation.  He believed that God is revealed in and 
through the world, in the experience of God in the world, in the feeling of absolute 
dependence, and in Christ.  I also demonstrated that while he accepted an indirect 
connection between scripture and divine revelation, since scripture is a part of the world 
in which God is revealed, he did not believe that scripture is its locus.  For him, there is 
no warrant to support the claim of a direct connection between divine revelation and the 
New Testament. 
 Similarly, I will argue in this chapter that it is erroneous to claim that 
Schleiermacher did not believe in divine inspiration.  As I did in Chapter Three, I will 
begin by comparing his view of inspiration as it relates to scripture with a standard 
content-based/supernaturalist one.  In doing so, I will also be describing the basic features 
of his conception of this doctrine.  I will then point out some of the primary criticisms of 
his understanding, in particular the complaints that his interpretation renders God to be 
relatively inactive in the process of writing down scripture and that it over exaggerates 
the immanence of God.  Finally, I want to trace out what I believe would be his response 
to his critics and the reasoning that underlies it. 
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 Before moving into the body of this chapter, I want to preface my remarks with 
something of a disclaimer.  While the subject of divine inspiration vis-à-vis scripture is 
important to many content-based/supernaturalists for whom it is foundational, 
Schleiermacher seems to treat it as a subordinate concern in his writings.  It just does not 
seem to be very important or crucial to him.   As proof of this, we might consider 1
something he wrote in his Second Letter to Dr. Lücke: 
The belief in a special inspiration or revelation of God that continued up to a 
certain point of time in the Jewish nation is one that contemporary studies of 
Jewish history do little to corroborate.  Nor do I think it very likely that the 
results of these studies will lend that belief much more support.  Consequently, it 
seems to me to be essential that I state as clearly as possible my view and strong 
feeling that faith in God’s revelation in Christ is not dependent upon such belief.  
If our doctrine of faith were a collection or system of decisions about all the true 
or alleged facts of revelation, then of course a decision would have to be made 
about this point, too.  But, since it is only an account of Christian faith as such, 
we ought not place this additional burden on ourselves.  2
I believe Schleiermacher would also apply to New Testament scripture what he wrote 
above regarding the possible special inspiration of Jewish scripture: having to prove the 
legitimacy of biblical inspiration is an additional burden that we need not place on 
ourselves.  As I will lay out in later chapters, for Schleiermacher, Christian faith (and 
biblical authority) is not based on establishing an understanding of the Christian doctrine 
of biblical inspiration with certainty.  Having offered this disclaimer, what, then, is 
Schleiermacher’s conception of inspiration? 
 Schleiermacher, Christian Faith, §14.  For him, it is faith in Jesus, viewed as the Redeemer, that is 1
primary.
 Schleiermacher, On the Glaubenslehre, 65-66.2
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Henry’s Doctrine of Inspiration Vis-à-vis Scripture 
 For the purpose of clarifying Schleiermacher’s understanding of a key doctrine 
that tends to be closely related to biblical authority by comparing this doctrine to a classic 
content-based/supernaturalist model, I began the last chapter with a brief description of 
Carl F. H. Henry’s understanding of revelation.  Similarly, and for the same purpose, I 
want to begin this chapter with a description of Henry’s conception of inspiration.  3
 I noted in Chapter Three that the eleventh thesis of Henry’s magnum opus God, 
Revelation and Authority states: “The Bible is a reservoir and conduit of divine truth.”   4
Henry’s twelfth thesis must surely be intended to provide justification for the claims of 
thesis number eleven.  It asserts: “The Holy Spirit superintends the communication of 
divine revelation, first as the inspirer and then as the illuminator and interpreter of the 
scripturally given Word of God.”   For Henry, the Bible is a reservoir of divine truth 5
because it is divine revelation, which revelation is inspired by the Holy Spirit.  What, 
however, does Henry mean by the phrase “inspired by the Holy Spirit”?  What is his 
understanding of “inspiration”? 
 For a discussion of different models of inspiration see Stanley J. Grenz, Theology for the Community of 3
God (Nashville, TN: Broadman & Holman, 1994), 497-506; Paul J. Achetemeier, Inspiration and 
Authority: Nature and Function of Christian Scripture (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 1999), 8-63; 
Robert Gnuse, The Authority of the Bible: Theories of Inspiration, Revelation and the Canon of Scripture 
(New York: Paulist Press, 1985), 6-62; Mark J. Zia, What Are They Saying about Biblical Inspiration (New 
York: Paulist Press, 2011); and Bruce Vawter, Biblical Inspiration (Philadelphia, PA: Westminster, 1972).  
For an excellent summary of the doctrine of inspiration since the Reformation, see William E. Nix, “The 
Doctrine of Inspiration Since the Reformation, Part II: Changing Climates of Opinion,” Journal of the 
Evangelical Theological Society 27, no. 4 (December 1984): 439-457.
 Henry, God, Revelation and Authority, 2:13.4
 Ibid., 4:129.5
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 To provide a framework for unpacking Henry’s conception of inspiration, as well 
as to provide points of comparison with Schleiermacher’s understanding, I will now 
discuss some of the key features of their viewpoints by addressing these two questions: 
What is the essence of inspiration? and What is its locus?   
 First, Henry believes that, essentially, inspiration is the connection that occurs 
between God’s power and knowledge and the literary capabilities of select human beings 
for the sake of producing a written account of divine revelation.  “Inspiration is a 
supernatural influence upon divinely chosen prophets and apostles,” he asserts, “whereby 
the Spirit of God assures the truth and trustworthiness of the oral and written 
proclamation.”   Attendant to this definition, he adds that historic evangelical Christianity 6
considers the Bible to be the essential textbook because, in view of the aforementioned 
quality, it inscripturates divinely revealed truth in verbal form. 
 Henry finds justification for defining inspiration as a “supernatural influence” of 
the Holy Spirit in two biblical texts.  The first is 2 Timothy 3:16, which states:  “All 
scripture is inspired by God.”   The Greek word that is translated “inspired” is 7
theopnuestos.  The literal meaning of the word is “God-breathed.”  Commenting on this 
term and scripture, Henry writes: “The Scriptures in their written form are a product of 
 Ibid., 4:129.6
 All English translations of scripture are taken from the New Revised Standard Version, unless otherwise 7
noted.
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divine spiration, that is, are divinely ‘breathed out’ and therefore owe their unique reality 
to the life-giving breath of God.”   The second text is 2 Peter 1:19-21:  8
So we have the prophetic message more fully confirmed. You will do well to be 
attentive to this as to a lamp shining in a dark place, until the day dawns and the 
morning star rises in your hearts.  First of all you must understand this, that no 
prophecy of scripture is a matter of one’s own interpretation, because no 
prophecy ever came by human will, but men and women moved by the Holy 
Spirit spoke from God.  
Regarding this passage, Henry writes that, first of all, the apostle “disavows its human 
derivation,” then he affirms the origin of scripture to be divine by the phrase “men spoke 
from God.”   His conclusion is that both passages “unqualifiedly assert the divine origin 9
of Scripture.”   He insists, therefore, that “God is the ultimate author of Scripture” and 10
that “[t]he Holy Spirit is the communicator of the prophetic-apostolic writings.”   One 11
 Ibid., 4:131.  Just here, Henry sees an allusion to Genesis 2:7.8
 Ibid., 4:132.9
 Ibid.  Henry finds support for his understanding of inspiration not only in the biblical text itself but also 10
in the tradition of the church.  He refers with approval to what Benjamin B. Warfield wrote on the subject 
of inspiration: “The Church . . . has held from the beginning that the Bible is the Word of God in such a 
sense that its words, though written by men and bearing indelibly impressed upon them the marks of their 
human origin, were written, nevertheless, under such an influence of the Holy Ghost as to be also the words 
of God, the adequate expression of His mind and will.  It has always recognized that this conception of co-
authorship implies that the Spirit’s superintendence extends to the choice of the words by the human 
authors (verbal inspiration), and preserves its product from everything inconsistent with a divine 
authorship” (Warfield, The Inspiration and Authority of the Bible, 173).  In fact, Henry is certainly in 
Warfield’s theological lineage.  Warfield believed in verbal plenary inspiration because “it is the settled 
faith of the universal church of God” (The Inspiration and Authority of the Bible, 106).  To substantiate this 
claim, he wrote: “[T]he primary ground on which it has been held by the church as the true doctrine is that 
it is the doctrine of the Biblical writers themselves, and has therefore the whole mass of evidence for it 
which goes to show that the Biblical writers are trustworthy as doctrinal guides” (Ibid., 173).  He believed 
that the following was sufficient evidence to support this doctrine: 1) The doctrine held and taught by the 
Church is the doctrine held and taught by the Biblical writers themselves; 2) There is evidence—“internal 
and external, objective and subjective, historical and philosophical, human and divine—which goes to 
show that the Biblical writers are trustworthy as doctrinal guides (Ibid., 174).  He held that “[i]f criticism is 
to assail this doctrine . . . [i]t must either show that this doctrine is not the doctrine of the Biblical writers, 
or else it must show that the Biblical writers are not trustworthy as doctrinal guides” (Ibid.).  This is surely 
a circular argument at best.
 Henry, God, Revelation and Authority, 4:159.11
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may conclude, then, that Henry sees somewhat of an equivalence between divine 
revelation and inspiration. 
 A second characteristic of Henry’s conception of inspiration lies in his belief that 
the locus of inspiration is the content, rather than the authors, of scripture.   He writes: 12
“But when the Scripture speaks of inspiration, it does not stop short with the inspiration 
of only the person; rather, it affirms something specific also about the written texts.”   13
Additionally, Henry does not understand the content of inspiration to be merely the 
thoughts of the authors, but rather, their actual words.  He believed it frustrated the goal 
of inspiration to confine it to “mental concepts in distinction from words, since 
improperly phrased ideas fall short of being a communication of truth.”  He continues: 
“The biblical emphasis falls not on revealed concepts and ideas but on inspired 
Scripture.”   Thus, he affirms that  14
 One of the key questions related to the doctrine of inspiration is the locus of that inspiration.  Is it the 12
writers or the words that are inspired?  James Orr is an example of those who believe that the locus of 
inspiration is the authors of the biblical texts.  He argues that inspiration “belongs primarily to the person,” 
and only derivatively to the book “only as it is the product of the inspired person.”  He writes: “There is no 
inspiration inhering literally in the paper, ink, or type, of the sacred volume.  The inspiration was in the soul 
of the writer; the qualities that are communicated to the writing had their seat first in the mind or heart of 
the man who wrote” [James Orr, Revelation and Inspiration (1910; repr., Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1952), 
162-163].  Others, including Henry, assert that it is the words that those authors wrote which are inspired.  
They wonder how one can be sure that what the inspired author wrote is a true reflection of that inspiration 
if one cannot also say that the very words the author wrote were also inspired.  For a fine discussion of 
these alternative ways of understanding inspiration, cf. John Kelman Sutherland Reid, The Authority of 
Scripture (London: Methuen, 1957), 156ff. and Paul J. Achetemeier, Inspiration and Authority: Nature and 
Function of Christian Scripture, 9-22.  Reid certainly sees a connection between the inspiration of the 
authors and their words when he writes: “If the words of Scripture are inspired, since they are admittedly 
written if not composed by human agents, these human agents must have been moved to their writing in 
some unusual way, and this can mean only inspiration.  On the other hand, the view that the writers are 
inspired need not involve the inspiration of the words.  Hence inspiration of the words seems to be 
inclusive of but not coincident with that of the writer’s inspiration.” (Reid, The Authority of Scripture, 157).     
 Henry, God, Revelation and Authority, 4:143.13
 Ibid.14
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the text of Scripture is divinely inspired as an objective deposit of language. . . . 
The biblical and evangelical view does not limit divine inspiration as an activity 
internal to the psyche of the writers, but recognizes its importance beyond the 
subjective psychology of the chosen prophets and apostles.  The non biblical 
notions of inspiration obscure the nature of biblical inspiration by asserting the 
inspiration of only the writers, and not of the written truths they enunciate.  The 
biblical doctrine of inspiration, on the other hand, connects God’s activity with 
the express truths and words of Scripture.  15
 A third feature of Henry’s understanding of inspiration is that it is reserved for 
only a select group of individuals.  He holds that “divine inspiration is limited to a small 
company of messengers who were divinely chosen to authoritatively communicate the 
Word of God to mankind.”   He writes, “This inspiration is no universal phenomenon, 16
nor is it necessarily or actually shared by all or most spiritually devout and obedient men 
of God.”   He may possibly have had Schleiermacher in mind as he wrote these very 17
words, for in contrast to Henry, Schleiermacher did affirm that inspiration was a 
“universal phenomenon,” as we will see later in this chapter. 
Schleiermacher’s Understanding of Inspiration 
 Now, I want to lay out Schliermacher’s conception of inspiration and compare it 
to the content-based/supernaturalist model.  The primary characteristics of 
Schleiermacher’s understanding of “inspiration” may be found in Christian Faith, §130.  
Naturally, that this proposition is located in his discussion of the broader doctrine of 
scripture in §§128-132, is not surprising.  What may surprise many is that he absolutely 
 Ibid., 4:144.15
 Ibid., 4:152.  See also 4:155.16
 Ibid., 152.17
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did believe in this doctrine.  Proof of this is the heading he gave to §130: “The individual 
books of the New Testament  are inspired by the Holy Spirit, and their collection has 18
arisen under the guidance of the Holy Spirit.”  What can we learn about his conception of 
this doctrine from this proposition? 
  After stating the proposition and offering evidence that it reflects the confessional 
tradition of the Protestant church by citing several of her creedal statements,  19
Schleiermacher acknowledges the difficulty of assigning exact limits of meaning to what 
he calls an “ecclesial expression.”  He notes that the term is not, strictly speaking, a 
scriptural one, and it is figurative besides.   He does admit, however, that two passages 20
in the New Testament are commonly mentioned in connection with it.  (Incidentally, 
those two passages, as discussed above, are the same ones mentioned as part of Carl F. H. 
Henry’s rationale for affirming his understanding of biblical inspiration.)  The first of 
these is 2 Timothy 3:16, and Schleiermacher correctly notes, I think, that this text refers 
to Old Testament writings.  He admits that this expression could lead very easily to the 
 In an addendum to his discussion of the doctrine of scripture in Christian Faith, Schleiermacher sets out 18
his argument that the books of the Old Testament cannot be seen as possessing the same normative worth or 
inspiration as the New Testament books (Christian Faith, §132).  For now, I will set aside a discussion of 
this viewpoint until Chapter Six and my response to it in Chapter Seven.
 Specifically, he cites selections from the First Helvetic Confession (1536), Gallican Confession (1559), 19
Scots Confession (1560), Belgic Confession (1561), and Declaratio Toruniensus (1645).  Interestingly, 
Schleiermacher very frequently cites creedal statements rather than scripture in the notes of Christian 
Faith.  Vial offers an explanation for this when he writes: “[A]ll Christians share Scripture, but 
Schleiermacher is articulating the experience of faith in a particular Christian community (the evangelical 
community), who have defined themselves as a particular community in large part through creeds” (Vial, 
Schleiermacher: A Guide for the Perplexed, 84-85).  For Schleiermacher’s use of creedal statements in 
Christian Faith rather than scripture, see Christian Faith, §27.  For an analysis of Schleiermacher’s use of 
creeds in Christian Faith see Walter Wyman, “The Role of the Protestant Confessions in Schleiermacher’s 
The Christian Faith,” Journal of Religion 87, no. 3 (July 2007): 355-85.
 The term to which he refers is theopneustos, from 2 Tim. 3:16.  It may be translated, “God-breathed.”20
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idea that in the act of writing the Holy Spirit had a special relationship with the writer 
that was otherwise nonexistent.  But, such an interpretation does not follow so easily 
from 2 Peter 1:21, he claims.  That passage speaks of persons “moved by the Holy Spirit” 
who “spoke from God.”  From this passage Schleiermacher asserts that the interpretation 
that these persons “were already constantly moved by the Holy Spirit and in this state 
then also spoke and wrote” is as legitimate an interpretation as the interpretation that 
“they were first moved to spoken discourse and writing.”   Here, Schleiermacher seems 21
to be indicating in advance what he will discuss later in this proposition in more detail 
regarding the locus of inspiration.      
 Since the term is ambiguous, he suggests that the best way to come to an adequate 
understanding of the meaning of “inspiration” is to compare it with other, cognate 
expressions that describe the ways in which persons arrive at ideas.   He contrasts what 22
is inspired (das Eingegebene) and what is learned (das Erlernte) with what is excogitated 
or thought out (das Ersonnene).  What is thought out, he explains, is the product of the 
self’s own mental activity, whereas what is inspired and learned are the products of 
outside influences.  Schleiermacher affirms, however, that at other times, usage 
distinguishes what is inspired from what is learned.  When used in this way, what is 
inspired is understood to be original and “depends for its emergence solely on inward 
 Schleiermacher, Christian Faith, §130.1.21
 In the introductory address of On Religion: Addresses in Response to Its Cultured Critics, 22
Schleiermacher uses the terms “inspiration,” “idea,” and “insight,” interchangeably.  See Schleiermacher, 
On Religion, (Tice), 58, 64.
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[internal] communication.”   On the other hand, what is learned is derived from 23
“external communication.”  Thus, in contrast to what may approximate the more 
mechanical processes of learning, what emerges by inspiration can be seen as due to “the 
complete freedom of a person’s own productivity.”    24
 According to Schleiermacher’s thinking, then, it follows that there is a sense in 
which inspired thoughts are the result of the self’s own mental activity.   However, what 25
is inspired is not like what is excogitated, purely the product of one’s own ruminations.  
What seems fair to say, is that for Schleiermacher, what is inspired is to some degree the 
product of outside influences.  In fact, in his lexicon an acceptable synonym for 
“inspiration” is “influence.”  So, when he stands by the claim that “the individual books 
of the New Testament are inspired by the Holy Spirit,” he is only claiming that these 
books are influenced by the Holy Spirit. 
 This definition, of course, does not go far enough for Henry and Evangelical 
Christians who share his absolutely supernaturalist/content-based perspective.  As 
mentioned earlier in this chapter, Henry equates inspiration with revelation, the very 
thing Schleiermacher does not want to do.  He does not believe these terms can be used 
interchangeably.  In other words, he does not believe that inspiration means that God 
made known to the authors of scripture in detail what they were to write. 
 Schleiermacher, Christian Faith, §130.1.23
 Ibid.24
 Later, Schleiermacher writes that while “our proposition ascribes to the Holy Spirit . . . the composing of 25
the individual books [of the New Testament canon] . . . we regard the composition of a book as the 
intentional act of an individual” (Christian Faith, §130.1).
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 A second distinction between Henry’s and Schleiermacher’s conception of 
inspiration is its locus.  For Schleiermacher, it is not the words of scripture which are 
inspired, but the authors themselves. ,   That is, the meaning of inspiration is not that it 26 27
refers to an exact wording or quality of the New Testament writings themselves.  The 
inspiration is in the authors, and only derivatively in their writings.  Notwithstanding this 
observation, there is also a sense in which Schleiermacher shares the conviction that the 
words of the New Testament books are “inspired” by the Holy Spirit, or can be unless 
they are in error.  How so?  Since the Holy Spirit is the source of all spiritual gifts and 
good works, he reasons, all thinking about the kingdom of God must be traced back to 
and inspired by the Spirit.   He presumes that this holds true both of the apocryphal and 28
of the canonical elements of the thinking of the apostolic age.  Nevertheless, he claims, it 
is also true that the work of the Spirit is most profound and concentrated within the circle 
 James Orr explained Schleiermacher’s perspective well when he wrote: “Scripture is spoken of as ‘God-26
inspired’; but it is important to notice that inspiration belongs primarily to the person, and to the book only 
as it is the product of the inspired person.  There is no inspiration inhering literally in the paper, ink, or 
type, of the sacred volume.  The inspiration was in the soul of the writer; the qualities that are 
communicated to the writing had their seat first in the mind or heart of the man who wrote.”  Orr, 
Revelation and Inspiration, 162-163.
 Actually, Schleiermacher’s understanding that the authors, rather than the words, of scripture are inspired 27
is more nuanced than this.  According to him, inspiration refers to a divine influence on the writing of 
scripture, but the locus wherein such activity is recognized switches from the individual to the social level.  
Accordingly, inspiration would work, not exclusively on the individual writers, but rather on the entire 
community that historically conditions the contents of emotions, knowledge, and words utilized by these 
writers.  This “social” view of inspiration, however, does not change the fact that the epistemological origin 
of scripture is human.  See Christian Faith, §130.
Schleiermacher, Christian Faith, §130.2.  For Schleiermacher the Holy Spirit not only inspired the books 28
of the New Testament but also guided the entire process of collecting them into the canon.  Since, however, 
this process is “the result of a complex process of collaboration and counteraction in the church,” not 
everything that has been achieved by it can be attributed to the Holy Spirit to the same degree as it can in 
the process of the inspiration transmitted by particular authors.  For this reason, some refer to the collection 
of the canonical scriptures not as a case of inspiration but as a product of guidance (Leitung) by the Holy 
Spirit (Christian Faith, §130.1).  See also Jeffrey Hensley, “Friedrich Schleiermacher,” in Christian 
Theologies of Scripture: A Comparative Introduction, ed. Justin S. Holcomb (New York: New York 
University Press, 2006), 174.
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of those singled out by Peter (Acts 1:21ff.) with the assent of the entire community at that 
time, that is, among those who had walked with Christ from shortly after the start of his 
public ministry.  But, more than this, he asserts that inspiration, in the case of these 
individuals, extends beyond the writing of scripture to include “the whole of the official 
apostolic activity.”   Thus, inspiration is not simply a quality of the sacred writings; 29
rather, these texts share in the wider movement of the Spirit in the shared experience of 
the Christian community.  To think that the apostles were “less animated and moved by 
the Holy Spirit in other aspects of their apostolic office than in the acts of writing,” for 
Schleiermacher, “would destroy the unity of life among these apostolic men in the most 
hazardous fashion.”   For him, the apostles’ lives, not just their writings, were generally 30
guided by inspiration, or the influence of the Spirit. 
 As a result, this perspective forestalls many difficult questions.  For example, it 
allows dogmatics to ignore a whole set of questions about the extent of inspiration in the 
production of the text, a claim in which Schleiermacher seems to exult.  When did the 
moment of inspiration begin?  How did the impulse come?  To what extent did the Holy 
Spirit “inspire” the authors of scripture?  Did the Spirit provide the very words the 
authors wrote, or only their thoughts?  For Schleiermacher, questions like these are 
irrelevant.  In fact, he asserts that only a dead scholasticism would try to draw lines of 
distinction “along the way from the initial impulse to write . . . to the word actually put 
 Schleiermacher, Christian Faith, §130.2.29
 Ibid.30
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down or even want to present the latter in its external form (Äusserlichkeit) . . . as a 
special product of inspiration.”  31
  The perspective that the locus of inspiration is the authors of scripture, and not 
their words alone, and that inspiration means that the Holy Spirit influences their actions 
as well as their words, leads to another, related distinction between Schleiermacher’s and 
Henry’s understanding of this concept.  It is this: for Schleiermacher, inspiration is not 
limited to a select few.  Whereas Henry believes that divine inspiration is limited to those 
who were “divinely chosen to communicate the Word of God to mankind,”   32
Schleiermacher believes that every person can be inspired.  He holds to the potential of 
universal inspiration.   
 Schleiermacher’s On Religion verifies this position.  In the first Speech, in order 
to understand the nature of piety, Schleiermacher encourages his readers to transport 
themselves “into the interior depths of a pious soul, so as to try to understand its 
inspiration.”  This is what it takes, he claims, “to apprehend that effusion of insight and 
ardor” which issues from such pious souls.  And who are these pious souls?  According to 
 Ibid.  Regarding the mechanics of inspiration, and as a side note, Schleiermacher argues that the most 31
suitable analogy is provided by christology.  The divine essence unites with the human nature of Jesus in a 
person-forming way, but it does not, thereby, destroy the true humanity of the Redeemer.  So, too, the 
divine Spirit indwells the Christian church, inspiring the thoughts and actions of the apostles, but in a way 
that does not obliterate their full humanity.  This is why Schleiermacher rejects a special hermeneutics for 
the New Testament.  Scripture texts, while they are assuredly disclosures of God’s self-communication in 
Christ, are also completely human compositions.  That is, they are “fully human,” and thus they are open to 
being understood in the same way as any other text written by humans (See Christian Faith, §130.2).  
Regarding this text, Dawn DeVries adds an explanatory comment: “[T]he difference between God’s 
incarnation in Christ and in the church should not be overlooked: only in Christ was the God-consciousness 
absolutely powerful; in the church, given its struggle with sin within the whole process of history, the 
permeation of the Holy Spirit is never complete.  Thus, even the church’s witness to the revelation of God 
in Jesus Christ can be tinged with sin and error.  (DeVries, Rethinking the Scripture Principle, 303.)
 Henry, God, Revelation and Authority, 4:152; 4:155.32
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Schleiermacher, they are people whose spirits are “truly surrendered to the universe.”   33
Schleiermacher comments on this very passage in his own supplementary notes, added in 
1821.  There he clarifies that he was  
talking about how insight and ardor are produced in such a spirit—that is, about the 
actual emergence of such stirrings of piety as pass over immediately into religious 
views and ideas (insight) or into an attitude of surrender toward God (ardor).  It 
should have been clear to them that this is why I wanted to draw attention to the 
way in which such inner stirrings arise.  They arise when a man surrenders himself 
to the universe. . . . This can be seen in the fact that we are enabled as each 
occasion arises to take notice of God and of his eternal power and divinity through 
the works of his creation.  34
One may conclude from this reference that Schleiermacher surely believed that insight 
and ardor could emerge in any person who allowed herself or himself to be stirred by the 
universe.  These stirrings, he asserts, are inspired by God when one takes notice of God 
“through the works of his creation.” 
 In the second Speech, Schleiermacher once again expresses his conviction that 
inspiration may be universal when he refers to notions conjured up by the words 
“influence,” “inspiration,” and “a divine Spirit” in an oft-cited and beautifully-written 
paragraph:  
What can we say of the person who does not feel in the most important moments 
of his life, with the most vital conviction, that a divine Spirit impels him and that 
he speaks and acts from sacred inspiration?  Again, what can we say of the person 
who is not at least conscious of his feelings as immediate influences of the 
 Schleiermacher, On Religion, (Tice), 58.33
 Ibid., 64.  I like the way Tice clarifies the relationship for Schleiermacher between God and the universe: 34
“Thus, God is sovereign and supreme over nature, is supernatural and in no sense identical with it.  
However, God is also experienced as coming to us only in and through the wholly interconnected world of 
nature.  God becomes present to us, is revealed and made known, only through this ‘economy.’”  Tice, 
Schleiermacher, 33.
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universe upon him . . . and who does not recognize something distinctive within 
these influences either, something that cannot be merely imitated but that 
guarantees the purity of their origin deep within him?  What can we say but that 
such a person has no religion?  35
Later, when he explains the concepts of “revelation” and “inspiration,” he writes: 
“Decidedly pious people are always characterized by both.”  36
Schleiermacher’s Conception of “Holy Spirit” 
 Finally, there is a distinction between Schleiermacher and the majority of content-
based/supernaturalists regarding the agent of inspiration.  Both would agree that the Holy 
Spirit inspired the books of the New Testament, but their understanding of “Holy Spirit” 
is far from identical.   What does Schleiermacher mean by “Holy Spirit”?  An 37
introduction to his understanding of “Holy Spirit” in Christian Faith, found in §116 and 
§§121-126, is located within his discussion of the emergence of the church.  It 
immediately precedes his treatment of the doctrine of scripture (§§127-133), an 
arrangement that assuredly cannot be accidental.  What this ordering implies, of course, is 
that Schleiermacher understands there to be a close relationship between “Holy Spirit” 
and scripture. 
 A suitable place to begin to unpack his understanding of the agent of inspiration is 
Christian Faith, §116.3.  This section serves as a fine introduction to and survey of what 
 Schleiermacher, On Religion, (Tice), 143.35
 Ibid., 171.36
 Since the doctrine of the Holy Spirit is only relevant to this project as it correlates with biblical authority 37
and since, therefore, a detailed analysis of this entire doctrine itself is rather extraneous to this study, I have 
chosen not to compare Schleiermacher’s understanding of “Holy Spirit” with Henry’s.  I believe it is 
sufficient simply to assert that they are different.
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Schleiermacher explains in more detail in §§121-133.  That subdivision of §116 begins 
with this claim:  
[T]he term ‘Holy Spirit’  is understood to mean the unity of life that is inherent 38
in Christian community, viewed as a moral person.  Moreover, since everything 
that is actually law-bound is already excluded from it, we would be able to 
designate this presence in terms of the ‘common spirit’ (Gemeingeist) of that 
community.    39
I imagine that Schleiermacher knew that some would surely question his orthodoxy by 
use of the phrase “common spirit” for “Holy Spirit,” for he quickly affirms to his readers 
that by this phrase he is referring to what “in scripture is called the Holy Spirit and the 
Spirit of God and the Spirit of Christ, and in our church doctrine is also presented as the 
third Person in the Godhead.”   40
 What is behind his assertion that “common spirit” is a sufficient designation for 
“Holy Spirit”?  What is he trying to convey by the use of this phrase?  Let me permit 
Schleiermacher to answer these questions in his own words, after which I will draw some 
conclusions.  First, here is his heading for Christian Faith, §121, which contains a fairly 
succinct description of this designation: 
All who are living in the state of sanctification are conscious of an inner drive to 
become increasingly at one in a common cooperative and mutually interactive 
 Tice makes this point in the Tice, Kelsey, and Lawler edition of Christian Faith that capitalizing ‘Holy 38
Spirit’ does not imply that Schleiermacher attributed personhood to the divine and holy Spirit.  He states: 
“It emphatically does not bear this implication for Schleiermacher.  For him . . . writing ‘Holy’ simply 
indicated that he was referring to this specific, divine spirit” (Christian Faith, §116.1, fn. 1.) Thus, the 
Spirit is “holy” in the sense that the divine Spirit is active in Jesus, not as the name of a “person” in the 
godhead.  Rather, this Spirit is “holy” because it is God’s way in Christ of being continually in relationship 
with the community of faith, though it certainly is, for him, an integral part of the triune God’s redemptive 
activity in relation to the world.
Schleiermacher, Christian Faith, §116.3.39
 Ibid.40
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existence, this driving force being viewed as the common spirit of the new 
collective life founded by Christ.  41
 What is noteworthy in this heading is what Schleiermacher claims about this 
“common spirit.”  First, he describes this shared spirit as intrinsic to “the new corporate 
life founded by Christ.”  He makes this plain in a sermon he preached before 1829, 
entitled “Christ in the Temple.”  After making reference in that message to the biblical 
promise that no longer will anyone need to be taught by others, for all will be taught of 
God (Jer. 31:33; Jn. 6:45), he writes: 
We cannot say that every soul can be taught by God in solitude, nor does each 
person stand as a separate work of the Holy Spirit.  Rather, it comes about only 
through the interchange of insight and feeling with others in that living fellowship 
in which Christ united us all.  For it is this fellowship first of all, and not 
individual souls, that the Holy Spirit chooses for his temple, and he will illumine 
and sanctify individuals only through fellowship.  How could it be otherwise?  42
 Second, while it is possible that the heading of §121 may only indicate 
Schleiermacher’s belief that this common spirit is responsible for producing the “inner 
drive” (innern Antriebes) and “driving force” in the Christian church of which he writes, I 
believe it is more accurate to deduce that for him these terms are coextensive.  That is, the 
inner drive to unite and cooperate with one another in the collective life is a driving force, 
 Ibid., §121.  See also Schleiermacher’s sermon on “The Relationship of Evangelical Faith to the Law,” in 41
Reformed But Every Reforming: Sermons in Relation to the Celebration of the Handing Over of the 
Augsburg Confession (1830), ed. and trans. Iain G. Nicol, Schleiermacher Studies and Translations 8 
(Lewiston, NY: Edwin Mellen Press, 1997), 59. 
 See Schleiermacher’s sermon on “Christ in the Temple,” in Servant of the Word: Selected Sermons of 42
Friedrich Schleiermacher, trans. Dawn De Vries, Fortress Texts in Modern Theology (Philadelphia: 
Fortress Press, 1987), 123-24.  In a sermon based on the text of Philippians 1:6-11, Schleiermacher asserts 
that “the Spirit . . . is nowhere else to be found than in those who have faith.”  See Schleiermacher’s sermon 
on, “On the Goal toward Which the Effort of the Evangelical Church Is Directed,” in Reformed But Every 
Reforming: Sermons in Relation to the Celebration of the Handing Over of the Augsburg Confession 
(1830), 156.)
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which Schleiermacher views not as a product of the common spirit but as equivalent to it.  
To confirm this interpretation one need only consider Schleiermacher’s descriptions of 
the Holy Spirit elsewhere: it is “a shared tendency to advance the whole, a tendency that 
in each individual is, at the same time, a distinctive love for every individual”;  it is “the 43
innermost life force of the Christian church as a whole”;  it is communal activity, which 44
is also “shared self-initiated activity — which indwells everyone [in the church]”;  it is 45
that which “animates the collective life of faithful persons”;  and it is the power of the 46
new life which proceeds from Christ himself.   47
 The following comparison from Christian Faith, §121.2 clarifies 
Schleiermacher’s understanding of “common spirit.”  He reports: “Now, when we 
designate this endeavor by the term ‘common spirit,’ we essentially understand by it what 
is meant in worldly governance.”   For Schleiermacher, then, analogous to this common 48
spirit in the church, is what is found in any system of government.  What is that?  He 
explains: “[I]n all who together form a moral person there exists a shared tendency to 
advance the whole, a tendency that in each individual is, at the same time, a distinctive 
 Schleiermacher, Christian Faith, §121.2. 43
 Ibid., §122.1.44
 Ibid., §122.3.  Schleiermacher writes: “This communal activity corresponds to all that Christ promised 45
concerning the Holy Spirit and to what was presented as the working of the Holy Spirit.”  Referring to the 
first disciples of Jesus who “had been taken up into Christ’s community,” he writes: “[O]nly thereafter 
could there be a true community among them, manifesting itself as the Holy Spirit.”
 Ibid., §123.46
 Ibid., §121.247
 Ibid.  The German word Schleiermacher uses here is Regiment.  Tice adds this footnote: “Usually ‘church 48
government’ is used to translate Kirchenregiment.”
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love for every individual.”   In other words, the common spirit is, in one sense, 49
impersonal: it is a temperament, a quality, or a disposition that permeates and 
characterizes an organization.   50
 Consistent with this interpretation is a statement Schleiermacher made in a 
sermon he preached on July 4, 1830 on the relationship of Evangelical faith to the law [of 
Moses].  The sermon text for this message is Galatians 2:16-18.  Writing about what it 
means to be governed by the Spirit and to bear the fruits [sic] of the Spirit, 
Schleiermacher notes how true it is that God’s Spirit is poured out on us through the 
proclamation of faith and how this very faith is alive in us and active through love.  Then, 
he discusses two groups of people in the church: those who follow after the Spirit by faith 
and those who continue to bind on others the works of the law.  Following this 
explanation, he mentions the possibility that the influence of the latter group will 
interrupt, hold back, and corrupt the common spirit.   It surely seems that in this context, 51
the “common spirit” is not a reference to God per se or in se, but to the pure, invisible 
influences of God’s gracious activity, to the resultant cooperative relationships of God to 
persons within communities of faith, and to the quality of new life in the church. 
 In light of the above considerations, I conclude that Schleiermacher certainly 
conceives of the Holy Spirit/common spirit to be a force or impulse that is shared 
 Ibid., §121.249
 There are important parallels to Schleiermacher’s lectures on the state and how he believes all 50
communities form.  See Vial, Schleiermacher: A Guide for the Perplexed, 106-8.
 See Schleiermacher’s sermon on, “The Relationship of Evangelical Faith to the Law,” in Reformed But 51
Ever Reforming, 58-59.
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between persons in the Christian church.  According to him, this force which indwells 
and animates the church is, in fact, the person of Jesus.   
 Does Schleiermacher understand the Holy Spirit to be a divine being?  To answer 
this question, let us return to Christian Faith, §116.3, where he briefly explains the 
necessary function and purpose of the Holy Spirit. 
 First, he concedes the simple truth that individual influences no longer proceed 
directly from Christ.  Since that is the case, he claims that something divine must exist in 
the Christian church, and this something we call the “Being of God.”  This Being 
continues the communication of the perfection and blessedness of Christ, which, he 
claims, is an absolute and continuous desire for the Kingdom, or Reign, of God.  This is 
the desire or innermost impulse of individuals within the church.  But more, it is the 
common spirit of the whole.  Schleiermacher identifies this common spirit as the “divine 
Spirit that indwells it [the whole],” and that “has been taken up into the self-
consciousness of every invigorated member [of the whole].”   Then, he concludes: 52
This will for the Kingdom of God is the vital unity of the whole, and its common 
spirit in each individual; in virtue of its inwardness, it is in the whole an 
absolutely powerful God-consciousness, and thus the being of God therein, but 
conditioned by the being of God in Christ.  53
   
 In short, I infer that for Schleiermacher, the Holy Spirit is the being of God in the 
church.  Cathie Kelsey makes plain Schleiermacher’s understanding when she explains: 
 Schleiermacher, Christian Faith, §116.3.52
 Ibid.  See also, Christian Faith, §122.3.53
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[T]he being of God is in the Christian church. . . . [It] works in the church through 
its influence on the regenerate.  In other words, the life of Christ is in us as a 
common spirit.  A third way to say the same thing is that the Holy Spirit is leading 
us as a community of faith ([Christian Faith,] §124.1, §124.2).  Any one of those 
ways of speaking is acceptable in the church.  However, we clearly cannot do 
without Christ or go beyond Christ, nor can we do without the community of 
faith.  After Christ physically left the earth following his resurrection, the 
effectiveness of Christ came to be and is manifest through the community of faith, 
the church.  The effectiveness of Christ is the being of God in him, so his 
effectiveness in the church must be the being of God in it as the common Spirit of 
Christ.  The Spirit of Christ and the Holy Spirit are two ways of referring to the 
same reality in the church (§121.2).  Thus, being taken up into the life of Christ 
and participating in the Holy Spirit are the same thing.   54
 This brings us to a dilemma, which is only apparent, and to an important 
distinction in Schleiermacher’s understanding of the Holy Spirit.  I have concluded that 
he conceives the Holy Spirit to be both the common spirit, that is a force or impulse held 
in common by those in the church, as well as a divine activity of God’s being in the 
world.  The question arises, however: Is it possible for the Spirit to be both?  First, I 
reiterate that while Schleiermacher believes that the Holy Spirit is an expression, or 
extension, of divine being, he does not believe the Holy Spirit is a person with separate 
being and activity.   He suggests that “Holy Spirit” is simply the name we give to the 55
 Kelsey, Thinking about Christ with Schleiermacher, 99.  See also, Tice, Schleiermacher, 42.54
 As referenced above, Schleiermacher understands the expression “Holy Spirit” to mean the vital unity of 55
the Christian community, regarded as a moral personality (Christian Faith, §116.3).  Some may think this 
implies that he attributes personhood to the Holy Spirit.  However, the word he uses, Person, could 
designate a human organization, such as a church or a state, that bears characteristics of individual agency. 
See Christian Faith, §121.2, ed. note, fn. 8.  According to Tice, Schleiermacher conceives the ‘Holy Spirit’ 
not as a third person (prosopos) in a divine ‘Trinity’ (Christian Faith, §§55, 65.1, 74.2, 97.2, 105. p.s. and 
108.5) but as the ‘common spirit’” (Christian Faith, §116.3, fn. 1).
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being of God present in and influencing the community of faith.   This corresponds, as 56
Kelsey notes, in the same way we attach the name “Christ” to the being of God in a 
human being who is perfectly open to the being of God and whose person is completely 
formed by the presence of the being of God in him.  57
 But note, secondly, how Schleiermacher seems to anticipate the question of 
whether or not the Holy Spirit is a divine being and his answer in Christian Faith, §123.  
The heading of that proposition is as follows: “The Holy Spirit is the uniting of the divine 
being with human nature in the form of the common spirit that animates the collective 
life of faithful persons.”   In short, Schleiermacher believes the Holy Spirit is both an 58
activity of divine being and the common spirit, that is, a force, in the church.  How does 
he arrive at this seemingly incongruous conviction? 
 To explain this, Schleiermacher asks his readers to consider the relation between a 
Supreme Being and human nature insofar as this relation is present in a Christian self-
consciousness.   He then asserts that in the church’s experience, and indeed, in the New 59
 Kelsey, Thinking about Christ with Schleiermacher, 99.  See also, Tice: “The visible church is not itself 56
the Redeemer, but the Redeemer is now visibly present in the whole world, notably and ideally in and 
through the visible church.  To say, therefore, that Christ continues to dwell among us through the 
succession of generations since Jesus was alive is exactly the same thing as to say that the Holy Spirit 
indwells the church as its common spirit.” (Tice, Schleiermacher, 33.)
 Kelsey, Thinking about Christ with Schleiermacher, 99.57
 Schleiermacher, Christian Faith, §123.58
 He is only willing here to discuss the meaning of “Holy Spirit” in its relation to the church.  He grants 59
that when used outside of this relation, for example, when referring to the divine participation in the 
creation of the world or to its indwelling from which gifts or talents of all sorts issue, the expression and its 
identification may mean something wholly different.  Also, he does not feel obliged to identify the common 
spirit altogether in the Christian church with the Holy Spirit, which is presented as active in the prophets 
before Christ’s appearance or even with “the common spirit of the Jewish theocracy”  (Christian Faith, 
§123.1).  Indeed, he believes that the New Testament presents the Holy Spirit as something experienced 
within the community, never as something purely external to it.  See Christian Faith, §121.1-2.
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Testament scriptures, all powers that are efficacious in the Christian church have been 
traced back to the Holy Spirit.  This must be true, he claims, for otherwise Christ would 
have been superfluous.  Furthermore, it must be the case, he reasons, that the Holy Spirit 
exists in and works from within Christians rather than from outside them.  From these 
considerations Schleiermacher concludes that those who first possessed the Holy Spirit 
presented this Spirit as a divine action in persons of faith, yet one not to be separated 
from recognition of the being of God in Christ.  However, if the Holy Spirit is a spiritual 
power in persons of faith, it must be represented as united in them with their human 
nature, or else “we must abrogate the unity of their existence.”   This “total split in 60
human life” is unimaginable, Schleiermacher asserts.   
 The union, then, of the Holy Spirit in human nature must persist in the form of the 
common spirit.  And since each person attains to the new life only in and through the 
community, so also each person shares in the Holy Spirit, not in one’s personal self-
consciousness, but only as one is conscious of one’s being in this whole—that is, as a 
consciousness held in common.  Therefore, the union of the divine with human nature in 
persons of faith is not a person-forming union, because otherwise it would not be 
distinguishable from the union that is in Christ, and the distinction between Redeemer 
and redeemed would be abrogated.   
 To summarize, the Holy Spirit is an agency and activity of divine being, but its 
presence in the Christian church is something that works naturally in community-forming 
 Ibid., §123.3.60
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experiences among persons of faith, experience that may be regarded as the life force of 
the church.   Steven R. Jungkeit vouches for this perspective when he writes that the 61
church “hums to life through the activity of the Spirit, which thereafter is characterized as 
a power located within the system itself.”   One could say, then, that what once had a 62
supernaturally-effected advent and has continued via the influence of Christ, now has a 
natural explanation or extension, as well.  In other words, as in Jesus Christ himself, 
Schliermacher’s conception of the activity of Holy Spirit is both supernatural and natural, 
referring to both a divine being and a life force experienced between persons in the 
community of faith.   This is what he identifies as the common or shared spirit of the 63
collective life of the church. 
Criticism of Schleiermacher’s Theology of Inspiration 
 The core and general criticism of Schleiermacher’s understanding of inspiration is 
that, for him, God is relatively inactive in the process.  More specifically, his critics chide 
him for maintaining that the process of writing down scripture is essentially an 
exclusively human activity.  Since this is the case, one could argue that the overarching 
criticism of Schleiermacher’s perspective has to do with the relationship between the 
 For confirmation of this, see Christian Faith, §124.3.61
 Steven R. Jungkeit, Spaces of Modern Theology: Geography and Power in Schleiermacher’s World (New 62
York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), 185.
 As pointed out earlier, Schleiermacher believed that something supernatural could at the same time be 63
natural. This was true of his understanding of the Holy Spirit.  He claims: “Whenever I speak of the 
supernatural, I do so with reference to whatever comes first, but afterwards it becomes secondly something 
natural.  Thus creation is supernatural, but it afterwards becomes the natural order.  Likewise, in his origin 
Christ is supernatural, but he also becomes natural, as a genuine human being.  The Holy Spirit and the 
Christian church can be treated in the same way” (Schleiermacher,On the Glaubenslehre, 89).
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supernatural and the natural.   (This is not surprising, as this relationship has remained at 64
the center of theological debate throughout the modern period.)  Even though this is a 
false distinction for Schleiermacher, for his critics the crux of the issue is the extent to 
which God and human beings are active in the process of inspiration.  For them, the point 
in question is this: Is scripture primarily a divine or a human product?      
 For his critics, Schleiermacher’s supposed unwillingness to grant the supernatural 
an active role in the process of inspiration is a slippery slope.  For example, according to 
one critic, to disallow divine activity leaves Christianity without objective foundations.  If 
Christianity is without such foundations, either scripture is rendered practically irrelevant 
as a source of theology or the Christian religion is driven to draw the contents for its 
doctrines more from science, philosophy, experience, and tradition than from scripture.  
Ultimately, scripture loses its authority as a source of theology.  65
 According to those who disapprove of Schleiermacher’s stance on inspiration, the 
slippery slope begins with his alleged view of God.  Consider what Carl F. H. Henry 
claims is the problem with Schleiermacher’s theology, in general, which also pertains, 
 This was true of the criticisms of Schleiermacher offered by his students, J. A. Möhler and F. A. 64
Staudenmaier, by J. S. Drey, and by critics who are more contemporary, including Carl F. H. Henry, 
Geoffrey Bromiley, and Donald Bloesch.  For criticisms of Schleiermacher’s theology from Möhler, 
Staudenmaier, and Drey, I follow Bradford E. Hinze, “Johann Sebastian Drey’s Critique of Friedrich 
Schleiermacher’s Theology,” The Heythrop Journal (January 1996): 1-23.  For more contemporary critics, 
see Carl F. H. Henry, God, Revelation and Authority, 6 vols. (Waco, TX: Word Books, 1976-1983); G.C. 
Berkouwer, Holy Scripture (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1975); and Donald G. Bloesch, Holy Scripture: 
Revelation, Inspiration & Interpretation (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity, 1994).
 This line of argument is articulated by Fernando L. Canale, “Revelation and Inspiration: The Liberal 65
Model,” Andrews University Seminary Studies 32, no. 1 (Autumn 1994): 169-95.
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specifically, to his understanding of inspiration: it over exaggerates the immanence of 
God: 
What made it possible for modernism to elevate man to the level of prophet and 
apostle was its philosophy of exaggerated divine immanence; first, it put all men 
and history on the same plane, then, by exalting empirical methodology and 
evolutionary dogma, it raised the modernist to superior religious insight.  
Schleiermacher’s deference to pantheism was already evident in his On Religion: 
Speeches to Its Cultured Despisers, in which he sought to give religion universal 
significance but did so by trivializing God’s special initiative and activity.  66
Breaking down Henry’s criticism, but leaving aside the oft-repeated and spurious charge 
that Schleiermacher was a pantheist, a criticism unwarranted by his exposition in 
Christian Faith, Henry’s problem with Schleiermacher’s viewpoint, is that it makes 
“God’s special initiative and activity” seem less important.  How is this minimization of 
God’s activity in the process of inspiration demonstrable?  By the elevation of “man to 
the level of prophet and apostle.”  What made it possible for theologians to do such a 
thing?  Henry’s answer: modernism’s philosophy of exaggerated divine immanence.  That 
Henry is disapproving of Schleiermacher’s belief in universal inspiration is evident when 
he writes that “inspiration is no universal phenomenon, nor is it necessarily or actually 
shared by all or most spiritually devout and obedient men of God.”  67
 Another Evangelical, Donald Bloesch, agrees with Henry’s assessment.  Bloesch 
is referring to “a modernist view of revelation and inspiration,” as well as to 
Schleiermacher’s theology when he writes:  
 Henry, God, Revelation and Authority, 2:154.66
 Ibid.67
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[I]t stresses the inseparability of the infinite and the finite and sees the infinite as 
residing in the finite as its ground and depth. . . . It’s orientation is 
anthropological and psychological rather than theological in that its primary 
concern is the effect of the divine on humanity rather than the nature of divinity 
as such.  68
 Critics not only disapprove of what they suppose to be Schleiermacher’s view of 
God and God’s lack of involvement in the inspiration process, but also with his 
understanding of inspiration’s locus.  They reject that it is found primarily in scripture’s 
authors.  Henry asserts: “Inspiration is primarily a statement about God’s relationship to 
Scripture, and only secondarily about the relationship of God to the writers.”   Again, 69
they believe that Schleiermacher’s perspective leads to a slippery slope.  For example, 
defenders of verbal inspiration wonder: How can we be sure that what the inspired author 
wrote was a true reflection of that inspiration if we cannot also say that the very words he 
or she put down were also inspired?   They assert that if God inspired authors rather than 70
the text itself, there is nothing to make the text itself special.  Furthermore, if only the 
authors are inspired, how can one assign more spiritual authority to biblical books than to 
any other books written under the power of some great religious experience?  71
 A third criticism sometimes leveled against Schleiermacher’s doctrine of 
inspiration is that since biblical words and meanings are wholly human, biblical exegesis 
 Donald G. Bloesch, Holy Scripture: Revelation, Inspiration & Interpretation, 40.68
 Carl F. H. Henry, God, Revelation and Authority, 2:143.69
 See Achtemeier, Inspiration and Authority: Nature and Function of Christian Scripture, 10; Stephen T. 70
Davis, The Debate about the Bible (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1977): 54, 114-15.
 Achtemeier, Inspiration and Authority, 35.71
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is to be undertaken with the same tools and procedures utilized by the historical and 
literary sciences.   Many are not happy with this possibility. 72
A Response to Schleiermacher’s Critics 
 How does or how would Schleiermacher respond to the above criticisms? 
 First, he would certainly agree that the process of scripture creation and collection 
was essentially a human activity.  He believes the words of scripture are human words.  
No special divine charism is claimed by him to have assisted biblical writers.  However, 
Schleiermacher would not agree that his conception of inspiration makes God virtually 
inactive in the process.  While it is surely a challenge to articulate the co-presence and co-
activity of the supernatural and the natural in this or any other process, he does believe 
that God was part of the process. 
 There is a way in which Schleiermacher’s model traces religious discourse back 
to God.  First, as noted above, he does believe that the Holy Spirit, which he identified as 
the common spirit of the church, influenced the writers of the New Testament.  Second, 
the inner felt encounter of absolute dependence is considered to be the ultimate cause that 
motivates the origination of all genuinely Christian religious discourse, including, of 
course, scripture.   Schleiermacher connects the feeling of absolute dependence with the 73
origin of biblical and dogmatic writings by claiming that human self-consciousness 
includes two inseparable, interconnected levels, one sensible and the other absolute.  He 
 See Schleiermacher, Christian Faith, §27.3 and §130.2.72
 See Canale, “Revelation and Inspiration: The Liberal Model,” 188-195.73
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speaks of an absolute and a sensible self-consciousness of feeling.   Absolute self-74
consciousness is able “to manifest itself in time, by entering into relation with the 
sensible self-consciousness so as to constitute a moment.”   Thus, since within human 75
self-consciousness the feeling of absolute dependence (originated by a timeless God) 
always occurs with feelings of pleasure and pain (originated by sensory temporal 
experiences), the feeling of absolute dependence is always linked to the content of the 
sensible self-consciousness through which it expresses itself.  In the very instant of its 
origination, this content becomes the content of its external historical manifestation, and 
when the feeling of absolute dependence is linked to it, the result is emotion.   It is true 76
that emotions, even when they express the feeling of absolute dependence, are not 
knowledge.  But, the writing down of religious literature becomes “the attempt to 
translate the inward emotions into thoughts.”   Biblical teachings and Christian doctrines 77
as well, are “nothing but the expressions given to the Christian self-consciousness and its 
connections.”   Consequently, it is not accurate to say that God is inactive in 78
Schleiermacher’s conception of inspiration.  God’s mode of activity in Schleiermacher’s 
model of inspiration may not be the way in which God is thought to be active in the 
 Schleiermacher, Christian Faith, §5.4,5.74
 Ibid., §5.4.75
 Ibid., §5.5.76
 Ibid., §13, p.s.77
 Ibid.78
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content-based/supernaturalist model, but Schleiermacher certainly believes that God is 
active in the process. 
 One of the reasons Schleiermacher is unwilling to attribute more activity to God 
in the process of inspiration must surely be that he proposes a pious modesty and 
speculative restraint regarding what can be known about God.  In keeping with this 
position, his acceptance of some key elements in Kant’s epistemology is well-
documented.   According to Kant, pure reason is limited to the realm of objects of sense 79
experience, so that what lies beyond sense experience is simply not knowable by human 
reason.  Accepting the limitation Kant placed on reason, Schleiermacher follows Kant in 
restricting knowledge of God to what can be experienced and in eschewing speculation 
about God in se.      80
 Consistent with this, Schleiermacher reconstructed the doctrine of God.   81
According to him, the attributes of God are not to be taken as actually describing God, for 
to “describe” is to limit and divide, thereby taking away from God’s infinity and implying 
a dependence of God upon the world.  He writes: “None of the attributes that we ascribe 
to God is to designate something particular in God; rather, they are to designate only 
 Cf., Vial, Schleiermacher: A Guide for the Perplexed, 24-41; Stanley J. Grenz and Roger E. Olson, 79
Twentieth-Century Theology: God and the World in a Transitional Age, 22-51. 
 James Duke and Francis Fiorenza write: “In the Dialectik Schleiermacher clarifies his own position vis-80
à-vis Kant’s critique of rational theology.  He is critical of Kant for positing God solely as a postulate of 
practical reason, and as a corrective he argues that God is a necessary postulate of theoretical reason as 
well.  Yet he agrees with Kant’s basic position insofar as it denies the possibility of a speculative 
knowledge of God” (Schleiermacher, On the Glaubenslehre, 25).  See also Richard B. Brant, The 
Philosophy of Schleiermacher: The Development of his Theory of Scientific and Religious Knowledge (New 
York: Harper & Brothers, 1941), especially Chapter 6.
 For a brief introduction to Schleiermacher’s doctrine of God and God’s attributes, see Tice, 81
Schleiermacher, 32-35.
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something particular in the way in which the feeling of absolute dependence is to be 
referred to God.”   In other words, talk about God is always talk about human 82
experience of God.  Such statements describe not God-in-God’s-self  but a certain mode 
of experiencing God. 
 What this means, of course, is that one response to the criticism that 
Schleiermacher’s conception of inspiration overly exaggerates the immanence of God, 
lies in the belief that God in se cannot be known.   The irony of this is that many of 83
Schleiermacher’s critics believe that an infinite and wholly transcendent God can be 
known in se by finite human beings.  So, if God is knowable on any level, it makes more 
sense to emphasize God’s immanent activity over God’s transcendence. 
 How would Schleiermacher respond to the charge that his viewpoint does not 
limit inspiration to a select few, but that it has the potential to be universal in scope?  To 
respond to this question I will quote what Schleiermacher writes regarding a philosopher 
whom he highly respected: 
Respectfully offer up with me a lock of hair to the manes of the holy rejected 
Spinoza!  The high world spirit permeated him, the infinite was his beginning 
and end, the universe his only and eternal love; in holy innocence and deep 
humility he was reflected in the eternal world and saw how he too was its most 
lovable mirror; he was full of religion and full of holy spirit.  84
 Schleiermacher, Christian Faith, §50.82
 Another obvious response is that scripture itself affirms both the transcendence and immanence of God, 83
e.g., Isa. 55:8-9; 6:1-5; Ps. 97:9; 108:5; Eph. 4:6; Jer. 23:23-24; Acts 17:27-28; Jn. 1:14.  Perhaps 
Schleiermacher’s belief in the transcendence of God also had a profound affect on his doctrine of 
inspiration.
 Schleiermacher, On Religion, (Crouter), 24.  The “holy spirit” was originally an Old Testament ascription 84
(e.g., Judg. 3:10; 13:25; 1 Sam. 10:6; 1 Kngs. 22:24) referring to the “divine spirit,” which Schleiermacher 
frequently spoke of, not to the Nicene third person of the Trinity.
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Later, in the supplementary notes affixed to the 1821 edition of On Religion, 
Schleiermacher praises Spinoza again, indicating that “the mind and heart of this great 
man seemed to be permeated with piety, even though it was not Christian piety.”   But, 85
wait.  Did not Schleiermacher write in the 1799 edition that Spinoza was full of holy 
spirit?  How is it that one who is full of holy spirit does not possess Christian piety?  
Schleiermacher goes on to explain that “[n]othing I said should have led one to suppose 
that I was ascribing the Holy Spirit to Spinoza in the distinctively Christian sense of the 
word.”   Immediately following his praise of Spinoza, he pens this famous passage: 86
I entreat you to become familiar with this concept: intuition of the universe.  It is 
the hinge of my whole speech; it is the highest and most universal formula of 
religion on the basis of which you should be able to find every place in religion 
from which you may determine its essence and its limits.  All intuition proceeds 
from an influence of the intuited on the one who intuits, from an original and 
independent action of the former, which is then grasped, apprehended, and 
conceived by the latter according to one’s own nature.  87
 What are we to make of these intriguing references to Spinoza?  What may we 
reasonably surmise about Schleiermacher’s understanding of the Holy Spirit in the world 
from his remark that Spinoza was full of holy spirit, yet not “in the distinctively Christian 
sense of the word”?  And what may we reasonably infer about Schleiermacher’s 
understanding of inspiration from his phrase “influence of the intuited on the one who 
intuits,” which is found in the very same context in which he praises Spinoza and 
 Schleiermacher, On Religion, (Tice), 160.85
 Ibid., 160.86
 Schleiermacher, On Religion, (Crouter), 24-25.87
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Novalis?  First, it seems to me that Schleiermacher at least entertains the notion that the 
Holy Spirit is active at various levels and to various degrees in the world.  For example, 
he believes that there is a sense in which the spirit of God is active in the lives of 
philosophers and poets, like Spinoza and Novalis, and there is a sense in which the spirit 
of God is active in the lives of disciples of Christ.  The level of engagement may be 
different, as well as the degree of activity.  But, Schleiermacher affirms the possibility 
that God or God’s spirit is active in some sense in the lives of all people.   
 We might easily call this activity of the spirit of God “influence.”  Schleiermacher 
does not use the word Eingebung or “inspiration” in the aforementioned passage, but he 
is surely referring to the influence of God in this context.  Therefore, I believe we can 
reasonably infer from this and other passages in Schleiermacher’s works that he believes 
in various levels of inspiration.  To express this claim another way, Schleiermacher 
understands “inspiration” to have several layers of meaning.  The word “inspiration” can 
refer to prophets and apostles as they are influenced by the spirit of God to compose 
religious literature, and it can also refer to the influence of God’s holy Spirit in the lives 
of those who may not even be characterized as possessing Christian piety. 
   Finally, how would Schleiermacher respond to the criticism that if the locus of 
inspiration is the authors, rather than the words of scripture, there is no way to be certain 
that what the inspired author wrote was a true reflection of that inspiration?  Surely, his  
answer would be: “Correct!  There is no absolute certainty regarding such things!  The 
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affirmation that scripture is inspired is a matter of faith.  ‘All scripture is inspired of God’ 
is a proposition that cannot be proven.  It can only be accepted on the basis of faith.”     
 As I have demonstrated in this chapter, Schleiermacher’s understanding of the 
meaning of inspiration fits neither in the content-based/supernaturalist category, nor the 
function-based/rationalist category of the doctrine of biblical authority.  Because he 
believes the authors of New Testament were influenced by divine spirit and because he 
believes the Holy Spirit played a role in both the writing and the collection of the books 
of the New Testament, one could say that his understanding borrows from the 
supernaturalists.  However, since he does not believe scripture is a deposit of divinely-
revealed truths, his position may be said to borrow from the rationalist category.  Hence, 
it is more accurate to place his understanding in a third category, one which I have 
identified as content-based and rationalist. 
 The question to be discussed in the next chapter is this: How would 
Schleiermacher respond to the charge that if only the authors are inspired, the text cannot 
serve as a norm, authority, or source of theology?  His answer would be that the text is 
authoritative on other grounds.  If the biblical text is neither exclusively divine revelation 
nor an exclusively divine product, and if the authority of scripture does not lie in some 
property of the text itself, the question arises: Upon what basis can it be authoritative?  
This is the subject to which we turn in the next chapter: Schleiermacher’s Doctrine of 
Biblical Authority.  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Chapter Five: Schleiermacher and the Authority of Scripture 
 As I demonstrated in Chapters Three and Four, although Schleiermacher believed 
in the reality of divine revelation and held a concept of divine inspiration, he did not view 
the Bible as a deposit of divinely-revealed truths.  Rather, he understood it to be a human 
document, which expresses the experience of God in the lives of believers.  As a result, 
his critics suggest that such a position robs scripture of its ability to serve as any kind of 
authority in the Christian religion.  Schleiermacher begs to differ.  He believed in biblical 
authority. 
 In Chapters Five and Six, I go into more detail regarding the three-fold schema 
that I introduced in Chatper Two.  That is, in these two chapters, I explain more fully how 
Schleiermacher’s understanding of biblical authority is neither content-based/
supernaturalist nor function-based/rationalist, but content-based/rationalist.   
 I have three aims in this chapter.  First, I want to lay out Schleiermacher’s 
understanding of biblical authority.   Therefore, in this section I will discuss his 1
conception of scripture as an expression of Christian faith and as “Word of God,” a 
phrase often found in his sermons, and one which, I believe, he identified on occasion 
with scripture.  Second, I want to lay out what I consider to be the core criticism of his 
 To be more precise, in this chapter I want to explicate his conception of the authority of the New 1
Testament.  Schleiermacher argued that the Old Testament did not have the same normative status as the 
New, but I will save the discussion of his understanding of the Old Testament for Chapter Six, 
“Schleiermacher and the Normative Character of Scripture.”
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understanding of biblical authority from those who regard scripture as divinely-inspired 
revelation: it rejects scripture as the foundation of Christian faith.  Third, I want to trace 
out Schleiermacher’s response to this criticism and the reasoning which underlies it.  To 
effect this, I will scrutinize Christian Faith, §128 and examine in some detail one of his 
sermons.  Schleiermacher was almost universally hailed in his own day as a great 
preacher.  He filled the pulpit weekly for most of his life, and perhaps there we learn most 
about his view of the Bible—that it is a book that still speaks.  Dawn DeVries makes this 
discriminating and factual comment regarding Schleiermacher, the preacher:  
As a historical critic and philologist, Schleiermacher could be very skeptical.  As 
a dogmatician, he stayed away from what he perceived to be the imprecision of 
biblical language.  But as a preacher, he lived in the text in much the same way as 
the great Reformation exegetes and theologians had.  Biblical allusions saturate 
his sermons, texts interpret other texts, and that fusion of horizons occurs that 
allows an ancient book to become a living voice.  2
Schleiermacher’s Conception of Biblical Authority 
 To the surprise of many, that Schleiermacher believed in the authority of scripture 
in the Christian church is undeniably true.  To confirm this, a study of Schleiermacher, 
the preacher, is an appropriate starting point.  During his lifetime, Schleiermacher 
published seven collections of sermons.  These Sammlungen, together with separately 
published sermons, represent in full about one-third of his collected works.  Almost all of 
these published sermons are based upon a biblical text, which is explicitly set forth just 
 Dawn DeVries, “Schleiermacher, Friedrich Daniel Ernst (1768-1834),” in Dictionary of Major Biblical 2
Interpreters, ed. Donald K. McKim (Downers Grove, IL: IVP Academic, 2007), 890.
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below the sermon title.   Moreover, references to and citations of scripture in his sermons 3
are plentiful.  For example, the editors of Reformed But Ever Reforming, count over 380 
references to scripture in this ten-sermon collection.   Additionally, Schleiermacher felt 4
that preachers should conform their language to two norms, the most important of which, 
is the norm of scripture.   He writes: “It is really quite impossible to imagine a proper 5
Christian ministry without diligent occupation with the Bible. . . . It must become the 
center of all combinations of thought.”  6
 Further confirmation of Schleiermacher’s acceptance of scripture’s authority is 
found in Christian Faith.  There, he acknowledges the authority of scripture in the 
heading of §128: “The authority of holy scripture cannot be the basis of faith in Christ; 
rather, in order to accord special authority to holy scripture, this fact already must be 
presupposed.”  Then, he explains the basis of that authority in §129: “On the one hand, 
the holy scriptures of the New Testament are the first member in the whole series of 
 See, for example, Friedrich Schleiermacher, Servant of the Word: Selected Sermons of Friedrich 3
Schleiermacher, trans. Dawn DeVries, Fortress Texts in Modern Theology (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 
1987); Reformed But Ever Reforming: Sermons in Relation to the Celebration of the Handing Over of the 
Augsburg Confession (1830), ed. and trans. Iain G. Nicol, Schleiermacher Studies and Translations 8 
(Lewiston, NY: Edwin Mellen Press, 1997); The Christian Household: A Sermonic Treatise, ed. and trans. 
Dietrich Seidel and Terrence N. Tice, Schleiermacher Studies and Translations 3 (Lewiston, NY: Edwin 
Mellen Press, 1991); and Selected Sermons of Schleiermacher, trans. Mary F. Wilson (London: Hodder and 
Stoughton, 1890). 
 Nicol, Reformed But Ever Reforming, 182-85.4
 I will discuss Schleiermacher’s understanding of how scripture functions as a norm for the Christian 5
church in Chapter Six.  Incidentally, the second norm to which preachers should conform their language, 
according to Schleiermacher, is the intellectual capacity of the congregation and their life situation.  
Friedrich Schleiermacher, Die praktische Theologie nach den Grundsätzen der evangelischen Kirche im 
Zusammenhange dargestellt, ed. Jacob Frerichs (Berlin: Reimer, 1850), 240.
 Ibid., 242.6
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presentations of Christian faith, continued ever since.  On the other hand, they comprise 
the norm for all succeeding presentations.”  7
 The basis of biblical authority for Schleiermacher, therefore, is that the New 
Testament is the first recorded expression of Christian faith.  Working under the 
assumption that scripture is an authentic expression of faith, as he does, the New 
Testament serves as a kind of touchstone or check on later generations.  For 
Schleiermacher, then, later expressions of faith must accord with what we know to be the 
authentic expression of faith in the New Testament.  If they do not, either one is not 
articulating her or his faith correctly, or the later expression of faith is not Christian faith.  
This is what he means when he claims that scripture is normative.   Kelsey clearly and 8
succinctly explains Schleiermacher’s understanding: 
Scripture has a premier place in Christianity because it is the earliest written 
testimony of Christians to the influence of Christ.  Scripture is the record of early 
faith through Christ, and for this reason we check our own testimony to Christ 
against it.  9
   
 Certainly, the principal reason that scripture has authority for Schleiermacher is 
that he regards it as an expression of faith in Christ, the first in a series of such 
expressions, but normative in a way that later presentations of faith are not.   In addition, 10
 Schleiermacher, Christian Faith, §128 and §129. 7
 I will have much more to add regarding Schleiermacher’s understanding of the normative authority of the 8
New Testament in the next chapter.
 Kelsey, Thinking about Christ with Schleiermacher, 89-90.9
 To me, the explication of Schleiermacher’s understanding of the basis of scripture’s authority and his 10
conception of how or in what way(s) scripture is authoritative in the Christian church are closely-related 
topics.  I believe, however, that they are topics which are more effectively treated separately.  Therefore, I 
will defer the discussion of the latter until the next chapter, as my aim in this one is primarily to 
demonstrate that Schleiermacher ascribes authority to scripture and why. 
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I believe there is another reason, one that is closely related to the aforementioned.  It has 
to do with Schleiermacher’s use of the phrase, “Word of God.”  What is the meaning of 
this phrase, in what sense or senses did Schleiermacher use it, and what is the relevance 
of this discussion to the subject of biblical authority?  These are the questions to which I 
now turn. 
 In common parlance, “Word of God” is used as a synonym for revelation or for 
the Bible.  In the technical vocabulary of theology, the “Word of God” may refer to 
Christ.  Sometimes, the Word of God is also used to describe a contemporary divine 
communication—particularly in the act of preaching. 
 Schleiermacher himself uses the phrase “Word of God” in several senses.   First 11
and foremost, in Schleiermacher’s preaching, the phrase often corresponds to Christ.  For 
example, this seems apparent in a sermon he preached, entitled, “On the Public Ministry 
of the Word of God.”  His message is based on this scripture text: “And his gifts were that 
some should be apostles, some prophets, some evangelists, some pastors and teachers, to 
equip the saints for the work of ministry, for building up the body of Christ” (Ephesians 
4:11-12).  Upon close examination, one may discover that the function of this sermon is 
to explain the rationale for and benefits of the “ministry of the Word of God,” a ministry 
that refers to the teaching office of pastors and teachers.   In this sermon, Schleiermacher 12
 For a very fine treatment of Schleiermacher’s use of “Word of God,” see Dawn DeVries, “The Word of 11
God in the Theology of Friedrich Schleiermacher,” in Papers of the Henry Luce III Fellows in Theology, 
vol. 4, ed. Matthew Zyniewicz (Pittsburgh, PA: Association of Theological Schools in the United States and 
Canada, 2000), 45-69.
 See Schleiermacher’s sermon entitled “On the Public Ministry of the Word of God,” in Reformed But 12
Ever Reforming, 111.  He calls those who fill these roles “servants of God’s Word” (111), “ministers of the 
divine Word” (120), and “ministers of the Word” (120, 124).
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equates “the divine Word” with Christ: “[Christians] are united in a blessed community 
under the protection and guidance of the divine Word, which has become active in all of 
them to bring about a true spiritual life.”   Of people who are not called to the office of 13
pastor and teacher, he asserts that they should not “interpret the Word of God in public or 
dispense the holy pledges of his promise.”   In another sermon, titled, “Sermon at 14
Nathanael’s Grave,” after writing that this world “is glorified through the life of the 
Redeemer and hallowed through the efficacy of his Spirit,” Schleiermacher confesses that 
his highest goal was “to be nothing but a servant of this divine Word.”   Tice agrees with 15
this identification: 
The word is whatever God proclaims in Christ.  Schleiermacher uses this term of 
scripture only insofar as it represents and serves this purpose.  “Ministry of the 
Word” refers precisely to this word.  The word become flesh is God’s word 
spoken and enacted in Christ, not a preexistent part of the Godhead become 
incarnate.  “The word became flesh” is God’s word proclaimed by word and deed 
by and through the Redeemer.  16
DeVries agrees.  She claims that “Word of God” is a reference to Christ in the preached 
word:  
For present-day Christians, this powerful influence of the Redeemer is no longer 
exerted by his corporeal presence, but by the “picture” of him that is present 
within the church.  And the sermon is the location of that picture.  Carrying on 
the prophetic and priestly work of the Redeemer, preachers, by presenting their 
 Ibid., 107.13
 Ibid., 108.  See also 111-112, 116, 124.  Italics mine.14
 See Schleiermacher’s eulogy entitled “Sermon at Nathanael’s Grave,” in Servant of the Word, 211.  15
Italicized words are mine.  I am presuming that the antecedent of “this” is “the Redeemer.”  Here, 
Schleiermacher could very well be using the phrase to refer to divine communication in the act of 
preaching.
 Tice, Schleiermacher, 76.16
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own Christian consciousness, almost seductively “assume” their hearers into the 
power of their own experience of Christ and exert a powerful influence over 
them, just as Christ influenced his disciples.  And since any success they have in 
affecting their hearers is due to the presence of the Holy Spirit in their 
proclamation, it is certain that their congregations are encountering the Redeemer 
himself in the sermon.  Thus for Schleiermacher, the sermon was the “Word of 
God,” but not in the sense of a new declaration from God the Father.  Rather, the 
sermon is the transparent medium through which we encounter the Redeemer, 
who is himself God’s incarnate Word.  17
 Second, Schleiermacher’s use of the phrase seems to correspond to scripture in 
some of his sermons.  For instance, in the aforecited sermon, “On the Public Ministry of 
the Word of God,” he asks: “Why apostles and prophets if the divine Word is already 
alive in all of us?  Why evangelists if we can everywhere call to mind the life of the 
Redeemer and the fullness of his holy image from the written Word of God?”   Clearly, 18
the first usage of the phrase in this quotation is a reference to Christ, while the second 
reference—“the written Word of God”—is a reference to scripture.   Also, he writes that 19
one of the responsibilities of pastors is 
to place the Word of God in the hands of young Christians, urging them to 
observe it so that they themselves may derive from it the standards that will 
govern their lives and should test and understand themselves in the light from 
Christ that everywhere shines forth from it.    20
 DeVries, Servant of the Word, 11.17
 See Schleiermacher’s sermon entitled “On the Public Ministry of the Word,” in Reformed But Ever 18
Reforming, 107.
 When I believe Schleiermacher applies the phrase to scripture, I will render the phrase, “word of God.”  19
However, when I quote from one of his sermons as they are found, for example, in Reformed But Ever 
Reforming and Servant of the Word, I will render the phrase as it generally appears there: “Word of God.”  
My opinion is that for the sake of clarity, “word of God” should be used when the phrase refers to scripture, 
and “Word of God” when it refers to Christ.
 Ibid., 118.20
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In this passage, we may reasonably conclude that Schleiermacher is alluding to scripture 
as that from which the light of Christ shines. 
 There seems to be a similar correlation of scripture and “word of God” in a 
sermon Schleiermacher preached in 1817, which celebrated the three hundredth 
anniversary of the Reformation.  It was entitled, “Teaching the Reformation Faith to Our 
Children.”  Emphasizing the blessings that came to the church via the Reformation, he 
writes that these blessings can be traced chiefly  
to the recovery of the free use of God’s Word and to the reaffirmation of the great 
Christian doctrine concerning the futility of all outward works—the doctrine of 
justification by faith alone.  Accordingly, today’s meditation requires two 
resolutions of us: first, that we must assist our children in the free use of God’s 
Word, and second, that we must teach them the righteousness that comes from 
faith.    21
He adds that during the festival days of 1817 each one “sought to recall the stories from 
which we know how deeply the Word of God was buried in darkness for ages before the 
Reformation of the church.”  Is this a reference to Christ or to scripture?  At the very 
least, Schleiermacher demonstrates in the very next sentence the close association of the 
two: “In its original language, scripture was seldom sufficiently available even to biblical 
scholars, and it was as good as unavailable to the common people in their native tongue.”  
Schleiermacher is rejoicing in the fact that the Reformation restored the faded picture of 
the Redeemer.  How so?  By making scripture available to common people.  Also, noting 
that stories of Jesus make an impression upon children as well, he encourages parents to 
 See Schleiermacher’s sermon on “Teaching the Reformation Faith to Our Children,” in Servant of the 21
Word, 90.
!114
lead their children to “the treasures of God’s Word.”   For it is the duty of parents, he 22
charges, to expose their children to scripture:  
We have persuaded ourselves . . . that our children can only understand holy 
scripture rather late in childhood.  We are afraid that if we offered it to them too 
early they would be robbed of the desire and love for scripture later on; we fear 
that the holy reverence and awe with which they ought one day to approach 
God’s Word would be undermined in advance.   23
  
He concludes the sermon with this plea: “[W]e must solemnly pledge to educate young 
people in the fear and knowledge of the Lord as much as we can, and to give them early 
in life his Word as a light on their way.”  24
 In yet another sermon entitled “The Effects of Scripture and of the Redeemer,” 
Schleiermacher clearly identifies the “Word of God” with scripture:  
The Word contains above all the original testimony about the life and existence 
of the Redeemer, and it is by this testimony alone that we must judge whether 
something is taken from what is his. . . . If someone wants to remain within this 
fellowship but still boasts much or little about what the Lord has effected 
immediately in his soul . . . he must prove this for his congregation from God’s 
Word.  25
 Ibid., 91.22
 Ibid.  Throughout this particular sermon, Schleiermacher equates the word of God with scripture.  He 23
writes: “What do we mean when we say young people should first be able to understand the Word of God?  
Should we take it in the fullest sense, that they must be able to comprehend everything one can offer them 
from scripture in all its ramifications?  Must they know the precise definition of the meaning of each word 
and phrase, so that neither too much nor too little sticks in their souls?  We know well that such an 
understanding of the divine Word is solely the business of biblical scholars, and it is, even for them, a task 
to which they must dedicate their efforts unceasingly.  They do not claim to have explained scripture fully.”  
He encourages parents to feed and nurture in their children the first longings for a higher life.  He states: 
“When we observe this longing, what better thing could we do than to meet it with the pure milk of the 
divine Word?  Therefore, if today we are thanking God the Lord more fervently than ever for the blessing 
of his Word, we must also vow not to hinder and delay the salvific effects of that Word!  We should 
recognize the sacred duty not to hold our children back from the Word of God with an all too questionable 
cautiousness” (DeVries, Servant of the Word, 91-93).
 Ibid., 94.24
 See Schleiermacher’s sermon on “The Effects of Scripture and of the Redeemer,” in DeVries, Servant of 25
the Word, 112-113.
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 What did Schleiermacher intend to convey when he referred to scripture as “word 
of God”?  Assuredly, he did not mean that scripture is of God in the sense that it is from 
God.  As I demonstrated in Chapter Three, although he had a concept of revelation, he did 
not accept that scripture was a deposit of divinely and supernaturally revealed truths.  
Does German grammar provide some clarity on the meaning of this phrase?  I do not 
believe it does.  “Word of God,” or “divine word” (göttlichen Wort) is in the genitive 
case, which is commonly used to indicate possession.   Also, the genitive case can take 26
the preposition “regarding” or “concerning.”   According to the German construction of 27
this phrase, then, the meaning of “word of God” could be the word or message that 
belongs to God (Possessive Genitive) or the word or message regarding or concerning 
God (Objective Genitive).   
 One thing is certain: one cannot read Schleiermacher’s sermons without coming 
to the conclusion that here was a theologian and preacher who held a high view of 
scripture.  The fact that he correlates “Word of God” and scripture is ample evidence of 
his belief that scripture is special, indeed, authoritative.  
 His contributions to exegetical studies only confirm this.   From the beginning of 28
his teaching career in 1804, he lectured almost continuously in New Testament studies.  
At Halle he offered courses on Galatians, Thessalonians, Corinthians, Romans, 
 April Wilson, German Quickly: A Grammar for Reading German, rev. ed. (Peter Lang Publishing: New 26
York: 2007), 18.
 Terrence N. Tice, interview by author, Denver, CO, December 11, 2014.27
 The following biographical information was taken from DeVries, “Schleiermacher, Friedrich Daniel 28
Ernst (1768-1834),” in Dictionary of Major Biblical Interpreters, 886.
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Ephesians, Philippians, Colossians, Philemon, Timothy, Titus, and Hebrews.  At the 
University of Berlin, from 1810 to 1834, he lectured at least once each academic year 
(except in 1827) on some theme in New Testament studies.  He offered eleven semester-
long courses on the Gospels, six on Acts, nineteen on the Pauline, Pastoral and Catholic 
Epistles and Hebrews, four on the life of Jesus, and two on introduction to the New 
Testament.       
  
The Core Criticism of Schleiermacher’s Conception of Biblical Authority 
 As I did in the last two chapters, I want to identify and address the criticisms of 
those who tend to align with the content-based/supernaturalist approach to biblical 
authority.  Generally, their chief criticism of Schleiermacher’s view of scripture and its 
authority is that it severely limits the role of the Bible in theology and church.   More 29
specifically, they argue that his position does not grant to scripture its fundamental and 
essential role as the foundation of Christian faith.  This is key to understanding the 
viewpoint of Schleiermacher’s critics.  For content-based supernaturalists like Henry and 
many others who are critical of Schleiermacher’s theology, scripture is the starting point 
of faith. 
 Now, to be clear, both content-based supernaturalists and function-based 
rationalists acknowledge the authority of scripture, at least to some degree.  
Schleiermacher himself, as noted above in this chapter, believed in the authority of the 
New Testament.  Indeed, one could make the case that all evangelicals believe in biblical 
 Cf., DeVries, “The Word of God in the Theology of Schleiermacher,” 49-52.29
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authority.   The central issue and point of controversy, of course, is the locus of that 30
authority. 
 Stanley Grenz helps us to understand one of the chief criticisms of 
Schleiermacher, in his essay in Evangelicals and Scripture: Tradition, Authority, and 
Hermeneutics.  There, he argues that two approaches to the role of scripture have 
prevailed among evangelicals since the Reformation.  On the one hand, some have held 
that the Bible is a “source of correct doctrine.”   Others, characterized more by Pietism 31
and Puritanism, see the Bible as a “source of spiritual sustenance.”   This typology may 32
be overly simplistic, but I believe there is value in it.  In general, I would say that it 
typifies models of biblical authority advocated by content-based supernaturalists and 
function-based rationalists. 
 The criticism of Schleiermacher’s position is that since, for him, the New 
Testament is authoritative because it is an expression, indeed, the first expression, of the 
faith of the early Christian community, the locus of biblical authority is found in the 
community of believers, rather than in the text of scripture.  In other words, 
Schleiermacher is often presented as a theologian who radically subordinated the 
authority of scripture to that of experience.  As one critic asserts: “Scripture is not 
 Chad Owen Brand, “Defining Evangelicalism” in Reclaiming the Center: Confronting Evangelical 30
Accommodation in Postmodern Times, ed. Millard J. Erickson, Paul Kjoss Helseth, and Justin Taylor 
(Wheaton, IL: Crossway Books, 2004), 296-304.
 Stanley J. Grenz, “Nurturing the Soul, Informing the Mind: The Genesis of the Evangelical Scripture 31
Principle,” in Evangelicals and Scripture: Tradition, Authority, and Hermeneutics, ed. Vincent E. Bacote, 
Laura C. Miguélez, and Dennis L. Ekholm (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 2004), 23.
 Ibid.32
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ultimately about us, but about God and his redemptive work to rescue human beings from 
their lost condition.”   Schleiermacher’s critics wonder: If scripture is not a divinely 33
revealed deposit of correct doctrine then how can it serve as the foundation of faith?  
How can it function as the ground of theology and life?  This is the reasoning behind this 
chief criticism.  34
Schleiermacher’s Response 
 How would Schleiermacher respond to this criticism?  First, although he would 
certainly deny that his position diminishes the role of the Bible in the church, he would 
wholeheartedly agree with his critics that his position does not grant scripture the role 
that they think it must.  Schleiermacher rejects the notion that scripture is the starting 
point or foundation of faith.  Much of what makes him unique in theological history, as 
well as the one who ushered in the distinctively modern phase of Protestant theology, is 
his formulation of an alternative starting point: the shared faith experience of Christians 
in community understood and communicated through the “apostolic witness” in the New 
Testament.  Schleiermacher roots his accounts of Christian faith and life in an “immediate 
existential relationship” with God, experienced distinctively by each individual within a 
distinct religious community.  35
 Brand, “Defining Evangelicalism,” 302.33
 For more on this particular criticism and the reasoning that underlies the position that scripture is the 34
foundation of faith, see Stephen J. Wellum, “Postconservatism, Biblical Authority, and Recent Proposals for 
Re-Doing Evangelical Theology: A Critical Analysis,” in Reclaiming the Center: Confronting Evangelical 
Accommodation in Postmodern Times, ed. Millard J. Erickson, Paul Kjoss Helseth, and Justin Taylor 
(Wheaton, IL: Crossway Books, 2004), 161-197.
 Terrence Tice, Schleiermacher, xiv.35
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Scripture Is Not the Foundation of Faith 
 For Schleiermacher, scripture  cannot be the foundation of Christian faith.   He 36 37
declared this explicitly in §128 of Christian Faith: “The authority of holy scripture 
cannot be the basis of faith in Christ; rather, in order to accord special authority to holy 
scripture, this fact already must be presupposed.”   Why was Schleiermacher unwilling 38
to grant scripture this role?   
 First, he believed that if it were foundational to faith, it would be necessary to 
prove scripture’s authority on the ground of reason.   For him, this was unacceptable in 39
the first place, because he felt it would make scripture inaccessible to some.  To establish 
biblical authority on the ground of reason would presuppose a “critical and scientific use 
of the intellect, of which not all persons are capable.”   One of the problems of this 40
approach to scripture for Schleiermacher is that “only persons who are competent in these 
skills could have faith handed down to them in an original and authentic fashion.”   He 41
 Likely, this has been recognized already, but I will make the claim here: When Schleiermacher uses the 36
term “scripture,” he always, I think, has the New Testament in mind.
 For a provocative discussion of the ground of faith and an introduction to Schleiermacher’s view that 37
scripture cannot fill that role, see Kelsey, Thinking about Christ with Schleiermacher, 88-90.  Also, for 
Schleiermacher, almost everywhere in his writings, the term “faith” (Glaube), which in ordinary German 
usage can refer either to belief or faith, means faith, or religious experience, that is, what is immediately 
present or directly rooted in Christian “religious self-consciousness.”  In contrast, belief is a cognitive 
activity, issuing in opinion and information or supporting facts or knowledge (See Tice, Schleiermacher, 
58).  So, for Schleiermacher, “Christian faith is not about what we believe; Christian faith is about our 
relationship with God” (Kelsey, Thinking about Christ with Schleiermacher, 71).
 Schleiermacher, Christian Faith, §128.38
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felt this approach would force people to rely upon the authority of experts and, thus, 
could generate only a second-hand faith. 
 This over-reliance on “the experts,” he asserts, is incongruous with the 
Evangelical Church’s belief in the equality of all Christians.  It would demand from the 
laity an unqualified and submissive trust in those who alone would have access to the 
ground of faith due to their ability to apply their rational faculties to biblical 
interpretation.  This was unacceptable to Schleiermacher, who believed that scripture 
should be accessible to all.  He writes: 
[T]he right of access to the divine word that we afford to all Christians and the 
zeal with which we seek to keep it in vital circulation in no way relate to a 
supposition that everyone is supposed to be able to offer proof that these books 
contain a divine revelation.  42
 Schleiermacher’s second objection to proving the authority of scripture on the 
ground of reason is based on his contention that if such proof could be given and if faith 
could be established in this fashion, then faith could be implanted by argument.  The 
problem with this scenario, he argues, is that it would mean that faith could exist in those 
who felt no need of redemption.   The need of redemption, repentance, a change of mind 43
and heart—these are things that accompany a genuine faith, according to Schleiermacher.  
Consequently, and in other words, he believed that “faith,” which could be implanted by 
argument, would not be a genuine faith at all. 
 Ibid.42
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 But upon what basis does he make this claim?  What norm informed his 
understanding of “genuine faith”?  From his study of the Gospels in the Reformed 
tradition, Schleiermacher came to believe that the earliest disciples of Jesus had genuine 
faith.  Because their faith was real, Schleiermacher was sure that the “ground of faith 
must be the same among us as among the first Christians.”   This meant, then, that faith 44
must be generated, not by the New Testament, since the earliest disciples did not have the 
New Testament, but by the personal influences of Christ.  45
 But some might argue, Schleiermacher writes, that the faith of the earliest 
Christians was grounded on scripture, Old Testament scripture.   “Didn’t the Apostles 46
describe Jesus as the figure whom the prophets foretold?” some must have argued.  
Schleiermacher’s response is that it is impossible to take this as meaning that the earliest 
Christians had been led to faith in Jesus by the study of those prophecies and by the 
comparison of their contents with what they saw and heard in Jesus.  On the contrary, he 
asserts, it was a direct impression that awakened faith in those who had been prepared by 
 Ibid., §128.2.44
 Ibid.  A key argument against those who hold a content-based/supernaturalist approach to biblical 45
authority is that the earliest disciples were saved without scripture.  I believe this is a decisive argument in 
Schleiermacher’s doctrine of biblical authority.  If one grants that people since the time of Christ develop 
faith and are, therefore, saved in the same way as the earliest Christians, then scripture cannot be the 
foundation of faith.  Again, Schleiermacher explains: “If we proceed from the principle that our Christianity 
is to be the same as that of the apostles, then ours too must arise through the personal influences of Christ, 
since spiritual states are not independent of the way in which they emerge (italics mine)”  (Christian Faith, 
§127.2).
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the testimony of John the Baptist.  Moreover, their description of Jesus was only an 
expression of this faith combined with their faith in the prophets.  47
 Is it not possible, some might claim, that today faith begins from the acceptance 
of the doctrine that the preaching of Christ by the “inspired” Apostles is “revealed by 
God” in the writings of the New Testament?  Schleiermacher’s reply is that such faith 
does not spring from the acceptance of a special doctrine about these writings, as if these 
writings had their origin in special divine revelation or inspiration.  In Christian Faith, 
§14, he writes: 
[R]egarding inspiration, in Christianity this concept bears a thoroughly 
subordinate meaning.  This is the case, for reference of the concept to Christ 
finds no place in Christianity at all, in that divine revelation through him, 
however it might be conceived, is always taken to be identical with his entire 
existence, not as appearing in a fragmentary manner in scattered instances.  What 
the Spirit gave to the apostles, however, Christ himself spoke of as derived 
entirely from his own instruction.  Moreover, those who became persons of faith 
through the apostolic witness did not become so because this witness had arisen 
through inspiration, for they knew nothing of that.  48
 As further proof that faith does not come from believing in the inspiration of the 
New Testament authors, Schleiermacher notes that “[a]s for the New Testament . . . faith 
had been communicated over the length of two centuries before any agreement was set 
forth as to its distinctive currency.”   In fact, he argues that one must have faith before 49
 Ibid.47
 Ibid., §14, p.s.48
 Ibid.  The word “currency” is a translation of the word “Gültigkeit.”  Tice notes that this term refers to 49
“an agreed-upon set of writings that would have general currency for the churches represented in the 
decision-making.”
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reading scripture as containing and conveying divine revelation as a generally 
trustworthy witness to Christ.  He makes this point in one of his sermons: 
It is not altogether true to say, as we often enough put it, that scripture is the first 
witness to faith to have come down to us.  Faith in Christ arose through Christ 
himself, in response to how he lived, spoke, and acted.  It was only afterward that 
scripture arose, as it proceeded from faith.  Thus, it is Christ who ever remains 
the source of faith, even still today, and to this we must hold firm.   50
Moreover a doctrine of the divine inspiration of scripture, he claimed, can be credible 
only to those who are already believers.  51
Schleiermacher’s Understanding of the Foundation of Faith 
 Another reason Schleiermacher refused to view scripture as the faith-forming 
foundation is that he had the strong conviction that something else and something better 
had to be that foundation.  For him, that “something better” is the experience of 
redemption.  To explain this point of view, I want to examine in some detail a sermon 
Schleiermacher preached before 1826, entitled, “The Effects of Scripture and the 
Immediate Effects of the Redeemer.”  Based upon Luke 24:30-32, a text which describes 
Jesus’ post-resurrection appearance to a couple of disciples on the road to Emmaus, the 
sermon clearly articulates Schleiermacher’s understanding of the foundation of faith. 
 He begins the sermon by highlighting two elements in the story.  First, he notes 
that Jesus deliberately took special care to make clear to his disciples the scripture that 
 See Schleiermacher’s sermon entitled, “On the Handing Over of the Confession As Giving an Account 50
for the Ground of Hope, in Nicol, Reformed But Every Reforming, 41.
 Schleiermacher, Christian Faith, §14, p.s.51
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bore witness to him.  However, second, Schleiermacher asserts that there was something 
else which neither the scripture in itself nor even Christ’s explanation of it could bring 
about.  He writes: 
Despite the fact that the disciples’ hearts had burned along the way when he 
opened the scripture to them, they still did not recognize him.  That happened 
only when he sat at table with them, broke the bread with the customary 
thanksgiving, and divided it among them.  Only then did they recognize him.  52
   
 From this, Schleiermacher infers that the disciples did not attribute even the 
burning of their hearts within them to the scripture, but rather to Christ’s way of using it 
and expounding it.  Then, he articulates his thesis: “We see here, then, two things: the 
effects of scripture and the immediate effects of the Lord, which radiate purely from his 
person in the company of his own.”   Schleiermacher devotes the remainder of the 53
sermon to an explanation of these two effects and the relationship between them. 
 How does he explain or describe the effects of scripture?  He praises scripture as              
“a treasure shared by us all.”   He affirms its value when he asserts: 54
[T]he right way of contending for the truth and integrity of our evangelical 
Christianity is and always will be what it was when our church began: to prove 
 See Schleiermacher’s sermon on “The Effects of Scripture and the Immediate Effects of the Redeemer,” 52
DeVries, Servant of the Word, 100-101.
 Ibid., 101.  Italics mine.53
 Ibid., 102-103, 105, 114.  In addition to his praise of scripture, Schleiermacher praises those who 54
expound it.  He emphasizes the value and necessity of ministers of the word, who like Christ, “join the 
explanation of scripture to the scripture itself.”  He asserts that the Lord never fails “to produce in his 
church those students of scripture, well-educated to the Kingdom of Heaven, to whom God’s Spirit gives 
from his treasure, along with the old and proven things, new insights (Matt. 13:52) that enlighten us and 
make our hearts burn within us.”  He affirms the value of those Christians who are “the most zealous 
guardians of the great and common treasure we all possess in the written Word of the Lord. . . . They draw 
from this Word because they know that it is the well that never runs dry, the well that holds the Water of 
Life” (DeVries, Servant of the Word, 114.). 
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our good cause from scripture, just as Paul, and Stephen before him, did for the 
cause of Christianity.  55
He explicitly states his conviction that scripture is authoritative and again expresses the 
function of scripture when he asserts that “the holy authority of the Word must provide a 
firm rule for all that happens in the hearts of Christians.”  56
 How does Schleiermacher describe the effects of the Redeemer?  First, he asserts              
that they are impressions, independent of scripture, made by Christ’s personality.  He 
notes that while Christ walked the earth, “his distinctive nature however it might express 
itself, never failed to create such impressions.”   Again, Schleiermacher draws the 57
conclusion that this is how the disciples’ faith first arose: through the impression of 
Christ.  He makes this interesting distinction in this beautiful passage:   
Now if this impression came to them [the first disciples] as the Lord spoke words 
of doctrine and admonition to them which afterward became the source of their 
own instruction to Christians, then this is something that in essence belongs for 
us entirely to the effects of scripture.  Yet, the reason why their hearts burned 
within them was precisely because of the immediacy of his impression: the way 
in which the loving movements of the divine disposition were reflected in Jesus’ 
outward bearing, the strength of conviction expressed in his heavenly, clear eyes, 
and everything else we could mention by which the glory of the only-begotten 
Son of God, full of grace and truth, was to be beheld in him (John 1:14).  58
 Ibid., 110.55
 Ibid., 113.  In Schleiermacher’s theology, scripture is the norm for experience, as I will demonstrate in 56
the next chapter.
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 Elsewhere in this sermon, he describes these immediate and personal effects of              
the Redeemer as a light that sparks “immediately in the human soul by the Son of God,”  59
as something that stirs the depths of the soul,  as “immediate inner experiences of the 60
heart,”  and as “pious impulses of the soul.”   He equates these effects with that which 61 62
“arises through the inner working of the Redeemer in the soul.”   Schleiermacher’s 63
understanding of the effects of the Redeemer is nothing less than “the immediate spiritual 
presence of the Lord in the soul.”  64
 At one point in the sermon, he seems to anticipate an objection, or at the very 
least, a question, which he surely understands must be materializing in the minds of his 
hearers.  He wonders if these impressions, connected as they were with Christ’s personal 
appearance, are available to those who did not live during the period of his earthly life.  
His initial response, likely rhetorical in nature, is that it seems they are not.  But, did not 
Christ promise that “Where two or three are gathered in my name, there am I in the midst 
of them” (Matt. 18:20) and that “I am with you always, to the close of the age” (Matt. 
28:20)?  Schleiermacher asks.  Then, he challenges the skeptics:  
Could Christ have meant by these words nothing but the effects that the Word 
portraying him in the New Testament (and before that was written, the reports of 
those who had lived with him and under him) must bring about in the hearts of 
 Ibid., 112.59
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those who longed for salvation but had not been able to enjoy his personal 
acquaintance and influence?  And is this all he has left for us?  We can scarcely 
think so!  65
 One reason he trusts that the personal influence of the Redeemer is available since 
the period Christ walked the earth is because he feels that if it is unavailable, it would be 
unfair to all who have lived since that time.   But, he also realizes that there are some in 66
every church who want to abandon the hope that immediate experiences of the Lord are 
possible.  They want to listen exclusively to the word of the Lord  because “they are 67
rightly concerned that many things totally alien to the spirit and intention of the 
Redeemer could insinuate themselves into the faith and life of Christians through such 
imagined or alleged influences of Christ.”   Schleiermacher notes that these same people 68
argue that every Christian must be fully satisfied with scripture alone. 
 At this point in the sermon, he accepts the challenge to prove that the availability 
of these effects is reasonable and that they are unconnected to words.  He begins with a 
reference to the Eucharist.  He asks: 
 Ibid., 104.65
 He grants that to specify exactly what the immediate influences of the Lord could be, since Christ no 66
longer walks in person on earth, is problematic.  It would be easier, he states, to understand why Christians 
have not split into separate communions over this issue.  He writes: “In every Christian communion there 
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[D]oes not this narrative [Luke 24:30-32] remind us particularly of the Holy 
Supper that was connected with just such a meal?  And does not the special effect 
that many believers (not to say all of them) credit to this sacrament have a strong 
resemblance to the experience of the disciples?  Is it not a true recognition after 
the eyes had long been held shut?  A lively representation that all at once renews 
a host of earlier moments when our hearts burned within us? . . . [W]hat else can 
we say than that these are continuations and consequences of the immediate, 
personal influence of Christ?  69
 His second illustration comes from the days of the resurrection when the Lord 
approached his disciples several times and called out to them: “Peace be with you” (John 
20:19; 21:26).  He said, “My peace I give to you” (John 14:27).  After citing these 
passages, Schleiermacher concludes that the peace that came over the disciples was the 
immediate effect of the Lord himself.  Then he asks, “[M]ust this effect be tied to his 
bodily, personal presence?  Or should we not all be capable of having this experience in 
special moments? . . . All devout Christians have surely had such experiences!”   Here is 70
his conclusion of the matter: 
[B]eside the immediate effects of the Word there are also distinctive effects of the 
Redeemer that issue, so to say, from his whole and undivided being.  And this is 
not dependent on his bodily appearance for its efficacy.  The original spiritual 
efficacy of his existence is, of course, mediated only through the Word; but it is 
maintained in its characteristic nature within the communion of the faithful.  
Thus the original impression constantly takes shape anew in individual hearts, 
and on particular occasions it becomes efficacious in them in a wonderful way.  71
 The final illustration in his apologetic comes from the domain of ordinary, human 
life.  He argues that people often feel the effects of distant loved ones, even without the 
 Ibid., 106-107.69
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written word and even of those who are no longer alive.  Regarding these, he asserts: 
“They warn, encourage, correct, and illumine us, so that we are compelled to say, ‘This 
comes to me because of my union with this friend; this is his word and work in my inner 
self.’”   Moreover, he adds, people encounter the same thing in connection with those 72
whom they know only through their influence in the world, people who are set up as 
heroes and examples.  Then, Schleiermacher drives home his point: 
If we count among the marks of human greatness the fact that the total being of 
one individual can affect the inner lives of many others decisively and to an 
extraordinary degree, how can we fail to include the same mark in the greatness 
of One who is exalted above all others?  How can we fail to expect similar effects 
from him, who should be the hero and model for us all, the One whom we may 
all most rightly call the friend of our soul in a sense and measure we accord to no 
other?  73
 Why was it so important for one who acknowledged the authority and value of 
scripture and who often wrote of “the glorious treasure we have in God’s Word”  to feel 74
the need to defend the continued availability of the personal and immediate effects of the 
Redeemer?  The answer is that he believed faith springs from the effects of the Redeemer, 
rather than from scripture.  75
 Ibid.72
 Ibid.73
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 In the introduction of this sermon, Schleiermacher declares plainly that scripture cannot do what the 75
immediate influence of the Redeemer can.  Referring to the Luke 24:30-32 narrative and others, he asserts: 
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 For Schleiermacher, true and vital Christianity is based on the experience of 
redemption in Christ.  He asks: “If this [proving the cause of evangelical Christianity 
from scripture] were all, would we be certain that we had and held true and vital 
Christianity among us?”   At this point one might ask: How would Schleiermacher 76
define “true and vital Christianity”?  As if to anticipate the question, he continues:  
[D]oes not each of us admit that there are many people who share this good fight 
with us; many who, like us, strive against all works-righteousness and all power 
of human authority, and do so from the scripture, but of whom we cannot say that 
the love of Christ constrains them (2 Cor. 5:14).  77
He imagines people who “when they behold from a distance the commandments Christ 
gave to his own, the ordinances he established in the early church, the exemplary nature 
of his life, and the characteristic features of the way he acted as a person” feel that 
something special is there, “so that their heart likewise burns within them.”  But, he adds, 
their eyes remain closed, and “they do not come to that joyous, immediate recognition 
that this is the Lord.”   Is it important that people come to such a recognition?  Here is 78
his answer: 
True and vital Christianity rests on this recognition alone; we must admit that 
Christianity cannot be preserved or spread among us unless the effects that come 
from the living memory and spiritual presence of Christ and are based upon the 
whole of his nature and manifestation are added to what is, in the narrowest and 
most particular sense, the effect of Word and doctrine.  79
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 Schleiermacher claims that he does not mean to argue that if one takes Christ’s 
teachings from scripture but separates them from his personal influence, scripture must 
necessarily degenerate into “a dead letter.”   But, he recognizes that this has indeed 80
happened.  From personal experience, he asserts that “in our own church we have been—
perhaps still are—content with the mere letter of orthodox doctrine, without giving 
effective evidence of a true Christian disposition.”   Then, he adds: “But we do not 81
usually find this problem in those who are susceptible to the personal influences of 
Christ.”  82
 Not only in this sermon, but elsewhere, Schleiermacher expresses his firm 
conviction that scripture is unable to produce piety.  In On Religion, he excoriates those 
“who get their so-called religion from an external source or who depend on some dead 
writing, swearing on it and using it for proof texts.”   In one of his more famous 83
quotations, he both praises scripture while also noting its inability to equal the influence 
of the original spirit that inspired it: 
Every sacred scripture is in itself a glorious production, a monument in speech 
from the heroic ages of religion.  Servile devotion, however, makes a mausoleum 
out of it—a monument to a great spirit formerly present but there no longer.  If 
that spirit still has its vital effect, surely it is rather by inspiring a sense of fond 
objectivity toward that written work from earlier times, for that work can never 
be more than a weak impress of the spirit that initially produced it.  84
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 Why did Schleiermacher feel that scripture is so limited?  A partial answer is that 
he thought “[t]oo much of the pure impression contained in the original experience is lost 
in books.”   He utilizes an interesting metaphor to explain this concept: 85
We know how dark material absorbs most of the light rays striking it.  Written 
signs are like that.  Everything having to do with the pious stirring of the spirit is 
swallowed up by them.  Because the medium is insufficient to embrace the 
experience, the expected reflection does not occur.  86
   
One of the problems with written communications of piety, Schleiermacher avers, is that 
“everything has to be repeated two and three times removed from the original 
experience.”   This means that, essentially, the initial “reflection” is refracted too many 87
times, leading Schleiermacher to ask: “Must religion inevitably lose its abundant life in 
the dead letter, then?”  Naturally, his answer is, “Not at all,” since his conviction is that 
true religion is produced, not by words on a page, but by the immediate and personal 
effects of the Redeemer.     88
 He further explains why he believes it is necessary “that scripture be 
complemented by something from the inside” in his sermon, “The Effects of Scripture 
 Ibid., 210.85
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and the Immediate Effects of the Redeemer.”  He asks his hearers to consider how many 
difficulties one finds in interpreting the Word of scripture: 
It comes from a remote time, deals with strange customs, and was written in a 
language only slightly related to our own.  What risky scope for human caprice 
opens up there!  How many sad examples do we see in which caprice actually 
has been exerted on scripture to make dead and dull what reflects the true essence 
of Christianity most brightly, or to read into scripture something not in accord 
with the original spirit of Christian faith.  But every attempt, however well-
intentioned, to restrain this caprice by external means has proved to be in vain!  89
His presumption is that only the personal, immediate, and continuing effects of the 
Redeemer on individual souls is able to counteract the possibility of such human caprice. 
 Again, Schleiermacher is convinced that faith begins when “a light is sparked 
immediately in the human soul by the Son of God.”   Moreover, he believes that 90
regardless of when or how this illumination happens, if it happens, one may easily 
dispense with God’s Word.   Why so?  To reiterate, he believes that “this is how Christ 91
glorifies and reveals himself immediately in the soul with greater clarity and certainty.”   92
Kelsey summarizes well Schleiermacher’s firm conviction: 
Scripture cannot be the foundation for Christian faith; faith in Christ must exist 
before someone gives Scripture special authority ([Christian Faith], §128).  The 
experience of redemption is the ground of our faith. . . . That experience of 
redemption is the same for us as it was for Christ’s first followers.  They received 
the experience through personal encounter, seeing in the words and the actions of 
Jesus what the fulfillment of human life is like. . . . Faith passes from person to 
 See Schleiermacher’s sermon in DeVries, Servant of the Word, 111.89
 Ibid., 112.90
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person and generation to generation, because God-consciousness is articulated 
and otherwise made visible in the lives of faithful people.  93
 Just here, I want to say a brief word concerning Schleiermacher’s christology.  As 
Kelsey observed, for Schleiermacher, the experience of redemption for all Christians 
since Jesus’ day must be the same as it was for his first disciples.  What was the 
experience of the first Christians?  As I have demonstrated, they experienced the strength 
and drawing power of Jesus’ personality.  They saw something in him that was so 
compelling and attractive.  That something, that critical aspect of his personality, 
according to Schleiermacher, was Christ’s perfect God-consciousness.  Thus, Jesus 
expressed his experience of God to others, and the impression of this experience was 
redemptive.  As Vial summarizes: “What was redemptive for the disciples who were face-
to-face with Jesus was his personality and the power of his God-consciousness.”   94
 So, since Christ is gone, how can people since then experience redemption in the 
same way as the first disciples?  No, according to Schleiermacher’s christology, Christ is 
not gone; he is present in the community that he founded.  Vial writes: 
The Christian community, formed by Jesus . . . continues to embody his ways of 
speaking, gesturing, experiencing.  The Christian community carries in it the 
picture (Bild) of Jesus.  And so, when latter day people enter into that community 
they are confronted, in just the way the disciples were, by the redemptive 
personality of Jesus.  95
 “The redeeming influence of Christ today thus does not occur primarily through the biblical text.  The 93
redeeming influence of Christ extends today through the visible power of redemption in the lives of the 
redeemed community of faith” (Kelsey, Thinking about Christ with Schleiermacher, 89, 11).
 Vial, Schleiermacher: A Guide for the Perplexed, 89.94
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In short, Schleiermacher’s christology allows him to think about the ongoing presence of 
Jesus and the redeeming effects of that presence.  
 Schleiermacher closes his sermon on “The Effects of Scripture and the Immediate 
Effects of the Redeemer” with a plea for unity.  First, he asserts his belief that it is 
optimal for both effects to be present in the church: 
We should thank God, then, if both effects are always together in the Christian 
church and are always reacting upon each other.  The immediate testimony of the 
Lord’s efficacy in the soul must continually animate the effects of the Word; the 
holy authority of the Word must provide a firm rule for all that happens in the 
hearts of Christians, so that all may be held together in the unity of faith and each 
may submit to the consensus of the community.  So may we all remain in the 
truth that makes us free.  96
 Then he poses one final provocative question: “[H]ow should each individual 
relate to these two effects that our spiritual life rests upon?”  Surely he is being strategic 
when he first answers the question by referring to scripture: “The body is one and has 
many members” (1 Cor. 12:12).  In other words, he believes that both the person who is 
scripture-centered and the one who focuses upon the immediate effects of Christ are 
needed.  He urges: “In the Christian church, both effects must be united: the clear, 
intelligible, and easily communicable efficacy of the Word, and the more mysterious but 
immediate truth of the Redeemer that stirs the depths of the soul.”   97
 Even as he pleads for unity and for Christians to value those among them who 
“cling to God’s Word,” he simultaneously removes any doubt as to which effects he 
 See Schleiermacher’s sermon in DeVries, Servant of the Word, 113.96
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prefers.  Is it those that come from scripture or those that come from the Redeemer 
himself?  He affirms that he considers the immediate effects of the Redeemer to have 
greater value.  He acknowledges that perhaps those who are more scripture-oriented in 
their outlook are too suspicious of immediate inner experiences of the heart.  His hope is 
that they will continue to “nourish themselves with the Word, so that the Word of 
scripture that bears witness to Christ may become clear in their innermost being.”   As 98
for those who have never experienced the personal effects of Christ, he asks: “How could 
we despise them for lacking something that others have attained, when they are striving 
for the same goal as the others?  How could they not be valuable to us as the most 
zealous guardians of the great and common treasure we all possess in the written Word of 
the Lord?”  Schleiermacher is content to conclude that “the blessing that can arise only 99
through this inner working of the Redeemer in the soul is dispersed on these fellow 
Christians as well, at least indirectly, by means of the many contacts they have in 
Christian fellowship.”    100
 Finally, he appeals to the practice of Christian love in the church.  He instructs 
that love requires that both groups—those who experience more abundantly the blessing 
of the Word and those who experience the immediate spiritual presence of the Lord—
remain open to the special gift of the other.  101
 Ibid.98
 Ibid., 114.99
 Ibid.  Italics mine.100
 Ibid., 115.101
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 To recapitulate, Schleiermacher most certainly accepts the authority of scripture, 
one, because it is the first expression of Christian faith, and two, because it is in some 
sense the “word of God,” a message regarding redemption in Christ.  Although his 
understanding of the authority of scripture may not be robust enough for some, since he 
denies that it is the foundation of faith, he certainly held God’s word in high regard.  For 
him, however, the ground of faith is the experience of redemption in Christ.   
 But if scripture is not the foundation of Christian faith, what is its role in the 
church?  In what sense is it authoritative in Schleiermacher’s theology?  He believed it is 
normative, but what is the nature and extent of its normative character, according to him?  
Why did he accept the authority of the New Testament, but not of the Old?  These are 
some of the questions which I hope to answer in the next chapter.  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Chapter Six: Schleiermacher and the Normative Character of Scripture 
 Thusfar in my explication of Schleiermacher’s doctrine of biblical authority I 
have demonstrated that although he held doctrines of both inspiration and revelation, he 
did not hold the supernaturalist/content-based view that scripture is a deposit of divinely-
revealed truths.  Nevertheless, I have also shown that he most certainly believed in the 
authority of scripture on the basis that it is a record of the experience of God in the lives 
of believers.  Indeed, Schleiermacher understood scripture to possess normative authority, 
as I introduced in the previous chapter. 
 In this chapter, I want to unpack his understanding of the normative character of 
scripture.  In order to accomplish this objective, I will attend to three lines of inquiry.  
First, what is Schleiermacher’s conception of “canon”?  I believe it is necessary and 
helpful to lay out his understanding of “canon” as the essence or primary subject matter 
of Christianity and the relation of this essence to the biblical text.  This explanation will 
lay the foundation for understanding why he ascribed normative authority to some parts 
of Christian scripture over other parts.  Second, to which parts of scripture does 
Schleiermacher ascribe normative authority?  Since he did not grant it to all of scripture, I 
want to identify what qualified, for him, as an authoritative, biblical norm for Christian 
faith.  This will require an examination of his controversial opinion that the Old 
Testament should not have canonical standing in the Christian Bible as well as an 
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identification of the subject matter in the New Testament, which, I believe, became his 
“canon within the canon.”  Third, what kind of authority does scripture exert?  I want to 
explain how scripture functions as a norm for the church and in what sense it is 
authoritative in Schleiermacher’s theology.  I will begin with an examination of his 
notion of “canon.” 
Schleiermacher’s Understanding of “Canon” 
 An appropriate starting point from which to unpack Schleiermacher’s concept of 
“canon” is his discussion of philosophical theology in Brief Outline of Theology as a 
Field of Study.   There, he identifies “canon” as an idea, identified by philosophical 1
theology, which ensures the unity of a religious tradition over time.  He acknowledges 
that the Christian church, like every historical phenomenon, is necessarily subject to 
change.  What will ensure that the unity of any religious tradition, including Christianity, 
will remain intact in a changing world?  What will safeguard its authenticity and integrity 
in the face of certain change?  For Schleiermacher, it is the identification of the idea that 
accounts for the essence of Christianity.   Helmer summarizes this perspective when she 2
 Schleiermacher identifies three theological sub-disciplines in his Brief Outline of Theology as a Field of 1
Study: philosophical theology, exegetical theology, and systematic theology.  In this section, I am indebted 
to Christine Helmer, “Transhistorical Unity of the New Testament Canon from Philosophical, Exegetical, 
and Systematic-Theological Perspectives,” in One Scripture or Many? Canon from Biblical, Theological, 
and Philosophical Perspectives, ed. Christine Helmer and Christof Landmesser (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2004).
 Friedrich Schleiermacher, Brief Outline of Theology as a Field of Study: Revised Translation of the 1811 2
and 1830 Editions, 3d. ed., trans. and ed. Terrence N. Tice (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox Press, 
2011), §47.  Hereafter, I will abbreviate this source as Brief Outline.
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writes that “canon,” for Schleiermacher, is a “philosophical-theological concept derived 
from a theory of religion in order to account for the transhistorical essence of a religion.”   3
 That Schleiermacher begins his discussion of “canon” in this way must be 
significant.  After all, one might have expected him to begin his discourse with reference 
to the biblical text itself.  Eventually, he will address the notion of “canon” as it relates to 
the biblical text, but first he identifies philosophical theology’s determination of “canon” 
as concept.  What is the significance of this?   
 At the very least, this shows that Schleiermacher differentiates between the 
subject matter and the text in which it is fixed.  Helmer confirms this following her study 
of this section of Brief Outline: 
It must be stressed from the onset that Schleiermacher does not identify the 
canon with the Bible.  The Christian Bible is understood in pragmatic-ecclesial 
terms as the literary text composed of both Old and New Testaments and used by 
the church since its early history [Brief Outline, §115].  The canon, however, is 
an idea concerned with the unity of the Christian tradition as the identity of an 
experience that is expressed in a variety of ways and subsequently fixed in 
literature.  4
 Helmer, “Transhistorical Unity of the New Testament Canon from Philosophical, Exegetical, and 3
Systematic-Theological Perspectives,” 27.
 Ibid.4
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But why the differentiation?   Schleiermacher is once again demonstrating that which 5
occupies his focus: the experience of redemption.  Were we to ask him what he considers 
the main idea that accounts for Christianity and distinguishes it from all other historical 
religions, undoubtedly, this would be his answer.  The experiential identity of the 
Christian tradition is related to the historical appearance of Jesus of Nazareth.   It is that 6
appearance in history and the experience of redemption that followed as a consequence, 
which “ensures the unity of Christianity.”  He plainly asserts this conviction in Christian 
Faith: “Christianity is a monotheistic faith, belonging to the teleological type of religion, 
and is essentially distinguished from other such faiths by the fact that in it everything is 
related to the redemption accomplished by Jesus of Nazareth.”   Furthermore, 7
Schleiermacher is making a statement about the value of this singular idea, even when 
compared to and over against the biblical text.  He seems always to prefer the experience 
of Christ over the record of it.    8
 I must include Helmer’s comments here, which are so appropriate to this study: “The differentiation 5
between text and subject matter represents a crucial shift in understanding the relation of text to its critical 
investigation.  In the early nineteenth century, Schleiermacher saw the challenge posed by historical and 
natural-scientific theories against a supernaturalistic view of biblical inspiration and an inspired canonical 
text.  To salvage an aspect of Christianity against its cultured despisers, Schleiermacher takes its ‘inner fire’ 
to be both the subject matter of theology as well as the referent of scripture (see John 5:39).  The ‘inner 
power’ of Christianity is the experiential factor funding the unity of the Christian tradition as a whole, and 
urging its communication in speech and text” (Helmer, 30).  Later in her fine essay, Helmer notes that on 
the basis of this text-subject matter differentiation, the text can be the object of critical investigation, “the 
study of the subjective construals of an experience that critical methods cannot falsify.”  However, she 
documents that this relation between text and subject matter presents exegetical-theological difficulties, 
namely, the problem of an historical gap between Jesus and the New Testament record.  Cf., Helmer, 31-37.
 Ibid., 28.6
 Schleiermacher, Christian Faith, §11.  Italics mine.7
 Catherine Kelsey observes that in Schleiermacher’s preaching on John 1:35-51, for example, it is evident 8
that his interest lies not in the text but in the faith experience which the text describes.  Catherine L. Kelsey, 
“Calling Disciples: Schleiermacher’s Application of His Hermeneutics to John 1:35-51,” Toronto Journal 
of Theology 18, no. 1 (Spring 2002): 34.
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 After his discussion in Brief Outline of “canon” as the idea which explains the 
essence of an historical religion, he turns to the sub-discipline of exegetical theology and 
the task of determining the canon in its relation to a text.   (Of course, the text he has in 9
mind is the New Testament.  He writes that it is the canon of the Christian church because 
it is the collection of writings “which contain the normative presentation of 
Christianity.” )  Regarding the content of the literary canon, Schleiermacher notes: 10
Within the New Testament canon belong essentially both those normative 
documents which concern the action and effect of Christ both on and with his 
disciples and also those which concern the common actions and effect of his 
disciples toward the establishing of Christianity.  11
   
Here, he indicates that he agrees with the early church’s canonical distinction between the 
New Testament Gospels (evangellion) and the apostolic epistles (apostolos).  Also, what 
he makes plain here is his belief that the writings of the New Testament are a record of 
the experience of Christ, fixed in literary form.  For him, the text chronicles the 
experience of redemption through the Redeemer and the subsequent creation of the 
church. 
 As a consequence of the fact that the New Testament is the canon of the Christian church, Schleiermacher 9
suggests that the unique and essential task of exegetical theology is to determine the correct understanding 
of this canon (Schleiermacher, Brief Outline, §104).  Furthermore, he believes that one of the tools for use 
by the exegetical theologian is higher criticism, which may be utilized to more exactly determine the canon.  
He identifies this as higher criticism’s “greatest theological-exegetical task” (Brief Outline, §113).
 Scleiermacher, Brief Outline, §104.10
 Ibid., §105.11
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 In addition, Schleiermacher suggests that there must necessarily be a lack of 
certainty regarding the books that are accepted as canonical.   He recognizes that the 12
canon has obtained its present form through the decision of the church, and that, 
therefore, the decision as to what belongs in the canon is not immutable or sacrosanct.  
Consequently, he asserts that the church is justified in starting fresh investigations into 
it.   For instance, he asserts that an uncanonical book may contain canonical passages, 13
just as most of what has been interpolated by a later hand within a canonical book will be 
uncanonical.  14
 One of the reasons he believes that what belongs in the canon is and will always 
be an open question is his conviction that “the sense for what is truly apostolic is, as 
history teaches us, a gift of the Spirit that gradually ascends within the church.”   For, he 15
writes, “much can have slipped into the sacred books through people’s oversight or 
blunders, things which, in turn, can be recognized and definitely proved to be 
uncanonical only at a later time.”   Thus, it would be a mistake, he claims, to try to 16
 See Schleiermacher, Christian Faith, §130.4.  Schleiermacher held that what belongs in the canon is and 12
will always be an open question.  First, he insists that since its determination was made after the age of the 
apostles, there is no genuinely apostolic indication for how one might distinguish what is canonical.  
Second, through the natural, gradual process of sifting the early church writings, he believed that many 
things could have crept into the sacred books that could be recognized and definitely proved as uncanonical 
in a later age.  See also Schleiermacher, Brief Outline, §§106-109.
 Schleiermacher, Brief Outline, §110.  Again, these “fresh investigations” represent the greatest task and 13
use of higher criticism for Schleiermacher.  He also asserts in §110 that for him, it is more important to 
determine whether a piece of writing is canonical than to determine authorship, acknowledging that it could 
still be canonical no matter who authored it.
 Ibid., §112.14
 Schleiermacher, Christian Faith, §130.4.15
 Ibid.16
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prevent further unrestricted research into the matter, even though several of the 
confessional standards represent the canon as closed.  It can only contribute to the well-
being of the church if what does not truly belong to Holy Scripture is distinguished 
clearly from it.  17
 At the same time, Schleiermacher attributed the determination of the canon to the 
Holy Spirit.   This may appear surprising in the face of his repeated rejection of a 18
supernaturalistic understanding of the biblical text.  And yet, he refers to the Holy Spirit 
as the unifying principle behind the canon as a collection.  He writes: “[S]cripture—both 
each individual book in and of itself as well as the collection, a treasure laid up for all 
subsequent generations of the church—is always the work of the Holy Spirit as the 
common spirit of the church.”    19
 He claims that this common spirit is that which enlivens the New Testament 
authors and all subsequent believers in the church’s history and that, therefore, the canon 
 He seems to hint at what he believes should go into the canon when he writes that placing scripture under 17
careful scrutiny does not hurt the church.  Such an investigation, he writes, will ensure that “nothing 
essential to the preservation and well-being of the church” will have been withdrawn by such an 
investigation.  His warrant is that “the well-being of the church can only be advanced if what does not truly 
belong in sacred scripture is differentiated from it” (Schleiermacher, Christian Faith, §130.4).  So, it would 
seem that one criterion for canonicity, as well as possibly for scripture that merits the badge of having 
normative authority, is the contribution that scripture makes to the preservation and well-being of the 
church.  This line of thinking raises an important and relevant question regarding Schleiermacher’s doctrine 
of biblical authority: Is it scripture that has norming authority, or the church, since it determined which 
writings were given canonical standing? I will save this discussion for the next chapter.
 I established in Chapter Four that Schleiermacher believed that the Holy Spirit was active in the creation 18
of the biblical canon.  In Christian Faith, §130, he asserts: “The individual books of the New Testament are 
inspired by the Holy Spirit, and their collection has arisen under the guidance of the Holy Spirit.”  He goes 
on to acknowledge that the formation of the canon is the result of a complex process of collaboration and 
counteraction in the church, and not everything that has contributed to that compilation can be attributed in 
the same measure to the Holy Spirit.  For this reason, some refer to the collection of the canonical 
scriptures not as a case of inspiration (Eingebung), but as a product of the guiding activity (Leitung) of the 
Holy Spirit.
 Schleiermacher, Christian Faith, §127.2.19
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must be attributed to a power that continues to render Christ to every generation of 
believers.  His position is that the relation of the canon as idea (subject matter) to canon 
as text is just this: the New Testament canon communicates an experience that remains 
the same through the centuries.  20
 While Schleiermacher is convinced of the Holy Spirit’s involvement in the 
collection of the canon, he simultaneously understands that the church had a role in 
deciding those writings which merited canonical standing and those which did not.  He is 
well aware that the process of canon collection must be understood as a thoroughly 
human and historical one.  While he admits that “no tidy apostolic limit regarding what is 
canonical and normative can have been transmitted to us,”  he accepts the role of the 21
church in establishing what is canonical and normative.  For example, he asserts that the 
church in some regions might consider some biblical books to be disposable, in 
comparison with other books that were acceptable among isolated congregations and that 
were effective for them alone.  The collection of the books came into being only 
gradually and persisted in the careful adjusting of the various degrees of normative worth 
that people would assign to particular components of scripture.  So, it is true that in 
Schleiermacher’s estimation, the church decided which books had canonical standing and 
which parts of scripture possessed normative value. 
 For more on the relation of subject matter and text, see Helmer, “Transhistorical Unity of the New 20
Testament Canon from Philosophical, Exegetical, and Systematic-Theological Perspectives,” 38.
 Schleiermacher, Christian Faith, §130.4.21
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Schleiermacher’s “Canon within the Canon” 
 Now that some groundwork has been laid concerning Schleiermacher’s concept of 
“canon,” I believe we are in a better position to explain his understanding of what, for 
him, has normative authority in the Christian church.  Many Christians grant normative 
authority to all sixty-six books of the Protestant Christian Bible, some adding the 
Apocrypha.   Schleiermacher does not.  He not only clearly asserts that not all scripture 22
has the same normative worth,  he also demonstrates a greater reliance on some parts of 23
the Christian Bible than on other parts.  That is, he has a “canon within the canon.”  To 
which parts of scripture does he attribute normative authority in the Christian church? 
Normative Authority: The New Testament, Not the Old 
 First, Schleiermacher asserts that the New Testament is authoritative.  This is his 
claim in Christian Faith, §129: “On the one hand, the holy scriptures of the New 
Testament are the first member in the whole series of Christian faith, continued ever 
since.  On the other hand, they comprise the norm for all succeeding presentations.”   24
Hence, Schleiermacher argues that the Old Testament does not share the normative status 
 For representative sources that advocate this position, see Hermeneutics, Authority, and Canon, ed. D. A. 22
Carson and John D. Woodbridge, rev. ed. (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Book House, 1995); Wayne Grudem, 
Systematic Theology: An Introduction to Biblical Doctrine (Downer’s Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 1994).
 “[I]f we consider the canonical writings in and of themselves, these do bear in themselves a normative 23
value for all times.  We do not ascribe this value to every aspect of our holy scriptures 
equally” (Schleiermacher, Christian Faith, §129.2).  This statement and others from Schleiermacher’s pen, 
when taken together, seem to imply that while he ascribed normative authority to the canonical writings in 
general, he at the same time ascribed greater normative worth to some canonical writings over others.  Or, 
one could make the case that he did not ascribe normative authority to the entire canon.  I believe that 
whichever interpretive option one chooses, the consequence is the same: like most theologians and Bible 
students, Schleiermacher had a “canon within the canon.”
 Schleiermacher, Christian Faith, §129.  Italics mine.24
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of the New.  He does so on the grounds that the Old Testament expresses Jewish, not 
Christian, religion.   He understands Christianity not as a development of Judaism, but 25
as a genuinely new faith.   The Old Testament, therefore, cannot provide the scriptural 26
basis for peculiarly Christian doctrines, though it could be a help to understanding them.  
Moreover, he thinks that treating Jewish scripture as an authoritative source for Christian 
doctrines necessarily required dishonesty on the part of the interpreter, who would try to 
read Christian themes into pre-Christian texts and thus obscure their genuine historical 
and linguistic sense.  27
 In a postscript to the doctrine of scripture in Christian Faith, Schleiermacher sets 
out his view against the canonical standing of the Old Testament.  After acknowledging 
that the Old Testament writings owe their place in our Bible in part to New Testament 
references to them and in part to the historical connection between Jewish and Christian 
worship, he makes the controversial claim that the Old Testament writings on that 
account do not share the normative worth or the inspiration of the New.  Although he was 
 For a discussion of Schleiermacher’s view of the Old Testament, see Paul E. Capetz, “Friedrich 25
Schleiermacher on the Old Testament,” Harvard Theological Review 102, no. 3 (July 2009): 297-326; 
Horst Dietrich Preuss, “Vom Verlust des Alten Testament und seinen Folgen: dargestellt anhand der 
Theologie und Predigt F. D. Schleiermachers,” in Lebendiger Umgang mit Schrift und Bekenntnis: 
Theologische Beiträge zur Beziehung von Schrift und Bekenntnis und zu ihrer Bedeutung für das Leben der 
Kirche, ed. Joachim Track (Stuttgart: Calwer Verlag, 1980), 127-160; Martin Stiere, “Das Alte Testament 
im theologischen Denken Schleiermachers,” in Altes Testament Forschung un Wirkung: Festschrift für 
Henning Graf Reventlow, ed. Peter Sommer and Winfried Thiele (Frankfurt: Peter Lang, 1994), 329-336.
 Schleiermacher, Christian Faith, §12.2.26
 DeVries, “Schleiermacher, Friedrich Daniel Ernst (1768-1834),” in Dictionary of Major Biblical 27
Interpreters, 887.  Interestingly, Schleiermacher did preach on the Old Testament, but not frequently, and 
usually only when Old Testament texts were stipulated for special worship services by order of the king.  
See F. D. E. Schleiermacher, Die praktische Theologie nach den Grundsätzen der evangelischen Kirche im 
Zusammenhange dargestellt, ed. Jacob Frerichs (Berlin: Reimer, 1850), 238.
!148
well aware that this view was not yet generally recognized by church theologians, he felt 
sure that it was destined in some future time to be widely shared.   
 His argument against the authority of the Old Testament in Christian Faith rests 
on three grounds.  First, he asserts that the inspiration of the Old Testament texts, with the 
possible exception of messianic prophecies,  was not the activity of the same Spirit of 28
Christ at work in the church.  He bases his case on a reading of Paul’s treatment of the 
Law in Galatians and Romans.  If we suppose, he argues, that Paul is right to claim that 
the Law lacks the power of the Spirit from which the Christian life must spring,  then it 29
cannot be claimed that the Law is inspired by the same Spirit.  Rather, it reflects the 
common spirit of the people of Israel who wrote it, and, thus, not the Christian common 
spirit.  Also, he notes that Paul writes that God sends the Spirit into our hearts by virtue of 
our joining with Christ.  Moreover, he notes that Christ himself never represents the 
sending of the Spirit “as the return of something that was already present before and then 
afterward disappeared for a time.”  30
 Schleiermacher “was convinced that the Christian effort to prove Jesus’ messianic status on the basis of 28
Old Testament prophecy was a mistake and that the New Testament’s appeal to it was strictly an intra-
Jewish affair of the first century” (Capetz, “Friedrich Schleiermacher on the Old Testament,” 300).  He 
writes: “I cannot regard the attempt to prove Christ from prophecies as a joyful task, and I regret that so 
many prominent scholars still bother with it.  For this reason I cannot help but suspect that such an attempt 
is basically wrong and that placing great value on these external proofs is due at least to a lack of trust in 
the inner power of Christianity” (Schleiermacher, On the Glaubenslehre, 66).
 Here, Schleiermacher makes reference to Romans 7:6ff and 8:3: “But now we are discharged from the 29
law, dead to that which held us captive, so that we are slaves not under the old written code but in the new 
life of the Spirit. . . . For God has done what the law, weakened by the flesh, could not do: by sending his 
own Son in the likeness of sinful flesh, and to deal with sin, he condemned sin in the flesh.”
 Schleiermacher, Christian Faith, §132.2.30
!149
 Second, the Old Testament cannot, strictly speaking, serve as a productive or 
language-forming norm for Christian piety.  That is, the Old Testament cannot function as 
a constitutive norm, one which constitutes or forms the language and thought of Christian 
faith.  According to Schleiermacher, ideas are present there that Christians cannot 
appropriate as pure expressions of their piety, even in the noblest Psalms.  Consequently, 
only after deluding oneself through unconscious additions and subtractions could one 
construct a Christian doctrine of God from the Prophets and the Psalms, he claims. 
 Third, in addition to not being a constitutive norm for Christian faith, the Old 
Testament is ill-suited to function as a critical norm.  In other words, the Old Testament 
is in no position to evaluate or measure religious thinking that intends to be Christian.  
Schleiermacher grants that there are few Christian doctrines that people throughout the 
history of the church have not attempted to prove from the Old Testament.  But, he asks, 
why should we use the less clear premonitions of the prophets alongside the clear 
proclamations of Christ himself or his disciples?  He suggests that the history of Christian 
theology shows plainly enough how much these efforts to find Christian faith in the Old 
Testament has actually hindered honest exegesis and raised a myriad of complex 
problems that Christian theology had no need to address.  The best course of action, then, 
would be to give up Old Testament proofs for specifically Christian doctrines, and to 
wholly set aside whatever chiefly relies on such proofs for support.   31
 Ibid.31
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 Why, then, is the Old Testament in the Christian canon at all?  Schleiermacher 
cites two historical reasons for its inclusion.  First, the preaching of Christ himself and of 
the apostles was based on portions of the Old Testament read aloud, and this practice 
continued in the early Christian community before the formation of the New Testament 
canon.  He argues, however, that it does not follow from this fact, that the same 
homiletical use of the Old Testament should persist or “that we have to consider it a 
corruption of the church if our own generation of Christians is not just as conversant with 
the Old Testament as with the New Testament.”   On the contrary, precisely because the 32
relationship between the Old Testament and the New is historical, it is natural to expect 
that “the gradual, every broadening subsidence of the Old Testament lies in the nature of 
the matter.”  Because the connection between the apostolic proclamation and the Old 
Testament writings is an historical one, it could be expected that gradually the need for 
references to the Old Testament would diminish, and accordingly it would retreat behind 
the New Testament in the church’s usage.  Least of all, Schleiermacher asserts, is this 
connection able to guarantee the normative worth and inspiration of the Old Testament 
books.  33
 Another reason he claims that the Old Testament is in the Christian Bible is that 
Christ himself and the apostles refer to the Old Testament books as divine authorities 
 Ibid.32
 Schleiermacher asserts just here that the Pauline passages that attest to the usefulness of the Old 33
Testament writings—Rom. 15:4, 1 Cor. 10:11, and 2 Tim. 3:16—refer to the usage cited above.  He states 
that the author of these Pauline passages “would surely give us witness for the claim that we no longer have 
any need for such proofs” (Christian Faith, §132.3).
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favorable to Christianity.  Again, however, he suggests that it does not follow “that we 
still have need of these preliminary intimations [of Christian piety], since we have the 
experience [of that piety in the New Testament].”  Again, he demonstrates his preference 
for the experience of Christian faith when he writes: “one ceases to have faith on account 
of such testimonies if one has gained immediate certitude based on one’s own perception 
(Anschauung).”  34
 Although Schleiermacher did not recommend the removal of the Old Testament 
from the Christian Bible, he thought it would perhaps be better to include it as an 
appendix after the New.  Then, he opines, it would be clear that it is in no way necessary 
first to work through all of the Old Testament “in order to get onto the right path to the 
New Testament.”   So, in the first place, Schleiermacher attributes normative authority to 35
the New Testament, and not to the Old. 
Normative Authority: Reports of the Words and Deeds of Christ 
 Second, he attributes greater normative worth to the sections of the New 
Testament that report the words and deeds of Christ.  This is not surprising after an 
examination of his concept of “canon” earlier in this chapter.  His strong conviction is 
that one is able to establish what is normative in the New Testament by comparing it to 
 Schleiermacher, Christian Faith, §132.3.34
 Ibid.  He also maintained that candidates for the Protestant ministry needed to learn Hebrew and 35
Aramaic, since the New Testament authors articulated their faith in Christ in language and themes 
borrowed from the Hebrew scripture.  See DeVries, “Schleiermacher, Friedrich Daniel Ernst (1768-1834),” 
887.  Moreover, he believed that the Old Testament books are the most general aid for understanding the 
New (Brief Outline, §141).
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the essence of Christianity identified by philosophical theology.  That essence, that core 
of Christian faith, is his standard for what is normative.   Again, the essence of 36
Christianity for Schleiermacher, is what God did in Christ the Redeemer as reported in 
the four Gospels.  37
 I noted earlier in this chapter that Schleiermacher agrees with the early church’s 
canonical distinction between the New Testament Gospels and the apostolic epistles.  In 
Brief Outline, he ascribes normative authority to both the Gospels and the epistles when 
he asserts that there is no inherent reason for stipulating any difference in canonical 
standing between these two constituent parts of the New Testament canon.  Yet, he can 
imagine the possibility of doing so “if one were able to deny normative standing to the 
action and effect of the disciples when left to themselves.”   What the disciples do/effect/38
write when left to themselves may or may not be normative, Schleiermacher asserts.  If 
we ask what he means by the phrase, “when left to themselves,” we might well assume 
 See the discussion on pp. 134-36 in this chapter and Kelsey, Thinking about Christ with Schleiermacher, 36
30.
 The Life of Jesus is additional evidence of Schleiermacher’s understanding of the canon’s primary subject 37
matter, and, thus, his conception of Christianity’s essence.  (Cf., Friedrich Schleiermacher, The Life of 
Jesus, ed. Jack C. Verheyden, trans. S. Maclean Gilmour, Lives of Jesus Series (1975; repr., Mifflintown, 
PA: Sigler, 1997).  Schleiermacher was the first theologian to offer public lectures on the life of Jesus, 
lectures which were published in 1864, just before David Friedrich Strauss’s critique the following year 
(Cf., David Friedrich Strauss, The Christ of Faith and the Jesus of History: A Critique of Schleiermacher’s 
The Life of Jesus, ed. and trans. Leander E. Keck, Lives of Jesus Series (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1977).  
Notwithstanding Strauss’s critique, the Life of Jesus lectures are a key piece in Schleiermacher’s 
understanding of the Christ event as the New Testament canon’s common referent.  For more on 
Schleiermacher’s understanding of Jesus as “the person ‘behind’ the New Testament,” see Helmer, 
“Transhistorical Unity of the New Testament Canon from Philosophical, Exegetical, and Systematic-
Theological Perspectives,” 13-39.
 Schleiermacher, Brief Outline, §105.38
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from the immediate context that he is referring to what the disciples might do/effect/write 
after Jesus was no longer in their midst. 
 In fact, when Schleiermacher considers which canonical writings have authority, 
he places great value on proximity to Jesus.  He admits that the concept of normative 
standing cannot be reduced to fixed, immutable formulas.  However, he asserts that  
[i]f we figure that the normative character of particular propositions includes 
perfect purity, on the one hand, and the fullness of inferences and applications 
that may develop from them, on the other, we have no reason to suppose that the 
first attribute will exist, absolutely, anywhere but in Christ alone.  39
   
What he seems to suggest here is that the purest expressions of what is normative in the 
canon are related to Christ.  Here, “pure” means the most immediate expressions at a site 
historically proximate to Christ with as little intervening material as possible.   “Pure” 40
does not mean canonical in the sense of the text’s dignity.  Rather, it refers to the text’s 
transparency to the experience behind it that motivates the text’s production.  41
 Clearly, he regards “the holy scriptures of the New Testament” as normative,  but 42
he would not claim that this is true of everything written in the New Testament, even 
though he identifies these writings as canonical.  For although he can assert that the 
canonical writings bear “a normative value for all times,” he writes that “we do not 
ascribe this [normative] value to every aspect of our holy scriptures equally but only to 
 Ibid., §108.39
 Ibid., §83.  40
 Helmer, “Transhistorical Unity of the New Testament Canon from Philosophical, Exegetical, and 41
Systematic-Theological Perspectives,” 29.
 Schleiermacher, Christian Faith, §129.42
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the degree that the authors are found to be in the situation just described.”   To what 43
situation does he refer?  The context indicates that he is referring to authors of the 
apostolic age, authors who enjoyed spatiotemporal proximity to Christ and his teachings.  
That is, Schleiermacher is making the claim that the canonical writings of those who 
lived in the apostolic age, who had firsthand exposure to Christ and his teachings, are 
ascribed greater normative value than other New Testament writings. 
 After plainly suggesting that the normative value (normale Würde) granted to the 
canon  does not extend to every word of the New Testament, he seems to require another 44
criterion of literature that merits the normative stamp.  He writes: “[O]ccasional 
utterances (gelegentliche Äusserungen) and purely incidental thoughts (bloße 
Nebengedanken) do not accrue the same degree of normative value as what belongs to the 
main subject in each instance.”   Here, Schleiermacher seems to open the door to an 45
interpretation of this text which allows greater normative worth to “the main subject” of 
the New Testament scriptures.      46
 Schleiermacher’s instructions to those entrusted with the ministry of the word of 
God confirms this theory of his standard of normativity.  He advises them to focus on the 
 Ibid., §129.243
 DeVries assumes that the peculiar normative dignity Schleiermacher refers to here is reserved for 44
materials produced to restrain error or corruption (DeVries, “Rethinking the Scripture Principle,” 300-301).  
It seems to me, however, that in this context Schleiermacher is discussing canonical writings in general, 
rather than only those which may have been produced to counter error. 
 Schleiermacher, Christian Faith, §129.2.  Italics mine.45
 The meaning of the phrase, “what belongs to the main subject in each instance” is ambiguous, and is 46
arguably, debatable.  However, I will suggest later in this chapter that what constitutes the main subject of 
the New Testament for Schleiermacher has greater normative worth, for him, than other subjects which 
may be addressed in scripture.  I believe there is evidence in this very text for advocating this position.
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gospel of Jesus in their teaching and preaching.  Regarding the content of their ministry, 
he writes: “Everything must be referred to the conception of Christ that comes from 
scripture.”   Apparently, Christ’s words have the utmost normative worth for 47
Schleiermacher:  
The scripture that presents the Lord to us in his life and works on earth, that 
preserves for us the precious words of his mouth—the scripture of the New 
Testament—is greater and far more important for us than the Old Testament.  
These apostolic scriptures are for us the firm prophetic word on which we depend 
and the foundation of our faith.  48
Normative Authority: Writings Related to the Concept of Love 
 I have demonstrated that the New Testament and the words and deeds of Christ 
that are recorded there function as norms for Schleiermacher.  Finally, I want to show that 
he attributes greater normative authority to other parts of the New Testament, specifically, 
writings that are related to the concept of “love,” both divine and human.  The New 
Testament writings that discuss the subjects of Christian love for each other and the 
world, the love that God has for the world, and the love that Christians have for God, for 
example, seem to carry added normative weight, for Schleiermacher.   
 His focus on love may be found throughout On Religion, Schleiermacher’s 
Soliloquies, and many of his sermons. I have discovered in my study of these sources that 
for him, “love” is a central topic.  Others, too, have noticed that it is one of his key 
 Schleiermacher, Christian Faith, §133.1.47
 See Schleiermacher’s sermon on “The Effects of Scripture and of the Redeemer,” in DeVries, Servant of 48
the Word, 102.
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emphases.  For example, besides the fact that Steven Jungkeit puts forward the interesting 
and controversial theory that Schleiermacher’s theological contribution is more 
pneumatocentric than christocentric, Jungkeit highlights Schleiermacher’s focus on love 
in his writings.  He draws the following conclusion from his study of Christian Faith: 
When read carefully, Schleiermacher’s doctrine of the Spirit runs throughout the 
final third of The Christian Faith, such that pneumatology and ecclesiology 
dominate the book.  This suggests that Schleiermacher’s theological contribution 
is far more pneumatocentric than christocentric or anthropocentric.  As we recall, 
the Spirit for Schleiermacher binds human beings into a common project, a 
network of love. . . . Being bound in such a fashion gives rise to a universal love 
of humanity.  49
   
 Near the end of his On Religion: Addresses in Response to Its Cultured Critics, 
Schleiermacher sums up the essence of Christianity and Christian feeling.  Among the 
attributes that he claims are dominant in Christians and were dominant in its founder is 
love.   Elaborating in the supplementary notes added in 1821, he plainly asserts:    50
“Love is the mark of the Christian.”   His emphasis on love, of course, is unsurprising 51
since he believes that love is one of the principal, divine attributes: 
Within the divine government of the world the divine causality presents itself as 
love and as wisdom. . . . Love is the orientation of wanting to unite with others 
and wanting to be in the other.  Hence, if the pivotal point of the divine 
government of the world is redemption and the establishment of God’s reign, 
 Jungkeit, Spaces of Modern Theology: Geography and Power in Schleiermacher’s World, 210. 49
 Another dominant attribute, which he mentions in this context, is humility.50
 Schleiermacher, On Religion, (Tice), 332.  In one of his sermons, Schleiermacher states that one of the 51
signs of true and vital Christianity is that the love of Christ constrains a person.  He then refers to 2 Cor. 
5:14.  See Schleiermacher’s sermon on “The Effects of Scripture and of the Redeemer,” Servant of the 
Word, 110.
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whereby union of divine being with human nature is what is occurring, the 
underlying disposition in that process can be represented only as love.  52
 Certainly, one of the types of love he believes is core to Christianity is love for, or 
openness to, God.  In fact, he submits that “the aim of all religion is to love the World 
Spirit.”   Earlier in On Religion, Schleiermacher asserts the need of men and women for 53
a deity-sent mediator, one who “can show to their flittery anxious self-love another love
—a love by which man loves the highest and eternal in the very midst of earthly life.”   54
One of the callings of such a mediator, he writes, “is to awaken the slumbering seed of a 
better humanity, to kindle love for higher things.”     55
 Another type of love which he believes is central to the Christian faith is love for 
people.  He alludes to this in a reference to the Old Testament story of Adam and Eve:  
The story of us all is related in this sacred saga.  One gets nowhere by trying to 
stand alone.  To receive the life of the World Spirit within oneself and thus to 
have religion, a man must first have discovered humanity, and this he can do only 
in love and through love.  56
   
Indeed, he asserts that it is the longing for love that brings one inevitably to religion.    57
 Schleiermacher, Christian Faith, §165 and §165.1.52
 Schleiermacher, On Religion, (Tice), 112.  Not wishing to leave any doubt as to what he means by 53
“World Spirit,” he writes in his supplementary notes: “It should hardly be necessary to justify use of the 
expression “World Spirit” (Weltgeist) for designating that object of pious reverence which is common 
among all men” (On Religion, 167).  He uses this expression as a designation of the supreme being.  
 Schleiermacher, On Religion, (Tice), 46.54
 Ibid.55
 Ibid., 121.56
 Ibid.57
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 A brief perusal of Schleiermacher’s Soliloquies also demonstrates the importance 
of love in his theology.  Tice provides somewhat of an introduction to Soliloquies in his 
Introduction to On Religion. There, he suggests that the Soliloquies present the case that 
sense (or, sensitivity) and love are the cardinal conditions of moral perfection.   Sense is 58
receptive, the quality which at its deepest Schleiermacher describes in On Religion as 
“sense and taste for the infinite.”   Love is predominantly active and out-going, the basis 59
of true association, and must balance sensitivity. 
 In Soliloquies, Schleiermacher writes that without love, self-formation is 
problematic: “Love, thou force of gravitation in the spiritual world, no individual life and 
no development is possible without thee!”   He describes love as “sacred,” and for 60
Christians, “the alpha and the omega.”   Upon self-reflection, he writes of the place he 61
has cleared in his own soul for genuine love and friendship: 
Wherever I notice an aptitude for individuality, inasmuch as love and 
sensitiveness, its highest guarantees, are present, there I also find an object for 
my love.  I would have my love embrace every unique self, from the 
unsophisticated youth, in whom freedom is but beginning to germinate, to the 
ripest and most finished type of man.  Whenever I see such a one, I give him the 
salutation of the love within me, even if our brief meeting and parting permit no 
more than this gesture of spiritual greeting.  62
 Ibid., 18-19.  Tice notes that the same pair of terms was also used in the Addresses.  58
 Ibid.59
 Friedrich Schleiermacher, Schleiermacher’s Soliloquies: An English Translation of the Monologen, trans. 60
Horace Leland Friess (Chicago: Open Court Publishing Company, 1926), 38-39.
 Ibid., 39.61
 Ibid, 45-46.62
!159
Schleiermacher writes that whether he to whom he would be a friend is already receptive 
to the infinite or not, or whether he is or is not far advanced in his development, or 
whether he has many achievements to his credit or not, none of these things determine his 
attitude toward him.  “I love him in the measure that I find,” he writes.  For 
Schleiermacher, then, love focuses on one’s relationship with other people.  It is one’s 
embrace of all people. 
 Finally, Schleiermacher makes it plain in several of his sermons that love is a 
central tenet in Christianity, and that he attaches normative value to scripture that 
suggests as much.  For example, in his 1830 sermon entitled “Evangelical Faith and the 
Law,” a sermon based on Galatians 2:16-18, Schleiermacher’s focus of the message is 
that Christians are not justified before God by law-keeping.  In the conclusion of this 
sermon that warns against the making of laws which Christians are expected to obey, he 
adds this: “Christ established only one commandment: that we should love one another 
with the love with which he loved us (John 13:34).”   Then, he asks: How can followers 63
of Christ obey this one commandment?  He answers: “When the love for him in whom 
we see the Father constrains and impels us (2 Cor. 5:14), we will also be effective in that 
love,” adding that faith reveals itself in love.   From another most touching message, an 64
1829 eulogy entitled “Sermon at Nathanael’s Grave,” Schleiermacher concludes with this 
benediction: 
 See Schleiermacher’s sermon on “Evangelical Faith and the Law,” in DeVries, Servant of the Word, 151.63
 Ibid.64
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Now, thou God who art love, let me not only resign myself to thy omnipotence, 
not only submit to thy impenetrable wisdom, but also know thy fatherly love!  
Make even this grievous trial a new blessing for me in my vocation!  For me and 
all of mine let this communal pain become wherever possible a new bond of still 
more intimate love, and let it issue in a new apprehension of thy Spirit in all my 
household!  Grant that even this grave hour may become a blessing for all who 
are gathered here.  Let us all more and more mature to that wisdom which, 
looking beyond the void, sees and loves only the eternal in all things earthly and 
perishable, and in all thy decrees finds thy peace as well, and eternal life, to 
which through faith we are delivered out of death.  Amen.  65
 Permit me to offer one last example of the emphasis that Schleiermacher places 
upon the subject of “love” in his writings, as well as the New Testament texts that address 
this subject.  As the following example demonstrates, he considered this subject to be one 
of the Redeemer’s central teachings.   In 1833, Schleiermacher preached a sermon 66
entitled, “Our Community: Founded and Preserved through the Redeemer’s Love.”  The 
sermon is based upon the text of John 13:34: “A new commandment I give to you, that 
you love one another; even as I have loved you, that you also love one another.”  He 
begins this message by explaining how it happened that he selected this particular biblical 
text from which to preach.  He explains that he wanted to preach on the virtues of the 
community, the church that Christ founded.  Once he had settled on this subject, and 
 Schleiermacher’s sermon entitled, “Sermon at Nathanael’s Grave,” in DeVries, Servant of the Word, 65
213-214.  Italics in this quotation are mine.
 There are many other sermons that highlight Schleiermacher’s preoccupation, dare I call it, with New 66
Testament references to love, including the love of God for the world, the love of Christians for one 
another, and the love of Christians for all of humanity.  For other examples of these sermons, see the 
following: “Forgiveness and Love,” “Love and Service,” and “Provoking Each Other to Love and Good 
Works” in Friedrich Schleiermacher, Selected Sermons of Schleiermacher, trans. Mary F. Wilson, vol. 3, 
Foreign Biblical Library (New York: Funk and Wagnalls, n.d.); “A Counsel to Form the Good Ever More 
Fully Among Us,” in Friedrich Schleiermacher, Fifteen Sermons of Friedrich Schleiermacher Delivered to 
Celebrate the Beginning of a New Year, ed. and trans. Edwina Lawler (Lewiston, NY: Edwin Mellen Press, 
2003); “Christian Hospitality” and “Christian Charity,” in Friedrich Schleiermacher, The Christian 
Household: A Sermonic Treatise, trans. and ed. Dietrich Seidel and Terrence N. Tice, Schleiermacher 
Studies and Translations, 3 (Lewiston, NY: Edwin Mellen Press, 1991). 
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asked himself how he could join “such an exalted concept to a single text of scripture, as 
is the customary practice in our public sermons,”  he searched until “these words of the 67
Lord came to my heart, and it seemed that this one text sums up the whole mystery of the 
Christian church.”   Here are some of the many statements regarding the significance of 68
Christian love from this sermon:  
“In the words of our text, he [the Redeemer] says: “A new commandment I give 
to you,” and adds that they should love one another.  We are all well aware that 
he had often impressed this point on them before. . . . So what could he have 
meant by this expression, other than to sum up the essence of Christian 
community?”  69
Since the Redeemer had in mind here . . . this new spiritual Kingdom of God that 
was to be established through him, he must have compared it almost instinctively 
to the earlier covenant between God and his people. . . . [T]he Old Covenant 
rested upon a law and was made up of a mass of individual commandments, 
whereas the Redeemer’s Kingdom was to rest only upon this one commandment 
to love.  70
“We may be taken by surprise at first when we hear the Redeemer’s command 
that we should love one another with the love with which he loved us. . . . Yet it 
is certain that we can only be members of this Kingdom in this way, and that his 
Kingdom consists in this love alone. . . . [D]ear friends in Christ, it is certain that 
a spiritual community cannot exist without love.”  71
And so he [the Redeemer] tells them [referring to John 6:67-68]: Now that I am 
going away, now that I will be with you a little while only, if your community is 
to endure, you must love one another with the love with which I have loved you. . 
 Kelsey asserts that “[n]inety-nine percent of the available sermons from Schleiermacher’s forty-year 67
preaching career were developed around a biblical text” (Kelsey, “Calling Disciples: Schleiermacher’s 
Application of His Hermeneutics to John 1:35-51,” 34).
 See Schleiermacher’s sermon based on John 13:34 in DeVries, Servant of the Word, 215.  Italicized 68
words in this quotation and the following quotations are mine.
 Ibid., 215-16.69
 Ibid., 216.70
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!162
. . This is the love that was the bond between the Redeemer and his own, and it is 
also the love that maintains the community he founded.  72
“He [the Redeemer] had come to seek what was lost—yes, actually to seek it, not 
waiting to see whether people would first turn to him. . . . It is this seeking love 
that is essential if we are to be united as Christians by our love for one 
another.”  73
He [the Redeemer] gives us another description of his love, and only when our 
love for one another has this other element does Christian community arise from 
his love.  He says that the Son of Man did not come into the world to rule, but to 
serve (Matt. 20:28). . . . What does it mean to serve?  In this context, the word 
cannot be taken to mean anything else but to note the need of an individual to 
whom we are directed, and to satisfy this need, once noticed, with every effort in 
our power. . . . We find so many beautiful examples in the Gospels of how the 
Redeemer turned to individuals to serve them in their spiritual life. . . . [T]his 
serving love of the Redeemer has not ceased and will never cease. . . . Without 
this serving love . . . the community of believers could not exist either, and even 
less could it become what it should be.  74
But we must not forget one more thing that is an essential component of the 
Redeemer’s love.  He says to his disciples: I have placed you here and chosen you 
so that you will bring forth much fruit, and so your fruit will abide (John 15:16). . 
. . The Redeemer’s love could—indeed had to—turn affectionately to individuals. 
. . . His eyes were directed to something further; his vision—and it was always 
the vision of love—took in the whole human race. . . . The individual vanishes 
and must vanish, when the Lord’s gaze is directed to the totality of the human 
race.  75
 What I have tried to show in this long discussion of “love” is that this subject is a 
central focus in Schleiermacher’s writings and sermons.  Not only is the subject itself 
somewhat of a theological nucleus, for him, but so are also the writings of the New 
 Ibid., 217.72
 Ibid., 221.73
 Ibid., 222-25.74
 Ibid., 226.75
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Testament that discuss this pivotal topic.  The logical corollary to this is that because of 
his affinity for the subject of “love,” Schleiermacher seems to attach greater normative 
worth to passages that discuss this subject.  In this case, of course, he views these 
writings as an authority, not for Christian faith, per se, but for Christian life.  Just how 
scripture functions as a norming authority for faith and life in the Christian church in 
Schleiermacher’s doctrine of biblical authority is the subject of the next section. 
What Kind of Authority? 
 I have explained Schleiermacher’s notion of “canon” and have established what I 
consider to be his “canon within the canon.”  But what is the nature of the normative 
authority that he ascribes to the New Testament, to the words and deeds of Christ, and to 
the passages that discuss the principle of love found there?  Many, if not most, would 
agree with Schleiermacher that the Bible has authority.  The question is: What kind of 
authority does scripture possess?  How does scripture function as a norm for Christian 
faith and life in the Christian church?  To answer these questions, I will first take a look at 
two relevant propositions in Christian Faith.  After unpacking them, I will draw some 
conclusions regarding Schleiermacher’s understanding of how scripture is normative for 
the church.  The first proposition is one I referred to earlier in Chapter Five: “On the one 
hand, the holy scriptures of the New Testament are the first member in the whole series of 
presentations of Christian faith, continued ever since.  On the other hand, they comprise 
the norm for all succeeding presentations.”   76
 Schleiermacher, Christian Faith, §129.76
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 What is the meaning of this proposition?  To begin with, the New Testament is an 
expression of faith in Christ, in fact, the first in a series of such presentations.  That it is 
the first presentation of the experience of Christian faith is part of the reason 
Schleiermacher perceives it as unparalleled.  For although it is succeeded by other 
presentations of the same kind (gleichartig), he contends that it is not superseded by 
them.  Why is this so?  It is because he considers the likelihood that religious 
presentations during the apostolic age could have arisen very easily that came more from 
Jewish or Gentile thought than from Christianity itself.  Consequently, he views these 
latter presentations, when regarded as Christian presentations, as “imperfect to the 
highest degree.”    77
 Alongside these imperfect/incomplete presentations—imperfect because they 
were not properly “Christian,” but rather were hybrid presentations, particular 
modifications of Jewish or Hellenistic religious ideas—the teaching and preaching of 
Christ’s immediate disciples stood as a corrective, Schleiermacher argues.  This provides 
a partial clue as to Schleiermacher’s understanding of the normative nature of scripture: it 
is grounded in the proximity of the New Testament authors to Christ and his teachings.  
His argument is that this nearness to Christ purified the early disciples’ presentation of 
Christianity from “the danger of an unconscious, contaminating influence from their 
previous Jewish forms of thought and life.”  78
 Ibid., §129.2.77
 Ibid.78
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 Schleiermacher recognizes, then, that from the earliest times within the Christian 
religion there have been different, and sometimes competing, presentations of Christian 
faith.  These presentations came to be distinguished from one another and designated as 
canonical and apocryphal texts.  Those that were classified as canonical were viewed as 
preserving the most complete elements of the original witness to Christ.  Apocryphal 
texts were seen as preserving the most incomplete elements of that testimony.  The spirit 
of Christ as a living presence in the fellowship of the Christian community, he affirms, is 
ultimately the source of sorting out the canonical from the apocryphal works.    
 Furthermore, that same spirit remains the ground for a continuous determination 
of the normative character of the various contents of these works.  But this ongoing 
process of determination is not exactly the same as distinguishing between canonical and 
apocryphal texts.  For, he argues, the tendency toward apocryphal corruption of that 
witness to Christ from “foreign” or non-Christian elements decreases in proportion to the 
number of Christians who are born and raised in the church.  Further, he suggests, it is 
impossible for later Christians to generate truly canonical materials “because the living 
perception of Christ could no longer ward off contaminating influences in the same 
immediate way” as was true in the apostolic age.  79
 Interestingly, although Schleiermacher values the “original” presentation of 
Christian faith, he believes that the normative authority of scripture does not imply that 
every later presentation of Christ must be derived from the canon in the same way.  What 
 Ibid.  See also Hensley, “Friedrich Schleiermacher,” 171-172.79
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is his reasoning?  Since the Spirit has been poured out on all flesh, no age can be without 
its own peculiar originality in Christian thought, he contends.   
 Still, Schleiermacher asserts that scripture norms all subsequent accounts of the 
faith in two ways: 
[First] nothing is to be regarded as a pure product of the Christian spirit unless it 
is possible to demonstrate that it is in accord with those original products . . . 
[and second] no later product accrues an authority equal to those original writings 
if the aim is to ensure the Christian character of a given presentation or to point 
out the non-Christian character of one.  80
That is, later presentations of Christian faith must harmonize with the canonical 
presentation.  The original presentation guarantees the Christian character of later 
presentations or exposes what is non-Christian in them with a degree of certainty granted 
to no later presentation. 
 The idea that the New Testament presentation of Christian faith is the standard by 
which all other presentations are judged is also echoed in Schleiermacher’s sermons.  For 
example, in a sermon he preached before 1826, one that was discussed in the last chapter, 
he warns of the danger of leaning solely on the immediate influences of the Redeemer 
without paying attention to the biblical record.  His concern is that alleged immediate 
influences of the Redeemer match those of the biblical record.  For, he admits, that “from 
time immemorial much that betrays the unruliness, fanaticism, and excesses of the human 
 Schleiermacher, Christian Faith, §129.1-2.80
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heart has often crept into what is supposed to be the Lord’s immediate effects of the 
soul.”    81
 His yardstick for measuring the “immediate effects of the soul,” that they are of 
divine rather than human origin, is scripture.  He warns:  
God’s Word must ever remain the standard for measuring and judging everything 
else if we are to avoid deceiving ourselves into unintentionally confusing the 
human and the divine, or falling into the danger of becoming prey to those who 
intentionally substitute or pass off the human for the divine.  82
   
Schleiermacher is adamant that for any experience of Christ to be authentic, it must 
mimic the experience of Christ in the New Testament record.  He writes: “The Lord 
cannot be different in his effects in believers’ souls than he reveals himself to be in his 
Word.”   In fact, he bluntly asserts that if a person wanted to claim as Christ’s work 83
anything that is in conflict with “this rule of God’s Word,” that person would be a liar.   
 Nothing that contradicts “the divine Word of scripture,” he adds, can be thought to 
come from God.  Why is this the case if Schleiermacher does not believe scripture is 
inspired revelation?  He believes that scripture is a reliable witness to the words and 
 See Schleiermacher’s sermon on “The Effects of Scripture and of the Redeemer,”  in DeVries, Servant of 81
the Word, 111-12.
 Ibid., 112.  Schleiermacher often refers to scripture as a “standard.”  For example, he warns those who 82
lay special claim to experiences of the Redeemer’s spiritual presence of the need to “hold on to the standard 
of God’s Word” and to not “remove their own special experiences from its judgment and supervision!”  It is 
important, he writes, that those experiences are in agreement with God’s Word.  Of those who lay special 
claim to such experiences he instructs: “May they only guard themselves from evil and not presume to be 
above God’s revelation!” (Servant of the Word, 114-15).
 Ibid.83
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deeds of the Redeemer.  For Schleiermacher, one of the functions of scripture is to judge 
the validity of any purported effects of the Redeemer.  84
 He makes the point in Brief Outline that the Christian writings which come from 
the age of primitive Christianity are the proper subject-matter of exegetical theology 
“only insofar as they are held capable of contributing to the original, consequently for all 
times normative presentation of Christianity.”   Thus, as pointed out above, what makes 85
some of the writings of the New Testament normative is that they are a record of the 
original expression of Christian faith.  Why does Schleiermacher value the original or 
first presentation of faith in Christ?  He supplies an answer in Brief Outline, §83: in order 
to preserve the inner unity of Christianity as it expands over time one must apperceive 
“the purest perception of its distinctive nature, [which] can come only in relation to its 
earliest expression.”   That is, to apprehend the original presentation of Christian faith is 86
the first step to ensuring that all subsequent presentations are authentic.   
 The second relevant proposition in Christian Faith, which clarifies 
Schleiermacher’s understanding of the normative authority of scripture reads: “The 
Scriptures of the New Testament are authentic in their origination and sufficient as norm 
for Christian doctrine.”   It is the second half of the proposition that is relevant to this 87
 “[T]he holy authority of the Word must provide a firm rule for all that happens in the hearts of 84
Christians” (Schleiermacher’s sermon entitled, “On the Handing Over of the Confession As Giving an 
Account for the Ground of Hope,” in Nicol, Reformed but Ever Reforming, 41).
 Schleiermacher, Brief Outline, §103.85
 Ibid., §83.86
 Schleiermacher, Christian Faith, §131.87
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study.  What does Schleiermacher mean when he asserts that the New Testament writings 
are sufficient as a norm for Christian doctrine? 
 First, he is obviously equating the normative authority of scripture and its 
influence upon Christians.  That is, when scripture influences God’s people, it functions 
as an authoritative norm.  What kind of influence do these writings exert?  
Schleiermacher suggests that the doctrinal books  or “books of teachings” of the New 88
Testament are “to be grasped in terms of the life circumstances of Christians at that time, 
and in such a way that the apostles’ expressions bore influence upon the formation of the 
guiding thoughts as well as of the practical purposes of Christians.”   The historical 89
books on the other hand, are intended to rehearse the similarly influential words and 
deeds of Christ and the Apostles.   
 Second, Schleiermacher asserts that what makes the writings sufficient is that 
through our use of sacred scripture “the Holy Spirit can guide us into all truth . . . just as 
the Holy Spirit did the apostles themselves and all others who were gladdened by the 
direct instructions of Christ.”   When this thought is combined with the idea that 90
scripture has influence, it is clear that Schleiermacher is describing how scripture 
functions as a constitutive norm.  It actually creates Christian thought and language.  The 
language of Christian piety is rooted in scripture, and the common Christian orthodoxy of 
 As I noted earlier in this chapter, in Brief Outline, Schleiermacher identifies Gospels and apostolic 88
epistles as the two types of books in the New Testament canon.  The historical books correspond to the 
Gospels, and the epistles, to the doctrinal books.
 Schleiermacher, Christian Faith, §131.2.89
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every age is formed this way by the reigning interpretation of Christian faith called forth 
by scripture.   Thus, as DeVries notes, for Schleiermacher, the language of piety is not 91
created anew by each individual believer, or chosen freely to express inner experiences.  
Rather, it is formed in every age through the encounter with scripture.  Furthermore, each 
age’s articulation of the faith must be appropriate to the distinctive expressions of 
scripture.  92
 Third, Schleiermacher understands a second kind of normative sufficiency.  He 
calls it the critical sufficiency of scripture, which, he writes, is often the only kind of 
normativity one has in mind when discussing the concept of sufficiency.  This relates to 
the constitutive function of scripture as a strictly subordinate function, almost as a 
shadow.  As a critical norm, scripture tests the adequacy of any thought that purports to 
be Christian but was not produced under the influence of the Holy Spirit in scripture.   93
Schleiermacher believes that as the constitutive use of scripture in the church grows, 
there will be less need for scripture’s critical role to sort out misinterpretations. 
 In summation, Schleiermacher argues for the norming authority of scripture 
regarding Christian faith, based on its witness to faith in Christ.  Since the canonical 
writings are proximate to the direct influence of Jesus and his ministry, they serve as an 
authoritative standard for all succeeding expressions of faith in Christ.  This normative 
 Thus, Schleiermacher claims that if one day the church came to possess a complete image of Christ’s 91
living knowledge of God, we could understand this to be the fruit of scripture.
 DeVries, “Rethinking the Scripture Principle,” 306. 92
 Schleiermacher, Christian Faith, §131.2.93
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authority is both constitutive and critical.  As constitutive of the language and thought of 
Christian faith and as critical of any religious thinking that means to be Christian, 
scripture is a sufficient norm for the Christian church.  
 Schleiermacher himself provides a succinct summary of the nature of the 
normative authority of scripture for Christian faith in remarks he made in a June 25, 1830 
sermon in which he discusses the ground of hope.  What is the source of faith and hope?  
Is it scripture or is it Christ himself?  Schleiermacher affirms that it is Christ who ever 
remains the source of faith.  Then, he explains what is the normative value of scripture:    
[I]f any dispute should arise about whether some specific item of doctrine or 
practice in the Christian church is proper or not, the apostolic scripture gives us 
the norm by which this can be judged, insofar as it shows that from the beginning 
this norm has arisen from the Christian spirit and faith.  Thus, we have an 
important and permanent safeguard in scripture insofar as we truly have concord 
solely in our faith in Christ, setting aside all human authority, and acknowledge 
that no witness is valid for the development of doctrine and for the ordering of 
life other than what is expressed in these writings.  94
 The kind of authority, then, which Schleiermacher understands scripture to 
possess, is the kind of authority that norms “the development of doctrine” and “the 
ordering of life.”  According to him, scripture has constitutive authority as a language-
forming norm for Christian thought and piety.  It also has critical authority, which enables 
the Christian church to sort out, by the standard of scripture, misinterpretations of that 
language and thought.  As scripture is used in these ways, it exerts authority that norms 
the development of doctrine. 
 Cf., Schleiermacher’s sermon entitled, “On the Handing Over of the Confession As Giving an Account 94
for the Ground of Hope,” in Nicol, Reformed but Ever Reforming, 41.  Italics are mine.
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  But in addition, according to Schleiermacher, scripture has authority not only to 
norm Christian faith or doctrine, but also to norm Christian life.  This is so because, for 
him, the New Testament provides a “divine” template for a particular way of life, a way 
of living that is based upon the words and actions of one whose life is worthy of imitation 
due to his perfect God-consciousness.  This is the sense, for Schleiermacher, in which the 
principle of love as it is articulated and defined in the writings of the New Testament, 
exerts normative authority.  Moreover, those passages that underscore the high 
importance of this concept, the concept of love, define the church’s identity and mission 
in the world: to love God and all of humanity, as Jesus did.  These are some of the ways 
in which scripture exerts authority that norms the ordering of life. 
 In the next and final chapter, I will offer an evaluation of Schleiermacher’s 
doctrine of biblical authority.  Also, I will identify some of the advantages that accrue to 
his “third way” of understanding the authority of scripture.  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Chapter Seven: Conclusions and Implications: The Strengths of Schleiermacher’s 
Understanding of Biblical Authority 
 In Chapter Two of this study, I asserted that Schleiermacher’s understanding of 
biblical authority represents a third way to consider this much-discussed doctrine in 
Christian theology, as it does not fit neatly in either content-based/supernaturalist or 
function-based/rationalist categories.  In subsequent chapters I have tried to explicate his 
conception of biblical authority.  Chapter Three focused on his doctrine of revelation and 
his understanding that God is revealed in and through the world, in the feeling of absolute 
dependence, and in the revelation of God in Jesus Christ.  I presented evidence to the 
effect that, although Schleiermacher believes in divine revelation, he nonetheless does not 
believe there is warrant for the claim of a direct connection between divine revelation and 
scripture.  I unpacked his understanding of the meaning of inspiration in Chapter Four.  
Here, I made the case that, for Schleiermacher, the locus of inspiration is the authors of 
scripture, rather than their words, and that he understands the agent of inspiration, the 
Holy Spirit, to be the common spirit of the church. 
 Chapter Five launched a more focused view of Schleiermacher’s doctrine of 
biblical authority.  Here, I introduced his view that the New Testament is the first 
recorded expression of Christian faith, and, that as such, it serves as a kind of touchstone 
or check on later generations.  I explained in this chapter why Schleiermacher does not 
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regard scripture as the starting point for Christian faith.  Among other reasons, he 
believes that faith springs from the effects of the Redeemer, rather than from scripture.  In 
brief, he feels that people catch the faith from seeing it at work in people they know 
rather than by reading about it in a book. 
 Chapter Six continued the explanation of Schleiermacher’s understanding of 
scripture by zeroing in on why he believes it has normative authority in the church.  Here, 
I identified what I believe to be Schleiermacher’s “canon within the canon,” and why he 
ascribed normative authority to some parts of scripture over other parts.  I discussed his 
dismissal of the notion that the Old Testament shares the same normative worth as the 
New and the priority he placed upon sections of the New Testament that reported the 
words and deeds of Christ and that discussed the subjects of Christian and divine love. 
 My aims in this final chapter are twofold.  First, I want to respond to 
Schleiermacher’s controversial view regarding the status of the Old Testament in the 
Christian canon and it’s normative worth and inspiration in comparison to the New.  
Second, I want to discuss what I see as two significant strengths of his understanding of 
biblical authority. 
  
A Weakness: Schleiermacher’s Understanding of the Old Testament 
 In Christian Faith, §132, Schleiermacher makes two declarations regarding the 
Old Testament as it compares to the New.  First, he asserts that the Old Testament 
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writings do not share the normative worth of the New Testament writings.  Second, he 
asserts that they do not share the inspiration of the New Testament writings.  1
 Regarding the non-inspiration of the Old Testament, he contends that the 
inspiration of the Old Testament texts was not the activity of the same Spirit of Christ at 
work in the church.  From Paul’s treatment of the Law in Galatians and Romans, he 
argues that if Paul is right to claim that the Law lacks the power of the Spirit from which 
the Christian life must spring, then it cannot be claimed that the Law is inspired by the 
same Spirit.  He notes that Paul writes that God sends the Spirit into our hearts by virtue 
of our joining with Christ.  He adds that Christ himself never represents the sending of 
the Spirit “as the return of something that was already present before and then afterward 
disappeared for a time.”  2
 Regarding the inferior status of the Old Testament as an authoritative norm, 
Schleiermacher argues that it can serve as neither a constitutive nor a critical norm for 
Christian faith.  That is, the Old Testament writings cannot function as a language-
forming norm, nor are they well-suited to evaluate religious thinking that purports to be 
Christian.  If one accepts his worldview, Schleiermacher is right to assert that ideas are 
present in the Old Testament that Christians cannot appropriate as pure expressions of 
their piety.  Indeed, there are some Christian doctrines, including, of course, the religious 
 Schleiermacher, Christian Faith, §132.1
 Ibid., §132.2.2
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significance that Jesus has for Christians, that are new to the Christian faith and are, 
therefore, doctrines for which there are no Old Testament proofs. 
 On balance, I admit that my disagreement with Schleiermacher’s claim regarding 
the non-inspiration of the Old Testament has negligible impact on what I believe is his 
larger claim that the Old Testament does not share the normative worth of the New 
Testament.  Why is this so?  It is because whatever one claims regarding the inspiration 
of the Old Testament, its authority is for a specific community, and not for the community 
founded by Christ.  In response to Schleiermacher’s argument, however, I do not feel that 
for the Old Testament writings to be inspired, it is necessary that the common spirit of the 
church be responsible for their production.  They may be inspired by the common spirit 
of the people of Israel, as Schleiermacher himself readily admits.   That full divine 3
authority came with the revelation of God in Christ, does not mean that there was no 
divine influence upon the writers of the Old Testament.  This is especially true in light of 
Schleiermacher’s belief in the potentiality of universal inspiration.   In the New 4
Testament passages to which Schleiermacher alludes—Romans 7:6ff. and 8:3—Paul is 
not making any claim regarding the inspiration of the Old Testament, or lack of it.  Nor is 
he asserting anything regarding the presence or activity in the world of holy spirit before 
the coming of Christ. 
 Ibid.3
 See Chapter Four.4
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 Furthermore, his argument that “God sends the Spirit into our hearts by virtue of 
our joining with Christ,” in no way denies that divine spirit was active before the coming 
of Christ.  In fact, the Old Testament is replete with references to the presence and 
activity of  “divine spirit.”    Also, that Christ never represents the sending of the Spirit 5
“as the return of something that was already present before and then afterward 
disappeared for a time,” does little to prove that divine spirit was not present before the 
advent of Christ.  The silence of Jesus on this subject does not warrant the repudiation of 
divine influence upon the Old Testament authors. 
 Schleiermacher’s contention that the Old Testament is unable to act as a 
constitutive or critical norm for Christian doctrines is based on this underlying reason: he 
understands that Old Testament writings express Jewish, not Christian, religion.  For him, 
Christianity was a completely new religion and stood in the same relation, religiously 
speaking, to Judaism as to paganism, notwithstanding its historical ties to the former.   6
Since his unwillingness to grant normative authority to the Old Testament is so closely 
tied to his view of the church’s relation to Judaism,  of chief concern is his argument that 7
Christianity is not to be understood as a continuation or development of Judaism. 
 See, e.g., Genesis 6:3; Exodus 31:3; 1 Chronicles 28:12; 1 Sam. 10:6-7; Psalm 143:10; 139:7; Nehemiah 5
9:30; Isaiah 30:1-2; 63:10-14. 
 Schleiermacher, Christian Faith, §12. 6
 Paul E. Capetz suggests that perhaps Schleiermacher’s insistence that the Old Testament is inferior to the 7
New is due to his conviction that Christianity is superior to Judaism.  Capetz, “Friedrich Schleiermacher on 
the Old Testament,” 314.  For an in-depth treatment on Schleiermacher’s view of the Old Testament, see 
Capetz’s fine essay.
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 Among those who disagreed with Schleiermacher on the strict disconnection of 
Christianity from Judaism was D. F. Strauss.  Strauss believed that in his religion Jesus 
was a Jew.  He understood that even in its christological faith the church was still 
primarily a Jewish phenomenon.  For him, the New Testament’s witness to Jesus as the 
messiah was born of a continuation of motifs found in the Old Testament.  Hence, for 
Strauss, the Old Testament and its interpretation in second-temple Judaism were the 
formative influences upon the presentation of Jesus in the Gospels.  8
 Whether or not Christianity was a completely new religion, standing “in the same 
relation, religiously speaking, to Judaism as to paganism,” is arguable.  And one may 
certainly grant Schleiermacher’s assertion that Old Testament writings do not share the 
normative worth of the New, if only on the basis that Christ had not yet come.  In this 
sense, he is technically correct “[t]hat the Jewish codex does not contain any normative 
statements of faith regarding distinctively Christian doctrines.”   However, one must 9
accept the fact that Jesus was firmly rooted in the Old Testament Jewish tradition.  His 
Jewish character is undeniably portrayed in the Gospels. 
 For example, Jesus’ central message concerned the coming of God’s sovereign 
reign (“the kingdom of God”), and he called his fellow Jews to be prepared to receive it.  
 Cf., David Friedrich Strauss, The Life of Jesus Critically Examined, ed. Peter C. Hodgson, trans. George 8
Eliot, Lives of Jesus Series (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1972), 773; Capetz, “Friedrich Schleiermacher on 
the Old Testament,” 313-14.
 Schleiermacher, Brief Outline of Theology As a Field of Study, §115.  If one assumes that no “distinctively 9
Christian doctrines” could have preceded the appearance of Christ, then Schleiermacher’s assertion is valid.
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This theme was a key Old Testament theme.   Capetz claims that Jesus’ teaching and 10
ministry were firmly rooted in the Old Testament/Jewish tradition when he writes:         
Without rejecting the Torah in principle, he differentiated between greater and 
lesser commandments in it.  He continued aspects of the prophetic tradition in his 
concern for the poor and the oppressed.  He pointed to God’s providential care in 
the ordering of nature as had Israel’s wisdom teachers before him.  11
 Richard Niebuhr spoke of the faith that came to expression in Jesus’ words and 
deeds as a paradigmatic illustration of Israel’s “radical” or thoroughgoing monotheism.  
The historic significance of early Christianity, as Niebuhr noted, is that it made this faith 
available to non-Jews without requiring their conversion to Judaism.   This crucial step 12
required a sifting of the Jewish scriptures for the purpose of discerning what was still 
valid for the new community.  But this development did not negate the connection 
between Jesus’ faith in God and the faith of Israel to which he was heir. 
 Rudolf Bultmann emphasized that no matter how critical Jesus may have been in 
relation to the other Jewish teachers of his day, the content of his preaching was 
nothing else than true Old Testament-Jewish faith in God radicalized in the 
direction of the great prophets’ preaching. . . . [T]he concepts of God, world, and 
man, of Law and grace, of repentance and forgiveness in the teaching of Jesus are 
not new in comparison with those of the Old Testament and Judaism, however 
radically they may be understood.  And his critical interpretation of the Law, in 
spite of its radicality, likewise stands within the scribal discussion about it.  13
 See, for example, 1 Chronicles 29:11-12; Isaiah 10:5-19; 45:6,7,12; 46:9-10; Psalm 103:10; Daniel 2:21; 10
7:13-14, 27. 
 Capetz, “Friedrich Schleiermacher on the Old Testament,” 315.11
 H. Richard Niebuhr, Radical Monotheism and Western Culture (New York: Harper, 1970), 39-40.12
 Rudolf Bultmann, Theology of the New Testament, trans. Kendrick Grobel, 2 vols. (New York: Scribner, 13
1955), 1:34-35.
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Capetz notes that even the love-command that has been so important in Christian ethics 
(and in Schleiermacher’s preaching) is derived from Jesus’ summary of the Torah.  14
 Jesus’ use of and reference to Old Testament writings is further evidence of his 
Jewish character.  For example, here are just a few samples of some of his references to 
the Old Testament in the Gospel of John:  15
 —“And just as Moses lifted up the serpent in the wilderness, so must the Son of 
Man be lifted up” (John 3:14; Numbers 21:9). 
 —“Very truly, I tell you, it was not Moses who gave you the bread from heaven, 
but it is my Father who gives you the true bread from heaven” (John 6:32; Ex. 16:4, 15). 
 —“It is written in the prophets, ‘And they shall all be taught by God’” (John 6:45; 
Isaiah 54:13). 
 —“As the scripture has said, ‘Out of the believer’s heart shall flow rivers of living 
water’” (John 7:38; Isaiah 44:3; 58:11).   
 When he spoke of the importance of love for God and neighbor, Jesus derived his 
words from a summary of the Torah (Matthew 22:34-40).  Further, the New Testament 
records the story of a time when Jesus discussed the Old Testament with two disciples on 
 Capetz, “Friedrich Schleiermacher on the Old Testament,” 316.14
Schleiermacher’s preference for the Gospel of John has often been noted, not least by Schleiermacher 15
himself, who tried, in his lectures on the life of Jesus to argue for the Fourth Gospel’s priority to the 
Synoptics.  Cf., Dawn DeVries, “Schleiermacher on the Word Made Flesh,” in Jesus Christ in the 
Preaching of Calvin and Schleiermacher, Columbia Series in Reformed Theology (Louisville, KY: 
Westminster John Knox Press, 1996), 48.
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the way to Emmaus, that he began with Moses and all the prophets, and that he 
“interpreted to them the things about himself in all the scriptures” (Luke 24:27).  16
 In addition, there is ample evidence in the biblical text that neither Jesus nor Paul 
viewed their ministry as the creation of a new religion, but rather as the continuation, 
even the fulfillment of Judaism.   For instance, the Gospel of Matthew attributes to Jesus 17
this saying: “Do not think that I have come to abolish the law or the prophets; I have 
come not to abolish but to fulfill” (Matthew 5:17).   
 Certainly, although Schleiermacher was right to locate what is new about 
Christianity in the religious significance that Jesus has for Christians, to say that Jesus is 
of central importance to them is not to say that everything important in Christianity began 
with him.   Neither can it be said that Jesus was not rooted in Jewish tradition.  Jesus’ 18
Jewish character is undeniable.  This means that Jesus’ upbringing in the Jewish tradition 
and his exposure to and use of Old Testament writings must have played an undeniable 
role in his God-consciousness.  This, of course, leaves in doubt the magnitude of the 
chasm between the Christian and Jewish intuitions and therefore, challenges 
Schleiermacher’s claim that Christianity must be viewed as a totally new religion that has 
no significant connection to Judaism. 
 Similarly, Paul often quoted from the Old Testament in his writings.  For example, in Galatians 4, he 16
refers to an Old Testament allegory about Sarah and Hagar.  Based on that Old Testament story, he 
commanded the Galatians to drive out the trouble-making legalists in their midst.  His warrant for doing so 
is an Old Testament text, and he quotes it, assuming that his readers would recognize its authority: “But 
what does the scripture say? ‘Drive out the slave and her child; for the child of the slave will not share the 
inheritance with the child of the free woman’” (Galatians 4:30; Genesis 21:10).
 See, e.g., Matthew 5:17; Romans 11:1-27; Galatians 6:16. 17
 See also, Capetz, 322.18
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 That the Old Testament cannot be used as an authority for Christian writings does 
not mean that it cannot be used for devotional purposes.  Schleiermacher himself 
acknowledges that “Christ and the apostles themselves refer to the Old Testament 
writings as if to divine authorities advantageous for Christianity.”   That is, he seems 19
willing to acknowledge the influence of Israelitish piety on Christians.  He is willing to 
affirm that the earliest Christians found some of the Old Testament writings to be 
beneficial and helpful.  He admits that Paul, for example, attested to the usefulness of the 
Old Testament writings.   In the same proposition, he writes that “even the noblest 20
psalms always contain something that Christian piety (christliche Frömmigkeit) cannot 
appropriate as its purest expression.”   So, even as he acknowledges that there are some 21
expressions in the Psalms, which cannot serve as either a constitutive or critical norm for 
Christian faith, he seems to acknowledge in the same sentence that there are some 
expressions there, which may be so appropriated.  So, while he does not accept the 
normative value of the Old Testament writings, he does envision the utility of at least 
some of those writings.  
 To sum up, Schleiermacher does not believe that Old Testament writings are 
normative for Christian faith.  The Christian religious consciousness is not rooted in the 
Old Testament, but in the experience of Christ.  This does not mean, however, that 
Christianity does not have its roots in Judaism, or that it is not organically related to it.  
 Schleiermacher, Christian Faith, §132.3.19
 Ibid.  Schleiermacher refers to Romans 15:4; 1 Corinthians 10:11; and 2 Timothy 3:16 just here.20
 Schleiermacher, Christian Faith, §132.2.21
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Jesus was deeply rooted in the Jewish tradition, and his Jewish character surely played a 
significant role in his God-consciousness.  Neither does this mean that the Old Testament 
cannot provide useful expressions of piety (fromm, Frömmigkeit) for Christians.    22
Strengths of Schleiermacher’s Conception of Biblical Authority 
 Now, I want to identify what I see are two strengths of Schleiermacher’s doctrine 
of biblical authority.  The first is that it recognizes that scripture is both a human and a 
divine product.   
It Allows for a High View of Both Scripture and Church 
 As I demonstrated in Chapter Three, although Schliermacher understands that 
God is revealed in and through the world, in the feeling of absolute dependence, and in 
Christ, the supreme divine revelation, he conceives of only an indirect connection of 
identity between divine revelation and scripture.  He argues that there is no warrant for 
the claim that the authoring of scripture directly and literally originated with God.   
 Likewise, although he believes that the individual books of the New Testament 
are inspired by the Holy Spirit and that their collection has arisen under the guidance of 
the Holy Spirit,  he does not subscribe to the doctrine of inspiration as it is commonly 23
held among content-based supernaturalists: that the locus of inspiration is the words of 
 Perhaps these are questions for further study: Since the Old Testament does not directly offer the 22
immediate literature that reflects Jesus’ redemptive activity, how could it be considered as sacred literature 
for Christians?  If there are some sections of the Old Testament that merit canonical standing in the 
Christian Bible, what are they?  What is the Old Testament “canon within the canon” for Christians?
 Schleiermacher, Christian Faith, §130.23
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scripture.  Furthermore, as I explained in Chapter Four, Schleiermacher understands the 
Holy Spirit much differently than do content-based supernaturalists; he views the Holy 
Spirit to be the common or shared spirit of the church.  The bottom line of all of the 
above is that he understands the Christian Bible to be a human document. 
 However, he also holds in tension with his conviction that the divine spirit is not 
responsible for or the author of the words of scripture his belief that God’s spirit 
influenced scripture’s human authors.  Consequently, Schleiermacher also believed that 
God was active at some level in the process of the writing of scripture. 
 This same co-presence and co-activity of the supernatural and the natural is 
apparent in Schleiermacher’s understanding of how the biblical canon was assembled.  
For, although he understands the process of canon collection to be a thoroughly human 
process,  he also attributed its determination to the Holy Spirit. 24
 What this means is that he takes a mediating position between the content-based 
supernaturalists and the function-based rationalists on the nature of scripture.  For him, 
scripture is not the inerrant, inspired, and divinely-revealed document that many 
supernaturalists understand it to be.  However, neither is he willing to claim that God is 
wholly absent from and uninvolved in the process, something which rationalists are 
inclined to do.      
 The significance of this stance is that it may allow us to formulate a reasonable, if 
yet murky answer to a question I raised in the last chapter: Where is authority located in 
 Schleiermacher, Brief Outline, §110.24
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the Christian religion?  Is it in the canon itself or in the community of faith?  I suggested 
in Chapter 1 that content-based supernaturalists tend to assert the authority of scripture 
over that of the church.  Kevin Vanhoozer, for example, claims that final authority resides 
in the divinely authorized and appropriated discourse of the canon.   Nor does 25
Vanhoozer believe that scripture’s authority is conferred upon it by the church, but that it 
possesses inherent authority due to its status as an inspired document.   On the other 26
hand, function-based rationalists, such as David Kelsey, tend to attribute authority to the 
church.   They assert that whatever authority scripture exercises, it is, indeed, a 27
conferred authority. 
 Once again, Schleiermacher takes a mediating position in contrast to the above 
perspectives.  He claims that the Holy Spirit was active in the canonization process and 
continues to be active in the decision-making of the church.  At the same time, as I 
demonstrated in Chapter Five, he recognizes the authority of the church since the canon 
obtained its present form through the decision of the church.  In light of this truth, it 
seems unreasonable to claim that the authority of scripture is not one that is conferred 
upon it by the church.  Moreover, Schleiermacher asserts that it is the church’s 
responsibility to continue to investigate what is canonical and normative, based on what 
contributes to the preservation and well-being of the community of faith.  In other words, 
 Vanhoozer, The Drama of Doctrine: A Canonical-Linguistic Approach to Christian Theology, 166.25
 Ibid., 165.26
 See Farley and Hodgson, “Scripture and Tradition,” 80-81; Kelsey, Proving Doctrine: The Uses of 27
Scripture in Modern Theology, 207-212.
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according to him, the church has influence over what in scripture constitutes normative 
authority.   This is a high view of the church.   28
 While he attributed authority to the church for the role it played and continues to 
play in the determination of the canon, there is no doubt that he also ascribed authority to 
some sections of the New Testament itself, as I showed in Chapters Five and Six.  Those 
sections act as a rule or standard by which the experience of the church is to be measured.  
In such cases, of course, the church is submitting to the authority of scripture.  This is a 
high view of scripture. 
 Therefore, to the question of where authority is located, in the biblical canon or in 
the church, Schleiermacher’s measured answer would surely be: “It is located in both.”  
What this means for this study is that one of the strengths of his conception of biblical 
authority is that it acknowledges and accentuates the value and importance of the/a faith 
community, while at the same time, acknowledging scripture’s inherent authority.  29
 Schleiermacher, Christian Faith, §130.4.  For me, part of the brilliance of Schleiermacher’s position is 28
that it is somewhat of a hybrid of the positions stated above.  For him, authority is located in both scripture 
and the church, and the Holy Spirit both indwells the church, as its common spirit, and plays a significant 
role in the creation and collection of the New Testament canon.
 Stanley Hauerwas argues well for the authority of both church and scripture.  He asserts that in order to 29
read the Bible “Christianly,” one needs training in Christian virtue, and this is largely the work of the 
Christian community.  He goes on to make the claim, likely one with which Schleiermacher would 
disagree, that the Reformation principle sola scriptura is a heresy, because it assumes “that the text of 
Scripture makes sense separate from a Church that gives it sense.”  See Stanley Hauerwas, Unleashing the 
Scripture: Freeing the Bible from Captivity to America (Nashville, TN: Abingdon, 1993), 155, n. 7.
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It Allows Faith and Historical-Biblical Criticism to Coexist 
 A second strength of Schleiermacher’s doctrine of biblical authority is that it 
allows faith and the historical-critical method to coexist.  That is, his understanding 
empowers scholars, students, and lay people to be thoroughly critical of the biblical text. 
 In the Introduction to this study I asserted that one of the factors that may explain 
the erosion of biblical authority since the Enlightenment is the advent of historical 
criticism.  Accordingly, some have seen the historical-critical method as an enemy of the 
church and a threat to faith.   For example, one prominent evangelical declares that 30
“orthodoxy and the historical-critical method are deadly enemies that are antithetical and 
cannot be reconciled without the destruction of one or the other.”   Alan Johnson adds: 31
“[T]he current use of the historical-critical method even in the hands of its most 
responsible practitioners has led to historical-theological schizophrenia, while the 
articulation of an adequate basis for religious authority flounders.”  32
 On the contrary, Schleiermacher does not consider critical examination of the 
biblical text to be unfriendly to Christian faith.  He acknowledges that he does not want 
to restrain biblical criticism.   Indeed, his exegetical writings demonstrate that he 33
embraces the historical-critical method and its findings.  
 Harrisville and Sundberg, The Bible in Modern Culture: Baruch Spinoza to Brevard Childs, 10-13, 64. 30
 Harold Lindsell, Battle for the Bible (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 1976), 82. 31
 Alan F. Johnson, “The Historical-Critical Method: Egyptian Gold or Pagan Precipice,” Journal of the 32
Evangelical Theological Society 26, no. 1 (March 1983): 10.  Johnson lists five objectionable features of 
radical criticism: historical skepticism, antisupernaturalism, separation of history and theology, denial of 
the unity of Scripture, and noncognitivism of divine revelation.  Johnson, “The Historical-Critical Method: 
Egyptian Gold or Pagan Precipice,” 10.
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 Before explaining why biblical criticism does not intimidate Schleiermacher’s 
model of biblical authority or threaten faith for him, I need to add a very brief word 
regarding the times in which he lived.  Schleiermacher’s approach to theology was 
certainly influenced by several factors, not the least of which is that he lived in the wake 
of the Enlightenment.  And as Vial notes in his book, Schleiermacher: A Guide for the 
Perplexed, two of the greatest challenges left by the Enlightenment for Christian theology 
were the rise of science and the rise of historical consciousness.   These challenges 34
called into question the plausibility and historicity of some of the biblical accounts.   
 As an heir of the Enlightenment, it was important for Schleiermacher to find a 
way to understand faith, as well as biblical authority, without being inconsistent with an 
understanding from science or history.  In other words, it was important to him that faith 
is consistent with intellectual life and with the scientific, historical, and theological 
advancements of his day.  Regarding his doctrine of scripture, for example, 
Schleiermacher admits that he is willing to accept the “scientific” findings of historical-
critical research.  He confirms this when he writes: “But as for our doctrine of the canon 
and of inspiration as a special activity of the Spirit producing the canon, we must take 
care not to make any claims that conflict with the universally recognized results of 
historical research.”  35
 In this section, I am indebted to Ted Vial’s analysis of the setting of Schleiermacher’s theology in 34
Schleiermacher: A Guide for the Perplexed, 85-90.  
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 To clarify what this means for him and to illustrate my point, I refer to Vial’s 
analysis of Schleiermacher’s doctrine of Christ.  Vial notes that Schleiermacher’s 
generation found itself confronted with two ways of approaching christology.  On the one 
side were the confessionalists and traditionalists, who believed that Jesus effects salvation 
supernaturally.  On the other side were the rationalists for whom Jesus was seen as a great 
moral teacher.  Regarding the christology of the traditionalists, Vial asserts:  
Its weakness is that it [their understanding of the work and identity of Christ] 
seemed to Schleiermacher to call for a sacrifice of the intellect . . . [for a denial 
of] all the best fruits of the human intellectual and cultural endeavors that were so 
exciting and empowering in his day.   36
  
On the other hand, the strength of the rationalist view, Vial suggests, “is that it does not 
require one to choose between scientific and philosophical advances and Jesus.”   37
 One of Schleiermacher’s chief critics understood his reluctance to make that 
choice.  Karl Barth writes of him that he was a man  
who felt responsible . . . for the intellectual and moral foundations of the cultural 
world into which a man was born at the end of the eighteenth century.  He 
wanted in all circumstances to be a modern man as well as a Christian 
theologian.  38
   
Likewise, Jack Forstman asserts that, for Schleiermacher, there was no alternative to 
being a modern man, for as an heir of the Enlightenment, his intention was “to guard 
against [making a sacrifice of the intellect] at every turn.”  He explains:  
 Vial, Schleiermacher: A Guide for the Perplexed, 88.36
 Ibid.37
 Karl Barth, Protestant Theology in the Nineteenth Century, trans. Brian Cozens and John Bowdon (1959; 38
repr., Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2002), 314.
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For Schleiermacher as for the Enlightenment there can be no conflict between 
scientific statements (understanding ‘scientific’ in the wider sense) and 
theological statements.  If there are two contradictory statements, one with and 
the other without solid support, then the first must be accepted and the second 
rejected.  If one makes a theological statement that differs in no apparent way 
from a scientific statement but does not offer the kind of support for it that 
scientific statements require then that statement is suspect.  It cannot be accepted 
without sacrificing the canons for understanding that one must continue to 
uphold.  39
 Schleiermacher’s explanation of positions he took in Christian Faith to his friend, 
Dr. Lücke, confirms his intention to be both “a modern man and a Christian theologian.”  
For instance, he explains to his friend that in the Glaubenslehre he aimed to show “that 
every dogma that truly represents an element of our Christian consciousness can be so 
formulated that it remains free from entanglements with science.”   Thus, it is important, 40
for him, that Christian faith and whatever post-Enlightenment intellectual advancements 
of his day may prove to have been made are able to exist side-by-side. 
 What makes such a coexistence possible?  I want to identify two justifications.  
First, Schleiermacher believes that it is not possible to equate scripture with divine 
revelation, as I have already discussed.  What I am suggesting here is that there is a 
definite cause-effect relationship between Schleiermacher’s unwillingness to accept the 
alleged divine origin of scripture and his willingness to embrace a worldview that did not 
threaten Christian faith.  As I have mentioned repeatedly, for him, the biblical texts are 
human reports of the revelation of God in Jesus Christ.  They are not inerrant, inspired, 
 Jack Forstman, “Barth, Schleiermacher and The Christian Faith,” Union Seminary Quarterly Review 21, 39
no. 1 (November 1965): 306-7.
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and revelatory in each and every word—at least, not in the sense or to the extent that 
many content-based supernaturalists understand them to be.  We may easily theorize that 
one of the values of understanding Christian writings as human documents is the 
opportunity thus afforded to scholars to be thoroughly critical in their approach to the 
biblical text, without feeling the need to defend a theory of divine authorship. 
 A second reason that Christian faith and scientific advancements can coexist in 
Schleiermacher’s theology, is his firm conviction that faith is not founded on a document. 
I addressed this subject in Chapter Five.  For him, scripture is not the starting point of 
faith.  Rather, faith begins in the shared experience of Christ in the community of 
Christians.  This explains why Schleiermacher is not afraid of the findings of biblical 
criticism: they will never be able to imperil faith’s validity, since faith is based on an 
experience instead of what may be written in a text.   
 Schleiermacher refers to the experience of redemption in Christ as what is 
“essential.”  He writes that he is assured that even if criticism challenges long-held 
beliefs regarding the New Testament, “[w]e would not lose anything essential: Christ 
remains the same and our faith in him remains the same.”   Again, he suggests that 41
Christians must be willing to rid themselves of everything that is secondary and based on 
presuppositions that are no longer valid.  His reason for this point of view is “so that we 
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might avoid becoming ensnared in useless controversies that might lead many easily to 
give up hope of ever grasping what is essential.”  42
 Vial summarizes well the reason faith and science are able to exist side-by-side in 
Schleiermacher’s system:  
By defining religion as a matter of experience (feeling) rather than a matter of 
knowing, like natural science and philosophy, or morals, and by defining 
dogmatic theology as a second-order expression of religious experience,  43
Schleiermacher declares some of the most troubling of these questions to be a 
category mistake.    44
He understood that there was “an eternal covenant between the living Christian faith and 
completely free, independent scientific inquiry, so that faith does not hinder science and 
science does not exclude faith.”   Vial identifies this “eternal covenant” as “a 45
nonaggression pact, because each [Christian faith and scientific inquiry] uses its own 
methods to undertake different tasks, tasks that do not overlap.”   As a result, the 46
historical examination of the biblical texts does not threaten Christian faith.  Vial 
summarizes: 
The Bible holds a special place for Schleiermacher because it is the first recorded 
expression of Christian experience.  But it is that experience, the experience of 
redemption found in the Christian community, that is the source of faith and the 
bedrock of theology.  If it turns out that we know less than we thought we did 
 Ibid.42
 Schleiermacher suggests that theological statements are of a different order from scientific statements.  43
He asserts that they are articulations of religious experience, rather than propositions about the world 
(Christian Faith, §15).
 Vial, Schleiermacher: A Guide for the Perplexed, 85.44
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about certain events or certain authors, that does not call into question that 
experience of faith found in the community.  47
Because the experience of redemption, rather than scripture, is the foundation of faith, 
there is no need to divorce faith from rigorous critical thought that accepts the results and 
methods of the sciences.  That such a significant consequence is consistent with and 
permitted by Schleiermacher’s doctrine of biblical authority is one of the great strengths 
of that doctrine. 
 This study set out to demonstrate that Schleiermacher provides us with a third 
way of understanding the doctrine of biblical authority.  That this alternative to content-
based/supernaturalist and function-based/rationalist models has significant and distinctive 
advantages over models in these two categories, is clear to me.  Schleiermacher’s 
conception of the authority of scripture is a robust one. 
 That understanding of biblical authority claims that scripture’s authority does not 
lie in some property of the texts themselves that historians or unbelievers can take away.  
It acknowledges that scripture is both a divine and a human product, and that as a 
corollary, ecclesial and biblical authority exist side-by-side.  It claims that scripture 
constitutes the language of piety, viewing it as a record of experience rather than a set of 
propositions about the world.  It articulates the communal nature of Christian faith, 
underscoring the value and authority of the Christian community.  It does not require 
people to contradict what they know to be the case about science, history, and philosophy.  
It provides the irreplaceable witness of those who knew Jesus in the flesh, and, therefore, 
 Ibid., 86.47
!194
supplies the norm and standard for experience and faith that purports to be Christian.  It 
alleges that scripture is not the foundation of Christian faith, but the first expression of it, 
and therefore, normative in a way that other presentations of Christian faith are not.  To 
be sure, Schleiermacher’s understanding of biblical authority clarifies and affirms what 
may be a continuing and central role for scripture in Christian religion today.  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